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 My heartfelt thanks go to my thesis committee, Dr. Mark Driscoll (thesis advisor) and Dr. 
Lorraine Aragon (second advisor, reader). Dr. Driscoll has been passionate and caring, and his 
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personal life. I could still recall my excitement when I explored Boys Love for the first time in a 
course with him back in 2018 and my delight after he said he would be willing to be my advisor 
for this project. I am glad and honored that I kept learning with and from him throughout most of 
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 Dr. Aragon has been professionally supportive, giving me the courage that I needed. She 
was dedicated to examining this thesis in a nuanced and attentive manner, and her suggestions 
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her, I got the chance to research Thai Boys Love series. The outcomes became a very significant 
foundation of this larger-scale project. 
 I wish to sincerely thank Dr. Robin Visser. The course (research seminar) with her in my 
junior year made me fully equipped to proceed, and at times she shared with me relevant articles 
and illuminating insights for my thesis, although she was not on the thesis committee. She has 
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“please invite me over to your house again for the wonderful meal and talk in the future.” 
 I am extremely grateful to Dr. Morgan Pitelka. The course (thesis seminar) with him in 
my senior year offered me confidence and numerous fundamental ideas in composing this thesis. 
I asked him to be rigorous about my writing, and he has provided countless valuable feedback 
for me to refine and further improve my work. His generous guidance continued to the very last 
day when I submitted my thesis. 
 I would like to thank Dr. Janpanit Surasin at University of Wisconsin-Madison. I studied 
first-year Thai with her at SEASSI (Southeast Asian Studies Summer Institute) in the beautiful 
summer of 2019. Familiarizing myself with the Thai language channeled me to several domains 
during my study-abroad semester in Thailand and my preparation of this thesis. She cared about 
my personal growth, and we always sent messages to each other on social media. 
 I had the pleasure to take courses and achieve a Japanese minor with my professors, 
Iwashita Fumi, Aratake Yuki, and Sawamura Katsu. Japanese courses at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill are vibrant and amazing, and my knowledge in the Japanese language 
enabled me to unlock more scholarship that embellished this thesis. 
 This list by no means includes every single person who has helped me throughout my 
undergraduate career. I hope to thank them all here, and I firmly believe that they represent the 
best of education in the United States, in terms of integrity, creativity, academic freedom, critical 
thinking, and generous knowledge imparting. 
 My deepest gratitude goes to my family in Beijing and Kunming, Zhang Jia (my father), 
Ye Min (my mother), Zhang Yunting (my paternal grandfather), Huang Heyun (my paternal 
grandmother), Ye Xinye (my maternal grandfather), and Li Qinxin (my maternal grandmother). 
 3 
They probably will not grasp what this thesis is about. Nonetheless, I have been blessed by their 
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am really into, and maintains their faith in me. They are always by my side, empowering me and 
cultivating me into an upright, responsible, determined, and optimistic person. Now as an Asian 
Studies and Communication Studies double major, I could not ask for more. Until this moment 
(April 2021), I have been away from home for more than one year primarily due to the ongoing 
coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19). I owe them my time, and I wholeheartedly appreciate their 
attention, understanding, and devotion. 
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Starting from the mid 2010s, the world has witnessed the spectacularly rapid rise of Thai Boys 
Love series, TV series produced in Thailand that center around the homoromantic and/or 
homoerotic stories of one or more young, physically attractive, and masculine-identified male-
male couple(s). The prevalence of these series is not only present within China’s intricate and 
distinctive social landscape. In fact, China, with millions of energized and devoted enthusiasts, is 
perhaps the most significant international market for Thai Boys Love series, and these series are 
indisputably the most popular non-animated male-male-love media in China nowadays. Guided 
by three subtopics, consumption, imagination, and friction, this thesis explores the reception of 
Thai Boys Love series in China, casting light on the Chinese consumers of these series, including 
viewers/fans, subtitle groups, and event organizers, in relation to the complex societal, historical, 
and ideological dynamics in contemporary China. The detailed introduction in the beginning on 
the development of Thai Boys Love series in Thailand and their trajectory in China sets the stage 
for this thesis to delve into four noteworthy aspects regarding the reception of these series in 
China. First, it unveils the carnivalesque consumption of Thai Boys Love series safeguarded 
largely by the various self-censoring strategies most consumers are practicing to get around the 
dominant but porous governmental censorship. Second, it examines the alternative unbounded 
world portrayed in these series that appeals to most viewers given the pressures and difficulties 
they have to confront in their day-to-day lives. Third, it indicates the problematic consequences 
these series may render in terms of how they promote and reinforce the fantasized “gay paradise” 
stereotype toward Thailand and the hegemonic “gay archetype” image to regulate gay men and 
marginalize some members in the gay community. Fourth, it explicates the actual vulnerability 
 5 
of the alleged “Chinese-Thai romance” under the rise of nationalistic sentiments as well as the 
comeback of Sinocentrism among most Chinese people. It ends with a reflective discussion 
about this thesis, the limitations, and possible directions for future research. This thesis is based 
on my close reading of the most well-received Thai Boys Love series from 2014 to April 2021, 
my extensive online observations since 2016, and a wide variety of secondary sources in English, 
Chinese, Japanese, and Thai. 
 




Notes on Romanizations, Names, and the Series 
 
Throughout this thesis, other than English, I include a range of terms, concepts, and names in 
Chinese (Mandarin), Japanese, and Thai. To avoid creating potential confusion or alienation, I 
situate the native Asian scripts and details in the footnotes and provide only romanizations in the 
main text. For Mandarin, I use the internationally accepted Hanyu Pinyin system. Exceptions 
include place names and personal names outside of mainland China, which are in line with local 
conventions. For Japanese, I follow the Hepburn system and present them in Rōmaji. Please note 
that macrons signifying long Japanese vowels are applied in every case, such as Ōsaka (rather 
than Osaka). For Thai, there is an absence of a standard and universal system for transcribing 
Thai into Latin alphabets. Although I am informed by the system developed by the A.U.A. 
Language Center, all Thai words and names contained in this thesis have previous conventions 
for romanizations, such as kathoey, lakhon, place names, and personal names. Therefore, I adopt 
them directly. 
 Personal names from the East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, Korean) cultural sphere are 
written with surname first, except names for citation usage and the author’s name (Zhang Junqi 
in natural order). Some names contained in this thesis are pseudonyms. Please keep in mind that 
the natural order of Japanese names is preserved as well, such as Miyazaki Hayao (rather than 
Hayao Miyazaki). Outside of the East Asian cultural sphere, I present given name followed by 
surname in most cases. Within this thesis, exceptions include Chinese names of Chinese-Thai 
people, such as Chen Binglin for Chinese-Thai actor Ohm Pawat Chittsawangdee. Most Thai 
people have both a long, more formal name as well as a shorter, more frequently used nickname 
(a.k.a. “play name”). Thai nicknames are diverse, usually monosyllabic, and may or may not be 
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relevant to the “formal” names: AJ, Arm, Boss, Can, Frank, Gameplay, In, Japan, M, Ma-prang, 
Nice, Pi Pi, Praepailin, Third, and Top are all examples of such nicknames. For Thai people 
(mostly Thai actors and directors in this thesis), I follow the “nickname, given name, surname” 
format, such as Jaylerr/JJ Kritsanapoom Pibunsonggram and New Siwaj Sawatmaneekul. For 
Thai characters in media representations, since their given names and surnames are not always 
indicated or called, I only use their nicknames, such as Kit in 2 Moons (dir. Meesuwan; 2017), 
played by Copter Panuwat Kerdthongtavee. 
 One sector this thesis is based on is the most well-received Thai Boys Love series from 
2014 to April 2021. Let me elaborate on the word “well-received” here. I have evaluated each 
series chiefly on its domestic and international popularity (particularly in Thailand and China), 
including but not limited to the popularity of the series itself, its actors, and its related products 
(such as music videos and boxsets), how many people are acquainted with it and are willing to 
discuss it online, and the efforts of promotion. In addition to these most well-received Thai Boys 
Love series, I refer to other media works from Thailand and elsewhere whenever necessary. I am 
informed by some episodes of the Thai Boys Love series released in 2021 but before April (the 
month of thesis defense), such as 1000stars (dir. Chaiwimol; 2021). Please see Appendix for all 
included media works in this thesis and other informative ones. 
In terms of the English title of Thai Boys Love series, some are in the format “XXX: The 
Series,” such as SOTUS: The Series (dir. Samajarn; 2016), while some go without “The Series,” 
such as I Told Sunset About You (dir. Kuno; 2020). In the case of most series, it is fine to refer to 
it with or without “The Series.” For the purpose of staying consistent and orderly, in this thesis, I 
omit “The Series” at the first place if a series has one. In addition, for each series, I introduce its 
director(s) and its release year only when it shows up the first time in the chapter. For example, 
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in Chapter One, I introduce Love by Chance (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2018) first, and it becomes 
Love by Chance hereafter within that chapter. 
Last but not least, it is important to clarify that although this thesis tends to investigate 
Thai Boys Love series as a “group” and oversimplification seems inevitable, I strive to avoid 
structuring these series as a monolithic group or making any blind generalization. Recognizing 
the diversity and nuances among these series, I attempt to illuminate a range of shining points 
and noteworthy patterns of them and discuss the significance in a boarder context, while being 






In early 2019, an “idol group” named “HS Boys,” consisting of eight good-looking young men 
from Thailand, successfully finished their fan-meeting tour to mainland China. Tickets in Wuxi, 
Xiamen, Wuhan, and Chengdu1 were sold out within minutes after they were released. Fans, in a 
carnivalesque manner, expressed their exhilaration, circulated related information on online sites, 
and prepared themselves for the group’s upcoming arrival to China, regardless of whether they 
could attend the events or not. Each group member had a Chinese name and nickname, which 
were amicably called by the Chinese fans to display and continuously highlight the emotional as 
well as ethno-racial closeness with these Thai boys. However, the name “HS Boys” would sound 
unfamiliar for most people worldwide, except the Chinese fans of the imported and translated 
“Thai Boys Love series.” In fact, these same Thai boys were the main actors of Love by Chance 
(dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2018), one of the many immensely popular Thai Boys Love series. The so-
called “idol group” under the umbrella name “HS Boys” was invented and advertised only for 
consumption within China’s complicated and unique milieu by distancing these boys from the 
male-male-love series and thereby avoiding censorship. 
 This story epitomizes the fascinating dynamics between the burgeoning Thai Boys Love 
series and their Chinese consumers that this thesis examines. I define “Thai Boys Love series”2 
as a group of TV series produced in Thailand that, in the main storyline and/or at least one of the 
notable side storylines, center around the homoromantic and/or homoerotic stories of one or 
 
1 This research inspects the reception of Thai Boys Love series in mainland China. Therefore, although a “HS Boys” 
fan meeting in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) was held in the same time period, I did not include 
it. In this thesis, “China” equals “mainland China.” 
2 Thai: lakhon wai (thay) ละครวาย(ไทย) or siri wai (thay) ซีร่ีส์วาย(ไทย). ไทย means “Thai(land)” and is usually optional. 
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more young, physically attractive, and masculine-identified male-male couple(s). Examples are 
SOTUS (dir. Samajarn; 2016), Our Skyy (dir. Botta et al.; 2018), Until We Meet Again (dir. 
Sawatmaneekul; 2019) (fig. 1), TharnType 2: 7 Years of Love (dir. Passawut; 2020), and Manner 
of Death (dir. Sakveerakul and Aroonnet; 2020). Those series with male-male-love subplots are 
accounted as Thai Boys Love series as well because many viewers will skip the stories depicting 
heteronormative love and only consume the homoromantic and/or homoerotic counterparts. 
After the relationship between the two male characters in Kiss Me Again (dir. Thongjila; 2018), 
Pete and Kao, became much more popular among the audience than other male-female couples, 
the production company GMMTV edited another shortened version of this series focusing only 
on the stories between these two male characters and uploaded it to online platforms under the 
name “Pete-Kao Scene | Kiss Me Again.”3 One year later, Dark Blue Kiss (dir. Chaiwimol; 
2019), a series devoted to the love stories between Pete and Kao and another male-male couple, 
was launched by GMMTV. 
Another striking and somewhat formulaic feature of Thai Boys Love series is that most 
protagonists are university or high school students. A few have jobs, such as Arthit in SOTUS S 
(dir. Botta; 2017), but most are still around their 20s. However, increasing diversity among these 
series is noticeable, since they are no longer that school-love-centric. 
Based on the discussion above, the following categories are excluded from Thai Boys 
Love series by my definition: series that contain male-male-love contents whereas the dominant 
genre is, for instance, action or thriller, such as 3 Will be Free (dir. Pookaothong; 2019); series 
that primarily use suggestive but intensive depictions of male-male sex as an appeal, such as 
Bangkok G Stories (dir. Intaraprom; 2017); and series that represent non-masculine-identified 
 
3 See, for example, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jP1vOljyTLI (รวมซีน พีท - เกา้ ep.1-4). 
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protagonists, such as Lady Boy Friends (dir. Kullawas; 2015) and Diary of Tootsies (dir. 
Boonnitipat; 2016). 
 Here, I would like to elaborate on why I have adopted the term “Boys Love” to refer to 
this media genre. Despite certain nuances, the terms Boys Love (a.k.a. Boys’ Love, Boy’s Love, 
BL), yaoi, shōnenai (shōnen-ai), tanbi,4 fu, danmei,5 and wai6 can be used interchangeably to 
connote texts that portray romantic and/or erotic relations between young men, a phenomenon 
that originated in Japan in the 1970s.7 The choice is ultimately dependent on the consumer’s 
personal habit and cultural identification. The term “Boys Love” I am using not only can be 
better recognized in the anglophone context, but also showcases the crucial importance of “boys” 
in this genre. As noted by McLelland, “Boys Love” has nothing to do with pedophilia, an image 
that might be misread into this phrase.8 Instead, the prototype of “boys” delineates young men 
who are adorable, handsome, but not effeminate and hence deserve the attention and affection 
from a more mature person.9 Actors of Thai Boys Love series are always called “cute boys,” 
“sexy boys,” or “cool boys.”10 In addition, “Boys Love” echoes with my wording “male-male” 
instead of “gay” or “homosexual.” In Thai Boys Love series, many male characters in love with 
other boys do not disclose and articulate a gay identity, and some even refuse to embrace it. This 
topic is discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
 
4 Japanese (in order): bōizu rabu ボーイズ ラブ (a.k.a. bīeru ビーエル), やおい, 少年愛, 耽美. 
5 Mandarin (in order): 腐 (derive from the Japanese term fujoshi 腐女子, “rotten women” who enjoy male-male 
love), 耽美 (share same Chinese characters with the Japanese term tanbi). 
6 Thai: วาย (pronunciation: wai/Y; come from the Japanese term yaoi). 
7 See, for example, Mark McLelland and James Welker. “An Introduction to ‘Boys Love’ in Japan.” Boys Love 
Manga and Beyond: History, Culture, and Community in Japan, edited by Mark McLelland, Kazumi Nagaike, 
Katsuhiko Suganuma, and James Welker. University Press of Mississippi, 2015, p. 3. 
8 McLelland, Mark. “The World of Yaoi: The Internet, Censorship, and the Global ‘Boys’ Love’ Fandom.” 
University of Wollongong Faculty of Arts Archived Papers, 2005, p. 14. 
9 In China’s context, for example, there is a group of fans named “mom fans” (mama fen 妈妈粉). They see the 
young male actors in Thai Boys Love series as their sons who should be taken care of. 
10 Prasannam, Natthanai. “The Yaoi Phenomenon in Thailand and Fan/Industry Interaction.” Plaridel, vol. 16, no. 2, 
2019, p. 64. 
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 Thai Boys Love series are indisputably the most famous and well-received non-animated 
male-male-love media in China nowadays. Broadly speaking, this thesis explores the reception 
of Thai Boys Love series in China. Guided by three subtopics, consumption, imagination, and 
friction, I look into, firstly, how these series are spread and consumed in China with individual, 
organizational, and governmental involvements; secondly, in which ways these series facilitate 
certain fantasies, promote certain images, and strengthen certain stereotypes among the Chinese 
viewers; and thirdly, what could be the potential conflicts simmering below the seemingly 
harmonious relationship between these series and their Chinese consumers. 
 
Thai Boys Love Series: A Detailed Introduction 
The emergence and development of Thai Boys Love series came in the wake of an epochal time 
period in Thailand’s history. Bangkok, the capital of Thailand, witnessed a “queer boom” in the 
early twenty-first century,11 along with concomitant growing recognition, political legitimacy, 
and social inclusiveness for non-heterosexual people,12 relaxed state regulation on queer-related 
representations,13 as well as the popularization of televisions and the Internet. These evolving 
social changes in the 2000s paved the way for Thai Boys Love series. 
 I maintain that it was not until the mid 2010s that a significant amount of Thai Boys Love 
series were systematically produced, gaining both domestic and international popularity. Prior to 
the mid 2010s, there were sporadic productions of series with male-male-love contents. The 
earliest Thai series with relatively direct depictions of male-male love is considered to be Love 
 
11 Jackson, Peter A. “Bangkok’s Early Twenty-First-Century Queer Boom.” Queer Bangkok: 21st Century Markets, 
Media, and Rights, edited by Peter A. Jackson. Hong Kong University Press, 2011, pp. 17-42. 
12 Ibid., pp. 22, 34. 
13 Ünaldi, Serhat. “Back in the Spotlight: The Cinematic Regime of Representation of Kathoeys and Gay Men in 
Thailand.” Queer Bangkok: 21st Century Markets, Media, and Rights, edited by Peter A. Jackson. Hong Kong 
University Press, 2011, pp. 59-80. 
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8009 (dir. Yojiew and Uppakarn; 2004; a.k.a. Varieties of Love). It has an entirely different 
feeling compared to contemporary Thai Boys Love series: the male-male stories are presented as 
a subplot and in a manifestly reserved manner.14 Most Thai series with male-male-love contents 
in the next ten years, like Tomorrow, I’ll Still Love You (dir. Viravan; 2009) and Qi Pao (dir. 
Rungwongpanich; 2012), followed this fashion.15 
 The role Love of Siam (dir. Sakveerakul; 2007), a blockbuster movie, has played in Thai 
Boys Love media cannot be neglected. Part of the movie focuses on the reunion and love stories 
between two teenage boys, Tong and Mew,16 which became an important factor that helped 
make the movie successful and iconic worldwide. Many people know this movie for its Boys 
Love contents. The direct portrayal of the male-male romance and a one-time kiss shocked the 
audience who did not anticipate that,17 at the same time fostering a new consciousness regarding 
homosexuality in the Thai society. The two main actors of Love of Siam, Mario Maurer and Pchy 
Witwisit Hiranyawongkul, became popular globally. For example, they were invited by several 
Chinese companies to participate in various TV shows and even the state-sponsored Mid-autumn 
Festival Gala in 2012 (fig. 2).18 The “triumph” of Love of Siam gave the entertainment media 
companies in Thailand the “signal” to pay more attention to this genre and its enormous potential 
profits.19 
 
14 See, for example, Kongkiat Limpongsatorn (Alizabeth Lin). “Fuhua wuzui BL wansui! Taiguo BL jü yu kuaguo 
huaren guanzhong zhi yanjiu” 腐化無罪、BL萬歲！泰國 BL劇與跨國華人觀眾之研究 [A Study of Thailand’s 
Boys Love Drama and Its Transnational Chinese Audiences] (Master’s Thesis, National Taiwan Normal University). 
Airiti Library, 2020, p. 1. 
15 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
16 It is always controversial that whether this movie should be regarded as a “Boys Love movie” (nang wai หนังวาย) 
or not. According to the director, Matthew/Ma-deaw Chookiat Sakveerakul, this movie is celebrating a wide variety 
of loves, not just the male-male love between Tong and Mew. 
17 Farmer, Brett. “Love of Siam: Contemporary Thai Cinema and Vernacular Queerness.” Queer Bangkok: 21st 
Century Markets, Media, and Rights, edited by Peter A. Jackson. Hong Kong University Press, 2011, pp. 89, 92 
18 Limpongsatorn. A Study of Thailand’s Boys Love Drama and Its Transnational Chinese Audiences. 2020, p. 7. 
19 Bunyavejchewin, Poowin. “The Wai (Y[aoi]) Genre: Local BL Media in Thailand.” Mechadamia Conference on 
Asian Popular Cultures, Kyoto, 2018, p. 15. 
 14 
 The credit of “the first ever Thai Boys Love series” has been given to Love Sick (dir. 
Kusolkulsiri; 2014).20 This is not exactly “accurate.” One year before the release of Love Sick, a 
series named Hormones (dir. Sugmakanan and Vachiratamporn; 2013) had already showed the 
love and other dynamics among high school boys in a moderately straightforward manner. A few 
lesser-known series, like Love O-net (dir. Throngprasit; 2014),21 are also about Boys Love stories 
and prior to the debut of Love Sick. However, Love Sick, the more carefully produced series with 
explicit male-male-love contents as the main storyline, drew huge attention from domestic and 
international viewers and created impacts considered to be tantamount to Love of Siam years ago. 
Its title as “the first ever Thai Boys Love series,” on this score, not only indicates that it is the 
earliest in the perception of most viewers, but also demonstrates that they, looking back from the 
current moment, acknowledge its vital role in the overall development of Thai Boys Love series. 
The year of 2014 and the release of Love Sick are even remarked as the “turning point” for Thai 
Boys Love series and movies.22 
Since 2016 and 2017, the world has observed the mushrooming of Thai Boys Love series, 
including but not limited to Senior Secret Love: Puppy Honey (dir. Thongjila; 2016), Make It 
Right (dir. Sawatmaneekul et al.; 2016), SOTUS, Senior Secret Love: Puppy Honey 2 (dir. 
Thongjila; 2017), 2 Moons (dir. Meesuwan; 2017), Make It Right 2 (dir. Sawatmaneekul and 
Wongskulphat; 2017), and Together with Me (dir. Boonyoprakarn; 2017). These series utterly 
opened the global entertainment market, especially in Southeast Asia and East Asia. With the 
sweeping popularity of Thai Boys Love series, many consumers began to rediscover and redefine 
 
20 This is supported by many scholars (Thomas Baudinette, Kongkiat Limpongsatorn, Natthanai Prasannam, and 
etc.) and most viewers of Thai Boys Love series. 
21 The release year of Love O-net is 2015 as shown on a few influential online sites, such as MyDramaList, but 
people can notice that this series had already been uploaded to YouTube back in May 2014. 
22 Bunyavejchewin. “The Wai (Y[aoi]) Genre: Local BL Media in Thailand.” 2018, p. 23. 
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the weight of Love of Siam and Love Sick, entitling them the founder of Thai Boys Love media 
and Thai Boys Love series, respectively, in spite of a few dissents. 
 Henceforth Thai Boys Love series have maintained the momentum up to the present day, 
and Thailand has evolved into a stronghold of male-male-love media. In the year of 2020 alone, 
more than twenty Thai Boys Love series came out, making the audience titillated yet confused 
about which series they should watch first (fig. 3 and 4). Meanwhile, the “surplus” empowers the 
audience to freely choose what they actually like, thus establishing a hierarchy among Thai Boys 
Love series. Under this environment, the producers endeavor to enhance the quality of the series 
chiefly through two mechanisms: the physical attractiveness of the actors and the design of the 
storylines. This vehement competition makes Thai Boys Love series both formulaic and creative. 
Furthermore, Thai Boys Love series have become highly industrialized and commercialized, 
accompanied by related music albums, myriad derivative commodities,23 lucrative offline events, 
and ubiquitous product placements, promotions, and endorsements (fig. 5). 
 
Thai Boys Love Series in China 
Based on my extensive online observations, in China, a sufficient number of viewers formed a 
decently sized fan community of Thai Boys Love series from 2014 to 2017. They became 
increasingly aware of the existence of this community and assembled to consume together on 
Chinese online platforms, such as Bilibili24 and Weibo.25 The earliest Thai Boys Love series, 
 
23 See, for example, GMMTV’s online shop (https://www.gmm-tv.com/shop/) that sells commodities (like T-shirts, 
cups, and boxsets) relevant to the series GMMTV has produced. 
24 Bilibili 哔哩哔哩 (弹幕网), a.k.a. B Site (B zhan B站), is one of the most popular video sharing platforms in 
China. After years of development, it has become the Chinese version of YouTube, offering videos of all kinds. It is 
famous for the function “bullet screens/curtains” (danmu 弹幕). Before July 12, 2017, most imported and translated 
Thai Boys Love series could be watched directly on Bilibili. The danmu and the takedown of these series in 2017 
are further discussed in Chapter Two. 
25 Weibo 微博, formally Sina Microblog 新浪微博, is one of the biggest social media platforms in China, with 523 
million monthly active users in June 2020. It is known as a combination of Twitter and Facebook. 
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especially Love Sick (season 1 and 2; season 2: dir. Kusolkulsiri and Wongskulphat; 2015), 
Puppy Honey (season 1 and 2), Make It Right (season 1 and 2), SOTUS, 2 Moons, Together with 
Me, and the movie Love of Siam, fostered the initial formation and subsequent development of 
this community. On top of a Thai name, most Thai Boys Love series have their English name, 
which is widely used in Thailand and most countries. In China, each series has one or more 
Chinese name(s) as well that are put forward by the “subtitle groups” that translate these series to 
Mandarin, and the use of their English name is not as prevalent. For instance, SOTUS is referred 
to as Yiniansheng (meaning Freshman, which relates to its storylines)26 in China. 
The male-male-love genre, in general, is nothing new to the Chinese consumers. It was 
introduced to China in the 1990s with the influx of Japanese manga and anime and has gradually 
developed into an extremely popular Internet-based cultural form.27 Japanese Boys Love manga 
and anime have always been influential in China. Thai Boys Love series, nevertheless, are easier 
for the Boys Love consumers to make connection to, empathize with, and build belonging in due 
to the non-animated characteristic. Previous studies concerning this phenomenon of Boys Love 
in China use mainly if not exclusively the term danmei. Yet, in fact, danmei, BL, and fu function 
basically the same and could be used interchangeably in the majority of cases. Among Chinese 
consumers, Thai Boys Love series are referred to as taiguo danmeijü, taiguo BL jü, and most 
notably, taiguo fujü (abbr. taifu).28 As I have pointed out in the footnotes above, all these three 
terms have Japanese roots. 
 
26 Chinese name:《一年生》. 
27 See, for example, Ling Yang and Yanrui Xu. “Danmei, Xianqing, and the Making of a Queer Online Public 
Sphere in China.” Communication and the Public, vol. 1, no. 2, 2016, p. 252; James Welker. “Bōizu rabu (BL) to 
sono ajia ni okeru henyou・henbou・henka” ボーイズ ラブ(BL)とそのアジアにおける変容・変貌・変化 
[Boys Love and the Transfiguration in Asia], translated by Mana Satō. “BL ga hiraku tobira: henyousuru ajia no 
sekushuariti to jendaa” BLが開く扉:変容するアジアのセクシュアリティとジェンダー [BL Opening Doors: 
Sexuality and Gender Transfigured in Asia], edited by James Welker. Seidosha, 2019, p. 16. 
28 Mandarin (in order): 泰国耽美剧, 泰国 BL剧, 泰国腐剧 (abbr. 泰腐). 
 17 
 In China, the consumption of Boys Love culture is dominated by young, heterosexual, 
and urban females.29 Influenced by the Japanese term fujoshi, literally “rotten women” who are 
excited, energized, and infatuated when consuming male-male love, some Chinese female fans 
self-mockingly call themselves funü, which derives from the term fujoshi and also means “rotten 
women.”30 At the same time, the more or less “invisible” men who enjoy Boys Love may call 
themselves funan,31 which means “rotten men.” Having long been deemed perverted and even 
abnormal, Chinese consumers of Boys Love culture, along with other gender minorities, are 
stigmatized and regulated by the public and others around them. A few of them exercise agency 
and disrupt the status quo in regard to the stigmatization, marginalization, and discrimination. 
Tian declares that the queer space of Boys Love in China equips and empowers its practitioners 
to question and challenge the policing heteronormative culture.32 
 Chinese consumers of Thai Boys Love series tend not to collectively articulate their 
identity as funü and funan. They do so not merely to evade the negative connotations of these 
terms. Rather, funü and funan might be seen as no longer in vogue. Nowadays, “fan-community 
girls” (fanquan nühai)33 is a much more fashionable word referring to female fans who exhibit 
extreme enthusiasm for their idols. In the fan community, the tie of girls (nühai) and boys 
(nanhai) to the notion of “fans” can be applied to numerous conditions. Female fans of Thai 
 
29 She’er. “Jiemi taiguo fujü zaoxing chanyelian: touzi zimuzu, ‘toudu’ jianmianhui” 揭秘泰国腐剧造星产业链：
投资字幕组,“偷渡”见面会 [Uncover the Industry of How Thai Boys Love Series Produce Idols (in China): 
Invest Subtitle Groups, Hold Fan Meetings Secretly]. Tencent News. 30 Jan. 2019; Yang, Ling, and Yanrui Xu. 
“Chinese Danmei Fandom and Cultural Globalization from Below.” Boys’ Love, Cosplay, and Androgynous Idols: 
Queer Fan Culture in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, edited by Maud Lavin, Ling Yang, and Jing Jamie 
Zhao. Hong Kong University Press, 2017, p. 3; Tian, Xi. “Homosexualizing ‘Boys Love’ in China: Reflexivity, 
Genre Transformation, and Cultural Interaction.” Prism: Theory and Modern Chinese Literature, vol. 17, no. 1, 
2020, p. 104. 
30 Mandarin: 腐女 (derive from the Japanese term fujoshi 腐女子). 
31 Mandarin: 腐男 (derive from the Japanese term fudanshi 腐男子). 
32 Tian. “Homosexualizing ‘Boys Love’ in China.” 2020, p. 108. 
33 Mandarin: 饭圈女孩. The corresponding term “fan-community boys” (fanquan nanhai饭圈男孩) appears less 
frequently. 
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Boys Love series call themselves ta-Thai girls (tatai nühai).34 Male fans of Tin and Can in Love 
by Chance and Love by Chance 2: A Chance to Love (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2020) call themselves 
“TC boys” (TC nanhai).35 Moreover, within the fan community of Thai Boys Love series, the 
identifications of fans are sometimes specified, catering to the niche of each sub-community. To 
take a case in point, fans of the “couple” (CP)36 Jimmy Karn Kritsanaphan and Tommy Sittichok 
Pueakpoolpol, main actors of Why R U (dir. Wongskulphat; 2020) and SaifahZon Story (dir. 
Wongskulphat; 2020), adopt the name “Mii2” (mitu),37 which is in line with the convention of 
the international fan community. In many cases, local creations are used altogether. Fans of the 
“couple” (CP) Tay Tawan Vihokratana and New Thitipoom Techaapaikhun in Kiss (dir. Susiwa; 
2016), Kiss Me Again, Our Skyy, Dark Blue Kiss, and I’m Tee: Me Too (dir. Mongkolsawas; 
2020) use both the name “polca”38 that obeys the convention of the international fan community 
and the names “dainiu girls/boys” (dainiu nühai/nanhai),39 “dainiu fans” (dainiu fen),40 or 
“dainiu supporters” (dainiu dang).41 Dainiu, literally “adorable silly girls,” is a pronouncing play 
on the nicknames of these two actors, Tay and New. 
 
34 Mandarin: 他泰女孩. Ta 他 is the third-person pronoun usually used by people to indicate an “Other” vis-à-vis 
China or their cultural identifications. 
35 Mandarin: TC男孩. T is for Tin and C is for Can. 
36 As the abbreviation of “couple,” “coupling,” or “character pairing,” CP is one of the most prevalent Internet 
languages in China. Nowadays, it is used more often to describe the (imagined) relations and intimacy of youth, 
especially celebrities, media characters, and anime figures. Take Japanese manga/anime Detective Conan (auth. 
Aoyama; dir. Kodama et al.; a.k.a. Case Closed) as an example. Some Chinese fans “support” (zhan 站) Kudō 
Shin’ichi 工藤新一 and Mōri Ran 毛利蘭 CP (xinlan CP 新兰 CP). In opposition, others “support” Edogawa Conan 
江戸川コナン (whose identity is in fact Kudō Shin’ichi) and Haibara Ai 灰原哀 CP (ke’ai CP 柯哀 CP). These 
people identify as and are labelled as xinlan dang 新兰党 (dang originally means Party but means supporters in this 
context) and ke’ai dang 柯哀党, respectively. Due to different personal preferences and interpretations, people can 
have different and changing “subjective choices” when it comes to CP. CP is a very significant notion in order to 
understand Boys Love culture, and fan culture in general, in today’s China. 
37 Mandarin: 米兔. It literally means “rice bunny.” 
38 Thai: โพกา้. 
39 Mandarin: 呆妞女孩/男孩. 
40 Mandarin: 呆妞粉. 
41 Mandarin: 呆妞党. Dang, as I have noted before, originally means Party but means supporters in this context. 
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 Thai Boys Love series are mediated mainly by two Chinese subtitle groups, Tianfu Taijü 
(hereafter, Tianfu) and CFan (Xifan).42 Usually, Thai Boys Love series are uploaded by their 
production companies to YouTube or other mainstream platforms43 with at least English subtitle 
so that domestic and international viewers can watch for free.44 However, under the “great 
firewall” that isolates China’s Internet from the outside, most Chinese viewers without a stable 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) have to rely on the Thai-to-Mandarin subtitle groups. Tianfu was 
started in 2014 by a group of undergraduate students at Southwestern University of Finance and 
Economics (Chengdu, Sichuan Province) who heartily love Thai language and culture. Tianfu 
stems from one of Sichuan’s ancient names “land of abundance” (tianfu zhi guo),45 signifying its 
birthplace, while Taijü means “Thai series.” This group became unexpectedly popular in 2015 
among Chinese netizens46 owing to its funny way of translating Lady Boy Friends. After that, it 
remained a voluntary and mostly non-profit group. On July 23, 2017, some Tianfu’s core 
members suddenly announced that they would leave Tianfu and establish a new group named 
CFan because some “outsiders” registered Tianfu Taijü as a commercial brand without their 
permission. As an underground group then, Tianfu could receive no legal protection for this kind 
of situation, so these members had to leave with indignation and grievance.47 Up to this date, 
Tianfu and CFan developed separately with hostility toward each other. Because Tianfu has been 
commercialized and is backed up by companies like FunThaiCulture, it possesses significantly 
 
42 Mandarin: 天府泰剧 (字幕组) and 喜翻 (译制组). There are other Thai-to-Mandarin subtitle groups in China, but 
these two unquestionably dominate the whole industry. 
43 For example, Line TV (one of the most popular video sharing platforms in Thailand) and WeTV (the international 
version of the China-based Tencent Video). 
44 There are exceptions, like I Told Sunset About You (dir. Kuno; 2020), of which certain dramas and documentary 
episodes were not free at first. However, they are free for the Chinese audience on Chinese platforms. 
45 Mandarin: 天府之国. 
46 Netizen, meaning “Internet user,” is a portmanteau of “(Inter)net” and “citizen.” 
47 I paid close attention to this incident from then on (July 23, 2017 and after) mainly on Weibo. However, some 
pieces of information might deviate from the so-called “truth,” because of the ubiquity of misinformation and 
disinformation online. 
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more resources than CFan, including the copyright of many Thai Boys Love series. Tianfu has 
8.95 million followers on Weibo, the main device to circulate information and interact with the 
fan community, while CFan has 3.47 million.48 In addition, Tianfu and CFan work on a wide 
variety of Thai series, movies, novels, and other cultural works, not just Thai Boys Love series, 
but what draws the most attention is, without a doubt, the Boys Love ones. 
 When it comes to Boys Love culture and Thai Boys Love series in China, it is inevitable 
to talk about governmental censorship. China’s censorship on anything queer-related and many 
other terrains are habitually viewed as rigid.49 It holds true if people only probe the provocative 
policies the state has enforced, such as the “ban” of Addicted (dir. Chaijidan; 2016) and the 
regulation of non-heteronormative media representations published on June 30, 2017. This topic 
is explicated in detail in Chapter Two, but here I want to illustrate that the degree of censorship 
in China should neither be downplayed nor be exaggerated. I would also like to clarify that I by 
no means intend to endorse what the Chinese government has done and is doing in this realm. 
However, it is necessary to offer a relatively objective evaluation of China’s censorship, which is 
significant for people to better comprehend how Chinese consumers of Thai Boys Love series 
agentically respond to and cope with governmental censorship. 
 
Literature Review 
This section aims to cover some insights in “Boys Love” scholarship that I have not discussed in 
previous sections. 
 The link between Boys Love representations and gay men in reality is a focal point in the 
scholarly literature. McLelland and Welker state that the genre Boys Love is only tangentially 
 
48 Update on April 15, 2021. 
49 See, for example, Tian. “Homosexualizing ‘Boys Love’ in China.” 2020, pp. 107-108. 
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connected with the lives of actual gay men.50 Nagaike notes the incident in Japan from 1992 to 
1996 that a number of gay men intensely criticized Boys Love on the basis of its limited and 
stereotypical images of the supposedly gay characters. In the opinion of these gay men in reality, 
on a subconscious level, the female Boys Love writers and readers are in fact homophobic.51 As 
a consequence, these Boys Love creators project an ideal regarding what gay men should look 
like and behave. Tian’s research suggests a relatively distinctive trajectory in China. She declares 
that although Boys Love creators have claimed that male homosexuality in reality is in no way 
identical to the representations by writers in the genre, homosexuality and sexual minorities in 
China have become increasingly interwoven with Boys Love. She designates this social and 
cultural shift “the homosexualization of BL (Boys Love),” which in practice has generated a 
porous culture that embraces gender diversity and contributes to increasing the visibility of the 
gay community.52 By this token, there seems to be an “absolute” demarcation between Boys 
Love representations and gay men in reality, but the two sides are frequently entangled with each 
other wittingly or unwittingly. 
 The top/bottom (seme/uke) convention53 is always under examination too. Seme/uke is a 
strict and obvious gendered relationship in the Japanese model of Boys Love: seme are taller, 
stronger, elder, and with smaller eyes, shorter hair, deeper voice, as well as more masculine 
traits, while uke are shorter, weaker, younger, and with bigger eyes, longer hair, softer voice, as 
 
50 McLelland and Welker. “An Introduction to ‘Boys Love’ in Japan.” 2015, p. 3. 
51 Nagaike, Kazumi. “Do Heterosexual Men Dream of Homosexual Men?: BL Fudanshi and Discourse on Male 
Feminization.” Boys Love Manga and Beyond: History, Culture, and Community in Japan, edited by Mark 
McLelland, Kazumi Nagaike, Katsuhiko Suganuma, and James Welker. University Press of Mississippi, 2015, p. 
190. 
52 Tian. “Homosexualizing ‘Boys Love’ in China.” 2020, p. 108. 
53 Japanese: 攻め/受け.To learn more, see, for example, Akiko Mizoguchi. “BL shinkaron: bо̄izu rabu ga shakai 
wo ugokasu” BL進化論：ボーイズラブが社会を動かす [Theorizing BL as a Transformative Genre: Boys’ Love 
Moves the World Forward]. Ohta Publication, 2015, pp. 70-74. 
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well as more feminine traits.54 Scholars like Welker55 and Mizoguchi56 regard this system as 
“roughly reproducing the male-female binary.” Nonetheless, this hegemonic structure has been 
exported to other societies via the influx of Japanese Boys Love manga and anime. Prassannam 
indicates that in Thailand’s context, the seme/uke trope has been widely employed by fans to 
describe the Boys Love stars based on their personas.57 He astutely detaches the fan-community 
imaginations and practices from what Thai Boys Love series actually display, since a clear 
seme/uke parallel, in most cases, does not exist or prevail on the screen. 
 Several scholars contemplate why people consume and are addicted to Boys Love media, 
with a specific focus on escapism and imaginations. According to Fujimoto, Boys Love emerged 
as a mechanism offering an escape for women from the social realities of gender suppression and 
the avoidance of sex(uality), opening up possibilities for them to shift their own viewpoint from 
passive to active engagement.58 Nagaike inspects the male audience of Boys Love, arguing that 
Boys Love provides them a space to reevaluate, negotiate, and dismantle the socially constructed 
model of “strong masculinity.”59 Limpongsatorn claims that Thai Boys Love series are appealing 
because the audience wants to reveal their awareness of equal rights for the queer community by 
consuming these series. Also, they long for a “pure relationship” embodied in the represented 
male-male romance that is not bounded up with marriage or social hierarchy.60 
 
54 See, for example, Takano Masamune (seme) and Onodera Ritsu (uke) in Japanese manga/anime The World's 
Greatest First Love: The Case of Onodera Ritsu (auth. Nakamura; dir. Kon; 2011). In Japanese Boys Love culture, 
this rigid division is not that manifest now, but this influence persists. 
55 Welker, James. “A Brief History of Shōnenai, Yaoi, and Boys Love.” Boys Love Manga and Beyond: History, 
Culture, and Community in Japan, edited by Mark McLelland, Kazumi Nagaike, Katsuhiko Suganuma, and James 
Welker. University Press of Mississippi, 2015, p. 46. 
56 Mizoguchi. Theorizing BL as a Transformative Genre: Boys’ Love Moves the World Forward. 2020, p. 70. 
57 Prasannam. “The Yaoi Phenomenon in Thailand and Fan/Industry Interaction.” 2019, p. 65. 
58 Fujimoto, Yukari. “Shōnen-ai/yaoi, BL: 2007-nen genzai no shiten kara” 少年愛/やおい・BL: 2007年現在の
視点から [Shōnen-ai, Yaoi, BL: From the Perspective of 2007]. Yuriika, vol. 39, no. 16, 2007, pp. 36-47. 
59 Nagaike. “Do Heterosexual Men Dream of Homosexual Men?” 2015, pp. 190-191. 
60 Limpongsatorn. A Study of Thailand’s Boys Love Drama and Its Transnational Chinese Audiences. 2020, pp. 96-
100. 
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 In China’s context, using Zhao et al.’s words, “Chinese-speaking popular cultures have 
never been so queer as in this digital, globalist age.”61 The scholarship in this paragraph helps 
people (re)think about China’s picture as a totally demonized place for anything queer. In their 
article, Zhao et al. highlight the Chinese government’s “no encouraging, no discouraging, and no 
promoting” attitude toward any queer culture,62 instead of a completely suppressive one. In other 
words, the celebration of Boys Love can become nothing special, radical, or risky in China 
nowadays. Zhou analyzes Chinese netizens’ party-like matchmaking of two reputational male 
artists, Wang Lihong (a.k.a. Leehom Wang) and Li Yundi. This fandom even extends to the 
CCTV Spring Festival Gala, the most influential show in China.63 Zhao resonates with Zhou’s 
finding, stating that the commercialization of same-sex intimacy is common in Chinese reality 
shows after 2010, such as The Rap of China.64 Bunyavejchewin’s discovery can be applied to 
China’s landscape as well: young male bodies and masculine homoerotic expressions have 
increasingly become “selling points.”65 In China, there is a prevailing notion “selling gayness 
intentionally” (maifu).66 
 In closing, in the last part of their article, Yang and Xu jump out of the “locus” of Boys 
Love and investigate Xianqing, a well-known website for original and adapted Chinese Boys 
Love literature, as “a nationalistic transnational Chinese sphere” where participants demonstrate 
a strong nationalistic and progovernment stance whenever political issues and discussion pop 
 
61 Zhao, Jing Jamie, Ling Yang, and Maud Lavin. “Introduction.” Boys’ Love, Cosplay, and Androgynous Idols: 
Queer Fan Culture in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, edited by Maud Lavin, Ling Yang, and Jing Jamie 
Zhao. Hong Kong University Press, 2017, p. xi. 
62 Ibid., p. xvi. 
63 Zhou, Shuyan. “From Online BL Fandom to the CCTV Spring Festival Gala: The Transforming Power of Online 
Carnival.” Boys’ Love, Cosplay, and Androgynous Idols: Queer Fan Culture in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan, edited by Maud Lavin, Ling Yang, and Jing Jamie Zhao. Hong Kong University Press, 2017, pp. 91-110. 
64 Zhao, Jing Jamie. “Queerness Within Chineseness: Nationalism and Sexual Morality on and off the Competition 
Show The Rap of China.” Continuum, vol. 34, no. 4, 2020, pp. 484-499. 
65 Bunyavejchewin. “The Wai (Y[aoi]) Genre: Local BL Media in Thailand.” 2018, p. 26. 
66 Mandarin: 卖腐. 
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up.67 This angle eschews the “male-male essence” of Boys Love culture, which inspires me to 
self-interrogate how to implement a more comprehensive analysis on the reception of Thai Boys 
Love series in China as a transnational/transcultural media flow. Male-male love, as the “nature” 
of Thai Boys Love series, is pivotal, yet I also need to avoid being trapped there and proactively 
dissect other noteworthy aspects.68 
 
Argument, Approach, Significance, and Outline 
It is undoubtedly significant to construe Thai Boys Love series as a male-male-love media within 
China’s intricate and distinctive social landscape, but people should not limit their scrutiny to 
this predominant queer framework. They should also turn their attention away from the “male-
male essence” of these series and (re)investigate them just like other transnational/transcultural 
media flows arriving in China. Put differently, when people analyze Thai Boys Love series, the 
male-male theme should not overshadow other attributes of these series, which affords a more 
profound understanding of Thai Boys Love series, contemporary China’s specific context, and 
the multiple connections in between. 
 This interdisciplinary thesis is built on my close reading of the most well-received Thai 
Boys Love series from 2014 to April 2021, my extensive online observations since 2016, and a 
wide variety of secondary sources in English, Chinese, Japanese, and Thai. This thesis contains 
some specific textual and visual analysis on Thai Boys Love series whenever necessary, but it 
mostly examines them as a “group.” 
 
67 Yang and Xu. “Chinese Danmei Fandom and Cultural Globalization from Below.” 2017, pp. 3-19. 
68 For example, in Chapter Five, I examine why the relationship between Thai Boys Love series and their Chinese 
consumers can be vulnerable under the rise of nationalism and the comeback of Sinocentrism among most Chinese 
people today. In such way, I treat Thai Boys Love series simply as one of the foreign media flows in China, like 
South Korean soap operas or Hollywood movies. 
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 The results of this research are groundbreaking in their attention to the relationship 
between Thai Boys Love series, a globally outstanding media phenomenon, and their Chinese 
consumers under the specific context. “Thai Boys Love series in China” is going to illuminate 
people’s understanding toward transnational/transcultural media flow. Compared to the immense 
popularity worldwide, Boys Love culture is still an understudied realm in academia. Previous 
research on Thai Boys Love series, and Boys Love culture in general, is mainly from institutions 
around the Pacific, especially academies in Australia, Japan, Thailand, and China. This thesis 
hopes to draw attention from people in Euro-American societies to this burgeoning media trend 
and lay a solid foundation for future research. 
 This thesis attempts to delve into four noteworthy aspects of “the reception of Thai Boys 
Love series in China.” Chapter Two continues to explore how Thai Boys Love series are 
disseminated and consumed in China. It makes clear how the consumers agentically help these 
series elude governmental censorship through self-censoring strategies and uncovers a carnival 
under the censorship. Chapter Three concerns the lived experiences and day-to-day struggles 
most viewers are facing, elucidating how Thai Boys Love series provide a utopian unconstrained 
world for them. Chapter Four complicates the seemingly positive-only influences Thai Boys 
Love series might have in China, disclosing how these series could promote and reinforce certain 
stereotypes and ideals that are obviously problematic. It is divided into two parts: one is about 
Thailand as a fantasized “gay paradise,”69 and the other is about the widespread “gay archetype” 
and its consequences. Chapter Five starts with the #nnevvy incident in April 2020 and then 
 
69 The image of Thailand as a “gay paradise” that this thesis revisits in Chapter Four was raised and discussed by 
Peter A. Jackson in 1999. See Peter A. Jackson. “Tolerant but Unaccepting: The Myth of a Thai ‘Gay Paradise.’” 
Genders and Sexualities in Modern Thailand, edited by Peter A. Jackson and Nerida M. Cook. Silkworm Books, 
1999, pp. 226-242. I had a brief conversation with Emeritus Professor Jackson regarding this in August 2020 by 
email. 
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unfolds the vulnerability of the alleged “Chinese-Thai romance” with the rise of nationalism and 
the comeback of Sinocentrism among most Chinese people in the wake of China’s impressive 
development. Chapter Six closes this thesis with a final discussion, the limitations, and a call for 





Figure 1. Poster of Until We Meet Again (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2019), one of the many Thai Boys Love 






Figure 2. Mid-autumn Festival Gala in 2012. Mario Maurer and Pchy Witwisit Hiranyawongkul, main 
actors of Love of Siam (dir. Sakveerakul; 2007), performed Mingyue Qianli Jixiangsi, a Chinese song 





Figure 3 and 4. “2020 New & Next” event hosted by GMMTV at GMM Live House, Central World 
(Bangkok, Thailand). This free event presented twenty-one series and one movie GMMTV planned to 
produce in 2020. Boys Love ones induced most ecstatic screams from the participants, especially those 
starring actors who had appeared in previous Thai Boys Love series, like Earth Pirapat Watthanasetsiri. 





Figure 5. The advertisement of Beauty Buffet’s whitening facial foam. It features Saint Suppapong 
Udomkaewkanjana in Love by Chance (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2018) and Why R U (dir. Wongskulphat; 
2020). This facial foam is one of the most popular products among tourists who come to Thailand. Made 




Censorship, Self-Censorship, and Carnival Under Censorship 
 
When it comes to fan culture in China, there is always a “competition” feeling pervading the 
dynamic cyberspace. Fans, with intense passion and motivation, are committed to glorifying the 
individuals or groups they like. In July 2019, for example, a weeklong “contest” took place on 
Weibo between fans of Cai Xukun, the then 20-year-old rising Chinese idol who is known for his 
“soft masculinity” and cuteness, and fans of Zhou Jielun (a.k.a. Jay Chou), the then 40-year-old 
Taiwanese singer who has dominated the Chinese-language pop world for years. It was triggered 
by Cai’s fans who uploaded posts on several online sites joking at Chou’s invisibility on Weibo. 
A multitude of Chou’s fans who did not frequent Weibo before immediately gathered and fought 
back, bringing Chou to the number one spot of Weibo “super topic” (chaohua)70 ranking of that 
week and laughing at the ignorance and naivety of Cai’s fans.71 
  In contrast to the aggression of this competitive exchange, Chinese consumers of Thai 
Boys Love series usually behave in a relatively low-key manner. To be sure, they are willing to 
circulate related information online and are enlivened by the popularity of the series or the 
actors, but consumers who have spent a certain amount of time immersed in this community and 
know “the rules of the game” (hereafter, rules) would work together to prevent any of the series 
or the actors from becoming overwhelmingly popular. Nearly all Chinese consumers of Thai 
 
70 Chaohua 超话, literally “super topic,” is a public online space for all kinds of heated topics on Weibo, which 
includes idols, music, variety shows, TV series, and the list goes on. There is a weekly ranking, signifying who and 
what are most popular at the moment. 
71 See, for example, “i21st.” “Zhou Jielun ‘zhongyu yingle’ Cai Xukun, zhonglaonian fensi huole! Ran’er beihou de 
zhexieshi ni keneng hai buzhidao” 周杰伦“终于赢了”蔡徐坤，中老年粉丝火了！然而背后的这些事你可能
还不知道 [Zhou Jielun Eventually Won Cai Xukun. “Elder” Fans are Ignited and Mobilized! Yet You May Not 
Know the Dynamics Behind It]. i21st. 23 Jul. 2019. 
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Boys Love series, including informed viewers/fans, subtitle groups, and event organizers, engage 
in self-censorship for the “survival” of these series and actors. This chapter continues with the 
discussion from Chapter One, aiming to cast light on the censorship from the Chinese state, the 
agentic and strategic self-censorship practiced by Chinese consumers of Thai Boys Love series, 
and the carnival under censorship. 
 
China’s Censorship on Queer-Related Cultures 
China’s state censorship is nothing unfamiliar for most readers, and it is, in most circumstances, 
automatically regarded as a stringent and non-negotiable system. Fueled by the ubiquity of media 
representations on discrete but interconnected issues like the crackdown of Hong Kong protests 
and the deployment of concentration camps in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region carried out 
by the Chinese government, the notorious image of China’s censorship, along with surveillance 
and suppression, appears to be unassailable. However, this oversimplified and to some extent 
manipulated impression will hamper people’s understanding about how censorship functions and 
how Chinese people, Chinese consumers of Thai Boys Love series in the case of this thesis, 
proactively and strategically get around the censorship. 
As a matter of fact, China’s censorship is documented as porous72 instead of airtight, 
which is seconded by my online observations as well. As for queer-related cultures, the attitude 
of the state is actually laissez-faire, permitting consumers to exercise agency and find ways to 
grapple with the censorship. Having said that, I am not denying the might of the censorship that 
polices the whole society every single moment: anything disrupting and threatening the Party, 
the state, or the mainstream collectivity will probably confront censorship. For example, people 
 
72 For details, see Margaret E Roberts. Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall. 
Princeton University Press, 2018. 
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should be extremely careful when they talk about anything politically sensitive online, such as 
the status of Taiwan73 and the past of the Communist Party of China (CPC).74 In this light, queer-
related cultures, particularly male-male-love representations, can be less troublesome if 
presented with due caution. Same-sex behaviors between males were decriminalized with the 
abolishment of the “hooligan” law in 1997, and it was further unlisted from the official register 
of mental illnesses in 2001.75 Since the introduction of Boys Love from Japan in the 1990s, this 
genre has coexisted with governmental censorship and continued to flourish until the present, 
attracting millions of active consumers. Blued, launched in 2012 and developed by the Chinese 
company BlueCity, has become the largest gay dating app worldwide, with 24 million users in 
China alone as of early 2020.76 The display of male-male intimacy has always been a popular 
and eye-catching theme on Douyin (Tik Tok) (fig. 6 and 7). Although these examples illustrate 
that queer-related cultures can be less sensitive in the context of today’s China, some did clash 
with governmental censorship. The most well-known incident so far is perhaps the takedown of 
Addicted (dir. Chaijidan; 2016), an unprecedentedly popular Chinese Boys Love series, which I 
explicate later in this chapter. 
 As can be seen, the extent of China’s censorship should neither be downplayed nor be 
exaggerated. It exists and never stops changing. Chinese people tend to see Hu Jintao’s regime 
(2003-2013) and Xi Jinping’s early years in power as tolerant, stable, ascendant, and heading to a 
liberal destination. It is possible that people collectively romanticize the past under Xi’s strict 
 
73 Nowadays, it is safer to use “China’s Taiwan” (zhongguo taiwan 中国台湾) instead of solely “Taiwan” as a 
reference. Even non-Chinese citizens in China and elsewhere are expected to obey it: a relevant event is detailed in 
Chapter Five. 
74 For example, on the Long March, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square Incident. 
75 See, for example, Zhou. “From Online BL Fandom to the CCTV Spring Festival Gala.” 2017, p. 96; Tian. 
“Homosexualizing ‘Boys Love’ in China.” 2020, pp. 115-116. 
76 Liu, Yiling. “How a Dating App Helped a Generation of Chinese Come out of the Closet.” The New York Times 
Magazine. 5 Mar. 2020. 
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domestic regulations and aggressive international policies in recent years, but governmental 
censorship in those years was probably at a historical low since the establishment of the People’s 
Republic in 1949. For instance, during Hu’s regime, queer-centered organizations developed 
with bravery and aspiration, such as Beijing LGBT Center (Beijing Tongzhi Zhongxin; founded 
in 2008), Beijing Queer Film Festival (Beijing Ku’er Yingzhan; founded in 2001), Common 
Language (Tongyu; founded in 2005), and ShanghaiPRIDE (Shanghai Jiao’ao Jie; founded in 
2009).77 Although there were regulations on queer-related cultures then,78 the policies were not 
that strictly enforced compared to the situations nowadays. Most queer activism in China started 
in 2008,79 when the Chinese state was starved to express its liberty and inclusiveness through the 
Beijing Olympics. During Xi’s early years in power, for instance, a movie named The Dead End 
(dir. Cao; 2015), containing a kissing and sexually suggestive scene of two male characters, was 
screened in cinemas nationwide, which would be unimaginable for Chinese people today. 
Xi gradually tightened the controls in China in almost all realms, including censorship. 
People can sense the tensions, and some claim that he wants to bring back the Mao Zedong-style 
dictatorship. Certainly, this change has seriously impacted queer-related cultures. On June 30, 
2017, China Netcasting Service Association (CNSA), subordinated to and supervised by the 
State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT), published a 
new set of guidelines regulating online contents and programs. In this regulation, homosexuality, 
incest, and sadomasochism are listed together and categorized as abnormal sexual activity, and 
 
77 Mandarin (in order): 北京同志中心, 北京酷儿影展, 同语, 上海骄傲节. 
78 See, for example, Hongwei Bao. Queer Comrades: Gay Identity and Tongzhi Activism in Postsocialist China. 
NIAS Press, 2018, pp. 154-156. 
79 This statement came from Xu Bin from Common Language (Tongyu) during The 7th Chinese Sexuality Studies 
Conference 第七届中国性研究学术研讨会. I attended this conference (August 28 to 30, 2019) and the preceding 
academic seminar (The 9th Chinese Sexuality Studies Seminar on Theories and Practices 第九期“性社会学理论与
实践”研讨班; August 24 to 27, 2019), which were “secretly” organized by Renmin University of China and 
Harbin Medical University and held in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province. 
 35 
their media representations are banned.80 Soon after, on July 12, 2017, a significant amount of 
media works of all kinds, including Thai Boys Love series and other male-male-love media from 
different countries, were removed from Bilibili, the then biggest online platform to watch the 
media works of this genre.81 Although this takedown was implemented in the name of copyright 
protection, people could not help but link it to the new regulation published days earlier. People 
were disappointed and speechless, and Thai Boys Love series were hit hard. Tianfu, as the single 
dominant subtitle group at that time, guaranteed the fan community that Thai Boys Love series 
could be watched through other methods, at least through Baidu Web Drive,82 a Cloud service 
for file storage. Tianfu, however, also reminded fans to keep an eye on future policies. On April 
12, 2019, both Weibo “super topic” (chaohua) “les” and Douban83 community “LesSky” were 
banned. In the same vein, on August 13, 2020, ShanghaiPRIDE abruptly announced that they 
would cancel all upcoming activities and take a break from scheduling any future event without 
indicating any reason.84 This kind of “terror” continues to this date, and many people no longer 
feel surprised if anything sensitive disappears with no warning beforehand. 
On the other hand, as I have mentioned above, China’s censorship is not airtight. Despite 
the fact that the censorship is there, and its degree keeps changing, there is always more or less 
room left for people to think up strategies to get around. Shanghai Queer Film Festival (Shanghai 
Ku’er Yingzhan; a.k.a. SHQFF; founded in 2016)85 stays active and vigorous. The above-noted 
thriving Chinese Boys Love (danmei) literature, among other cultural products, and the portrayal 
 
80 See, for example, Tian. “Homosexualizing ‘Boys Love’ in China.” 2020, p. 118. 
81 Although Thai Boys Love series are gone on Bilibili, lots of fan-edited versions of Thai Boys Love series can be 
found there even today, so is Take Guy Out Thailand, a gay dating show produced by TV Thunder, which is as 
sensitive as Thai Boys Love series. 
82 Baidu Web Drive 百度网盘 (a.k.a. Baidu Wangpan or Baidu Net Disk). 
83 Douban 豆瓣, launched in 2005, is a famous website for culture-related activities and is particularly known for 
people’s discussion on media works of all kinds. 
84 See the official website of ShanghaiPRIDE: https://www.shpride.com/?lang=en. 
85 Mandarin: 上海酷儿影展. 
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of bromance (jiqing)86 in short videos also attest to the porosity of China’s censorship. As such, 
countless queer-related cultures are still flourishing in contemporary China, although they are 
coexisting timorously with the censorship and heading to an unpredictable future. Meanwhile, 
Chinese people have been growingly aware of the deterioration of China’s overall landscape for 
queer-related cultures and learned to behave accordingly. The immensely popular Chinese online 
series The Untamed (dir. Zheng and Chen; 2019) is a case in point. It was adapted from an 
original Chinese Boys Love website novel with homoromantic and homoerotic depiction,87 but 
in the media representations, the relationship between the two male protagonists, Wei Wuxian 
and Lan Wangji, is presented as a male-male “friendship” accompanied by a strong emotional 
attachment. The audience knows this is a de facto unspeakable romance masked under their 
brotherhood camouflage. Many male-male-love scenes were filmed, but ironically, they are only 
showed outside of China for international viewers. 
Therefore, what is at stake is to self-regulate and successfully maintain a balance. If 
things are not radical enough to cross the threshold and hence “ostentatious” for the censors, they 
are mostly safe. More and more Chinese people are aware of the “rules” and welcome various 
tactics to deal with governmental censorship. This is exactly the case for Chinese consumers of 
Thai Boys Love series, a queer-related target of China’s censorship. 
 
Self-Censorship by Chinese Consumers of Thai Boys Love Series 
To ensure the safety and prospects of Thai Boys Love series, almost all Chinese consumers, 
including individuals (viewers/fans) and organizations (subtitle groups, event organizers), are 
 
86 Mandarin: 基情. 基 comes from Cantonese pronunciation of “gay,” and 情 means emotions or sentiments. This 
term does not necessarily relate to gayness. Instead, it is widely used to describe bromance (a portmanteau of “bro” 
and “(ro)mance”) or simply closeness of males. 
87 The original novel is Modao Zushi 《魔道祖师》 (auth. Moxiangtongxiu; 2015). 
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practicing self-censorship. Meanwhile, they also constantly seek a balance: they manage to avoid 
governmental censorship with minimized self-censorship to gain the satisfaction from their 
participations in Boys Love culture. As a result, they always evaluate the social context and then 
adjust the degree of their self-censorship accordingly. They usually need to be very cautious, but 
they sometimes can relax a little bit and treat Thai Boys Love series in the same manner as those 
non-sensitive media products, such as the Thai crime thriller movie Bad Genius (dir. Poonpiriya; 
2017). How they act and carry out the various self-censoring strategies is shaped by China’s 
social context at the moment, which, as I said before, keeps changing. Additionally, they do not 
try to challenge the status quo but endeavor to live with the state apparatus. 
Extracting insights from previous experiences, they collectively extrapolate methods that 
can distance Thai Boys Love series from governmental censorship. One incident they like to 
revisit is the aforementioned “ban” of Addicted. This series, depicting the male-male-love stories 
of Gu Hai and Bai Luoyin, drew unprecedented attention from the public. It received around ten 
million hits on January 29, 2016, the day it premiered. Within a month, this series garnered more 
than 100 million views on all video sharing platforms and the hashtag “Addicted” accumulated 
around 840 million views on Weibo.88 Moreover, it generated a large scale of online discussion 
not only about the series or the actors, but also issues like same-sex marriage, human rights, and 
even the CPC. In the eyes of the censors, it went too far and thus “deserved” being censored: on 
February 22, 2016, this series was removed from all Chinese public online platforms. Through a 
nuanced investigation, it is not a “complete ban” per se. As noted by Roberts, in most cases, 
governmental censorship in China is more like a “tax” on information, which forces users to pay 
 
88 See, for example, Yang Lu and Rui Yang. “Wangjü ‘shangyin’ bei xiajia yin fenjizhi reyi” 网剧《上瘾》被下架
引分级制热议 [The Takedown of Addicted Generated Discussion on TV Rating System]. Beijing Business Today. 
24 Feb. 2016. 
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money or spend more time if they want to access the censored material.89 Although Addicted 
could no longer be accessed directly online, it has been circulated on Baidu Web Drive and on 
platforms like YouTube that require VPN for mainland users. In addition, this series is still 
actively discussed on Weibo by a large number of participants, and its “super topic” (chaohua) 
has gained 330 million reads.90 From then on, nonetheless, efforts are needed for Chinese people 
to access this series. The two main actors, Huang Jingyu and Xu Weizhou, were prohibited from 
appearing together on screen. Akin to Addicted, Thai Boys Love series involve male-male-love 
stories that are deemed sensitive by the state. For Addicted, the governmental censorship was 
rendered mainly by its overwhelming popularity but also by its intense description of male-male 
intimacy, including many sexually suggestive scenes. To some extent, this incident informs and 
enlightens Chinese consumers of Thai Boys Love series as for how they can help these series and 
actors eschew governmental censorship. 
Controlling popularity is an important strategy. Online platforms where people can watch 
Thai Boys Love series directly have become increasingly decentralized. Take Tianfu, the most 
influential Thai-to-Mandarin subtitle group, as an example. After the takedown of Thai Boys 
Love series from Bilibili in July 2017, Tianfu started to cooperate with a considerable number of 
online platforms, including Renren Shipin, Diyidan, Fantexi, Quanfen TV, Xigua Shipin, Bilibili 
Live Stream, Weibo, and WeChat Mini Program91 where Thai Boys Love series can be shared. 
Tianfu also developed an app called Sawadi92 for Android users, which was available from late 
2018 to late 2019. Among all these partnerships, some have entered the dustbin of history due to 
 
89 Roberts. Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall. 2018, p. 2. 
90 Updated on April 15, 2021. 
91 Chinese names (in order): 人人视频, 第一弹, 范特西, 圈粉 TV, 西瓜视频, 哔哩哔哩直播, 微博, 微信迷你小程
序. This is not an exhaustive list, and there will be more in the future. 
92 The app’s name Sawadi 萨瓦滴 is a parody on “hello/goodbye” in Thai (sawatdee สวสัดี). 
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sudden shutdown or conflict with Tianfu, while some are still in operation now. In addition, 
since both Tianfu and CFan always save the translated Thai Boys Love series to Baidu Web 
Drive for people to download and in case all direct online accesses would be invalidated, it is 
easy to get a copy of these series. Many other unauthorized platforms just upload these series for 
consumption without the approval from the subtitle groups. However, it appears that the subtitle 
groups do not mind. In this way, the viewers disperse to different platforms to watch Thai Boys 
Love series. Admittedly, there are major platforms with large gathering of viewers, but minor 
platforms can always dilute the “density” on the major platforms and thereby protect them from 
the gaze of governmental censorship. The existence of several major platforms further scatters 
the viewers.93 Given that the total of the audience does not change, Thai Boys Love series would, 
in this way, seem “less popular” based on the data on each site. 
At the same time, Chinese viewers/fans of Thai Boys Love series purposefully control the 
popularity on Weibo, the most saturated platform for online discussion and interactions of these 
series. “Hot search” (resou)94 on Weibo is a real-time indicator of popularity, and there is a 
ranking. Informed Chinese fans of Thai Boys Love series will manage to prevent these series 
from appearing on the “hot search” list, let alone becoming one of the top trends. Consequently, 
although they are energized by Thai Boys Love series, especially the newly released ones, many 
will consciously restrain from their participations if there seems to have too many participants 
already. This is an attempt to keep these series away from the unwanted governmental attention. 
However, some fans are not familiar with these “rules,” and sometimes the series are just too 
stimulating to not discuss. On October 14, 2020, episode 8 of Love by Chance 2: A Chance to 
 
93 When I composed this thesis from August 2020 to April 2021, the major platforms to watch Thai Boys Love 
series directly were Renren Shipin, Weibo, and WeChat Mini Programs. It is probably not the case anymore the time 
you read this line.  
94 Mandarin: 热搜. It is similar to “Trending” on Twitter. 
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Love (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2020) was released. In this episode, Tin confesses his love to Can and 
they have sex (not directly portrayed, for sure), which was extremely exciting for the audience 
after a long time of waiting. Many rushed to Weibo to express their exhilaration, making this 
topic trending. Informed Chinese fans were anxious that this series would face consequences. As 
the only authorized translator of this series, Tianfu immediately reported this “trending” incident 
through its WeChat Public Platform.95 Instead of explicitly divulging the “rules,” Tianfu selected 
several comments from the informed fans to “educate” the uninformed fans regarding how to 
behave appropriately and warn some of the possible consequences. For example, one comment 
Tianfu chose to present under its article argued, “do not make this series trending at all costs, or 
this series can only be watched on Baidu Web Drive in the future.”96 
Regulating sensitivity is also a remarkable tactic. Because Thai Boys Love series are 
sensitive in China’s context by nature, what the subtitle groups are able to do is making them less 
radical, should it be needed. In late 2019, it seemed that another round of strict governmental 
censorship was about to take place. Under this atmosphere, Tianfu and CFan self-censored the 
potentially provocative scenes for public representations. They cut, covered, or at least pixelated 
the intense contents, such as long kissing scenes and sexually suggestive scenes, when they 
translated Thai Boys Love series released at that time. It was particularly manifest in TharnType 
(dir. Sintanaparadee; 2019), a series full of homoerotic scenes between the two male characters, 
Tharn and Type. They would then save the uncensored version of these series to the more private 
Baidu Web Drive that requires certain efforts from the audience to access. This vigilance is 
 
95 Mandarin: 微信公众平台. It is a platform on WeChat where people (including government officials) can register 
as “official accounts” and post their creations (mostly articles of all kinds). Most accounts can only post once per 
day or per week, which depends on the account type. To learn more about it, see Xianhui Che and Barry Ip. Social 
Networks in China. Elsevier Science, 2017, pp. 63-70. 
96 Mandarin: “千万别上热搜, 不然这剧以后只能（百度）网盘见了.” This comment received many likes, and 
many other comments echoed with it. 
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dependent on China’s ever-changing big environment. As noted by Zhou, “one feature of 
China’s online regulation and censorship of homosexuality is that it oscillates between being 
strict and being lax, and it is not always effective in practice, thus leaving a quite ambiguous 
space for netizens to test.”97 Sometimes, the subtitle groups do not self-censor any scenes from 
Thai Boys Love series. In mid 2020, for instance, they just translated and uploaded these series 
the way they originally are without any adjustment. 
Chinese fans, on the other side, try to limit their public discussion on anything sensitive 
related to Thai Boys Love series, even if loosely. How to use VPN is a representative example. 
Many Chinese fans of Thai Boys Love series hope to access banned social media apps like 
Twitter and Instagram to stay closer to the actors and directors they are fond of. Unfortunately, 
using VPN, known as “climbing over the (fire)wall” (fanqiang) or satirically “scientifically 
surfing the Internet” (kexue shangwang),98 is considered as illegal in China, notwithstanding the 
fact that the law is seldom stringently carried out. Therefore, it has become a taboo for most 
public online communities that are under governmental surveillance. Fans of Thai Boys Love 
series, unsurprisingly, do not want these series and actors to get into trouble because of this kind 
of “mistake.” In the pinned post of Weibo “super topic” (chaohua) community for Thai actors 
Off Jumpol Adulkittiporn and Gun Atthaphan Phunsawat, the person in charge requests all 
participants to avoid mentioning “VPN” in this community, no matter in what format. Otherwise, 
they reserve the rights to block any post that violates this regulation (fig. 8) before the censors 
may do so. As demonstrated previously, Chinese consumers of Thai Boys Love series pursue a 
balance and are inclined to minimize their self-censorship whenever possible. Within relatively 
private online communities where censors do not visit as frequently, like WeChat groups for 
 
97 Zhou. “From Online BL Fandom to the CCTV Spring Festival Gala.” 2017, p. 96. 
98 Mandarin (in order): 翻墙 and 科学上网. 
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fans, members usually assume that they possess more freedom to discuss sensitive topics than on 
directly accessible online platforms. 
As I have discussed before, the takedown of Thai Boys Love series in July 2017 was 
enforced in the name of copyright protection. Learning also from this incident, the subtitle 
groups become more aware of copyright and always enunciate the legitimacy of translating these 
series. To be sure, Chinese subtitle groups of all kinds had been deeply involved in the informal 
cultural economy, making use of the media works without getting permission from the copyright 
owners. In recent years, however, more and more organizations have begun to spend money to 
acquire copyright.99 This change remains applicable for Tianfu and CFan. According to members 
of Tianfu, nowadays, this group buys the copyright of Thai Boys Love series directly from the 
production companies. On condition that the copyright of a series is sold exclusively to Tianfu, 
members of CFan and other smaller Thai-to-Mandarin subtitle groups will not translate that 
series.100 Freeing the dissemination of Thai Boys Love series from any copyright infringement 
provides another shield against censor attempts from the state. 
Aside from subtitle groups and viewers/fans, Chinese event organizers also take pains to 
conduct self-censorship. The “HS Boys” story at the very beginning of this thesis vividly 
expounds such practices of detaching the actors from the Thai Boys Love series they are in and 
relinking them to an “idol group,” a non-troublesome image. Examples alike are too many to be 
enumerated. From mid 2017 to early 2018, when the six main actors of 2 Moons (dir. Meesuwan; 
2017) came to Chengdu, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Tianjin, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou for fan 
 
99 Hu, Kelly. “Between Informal and Formal Cultural Economy: Chinese Subtitle Groups and Flexible 
Accumulation in the Age of Online Viewing.” Routledge Handbook of East Asian Popular Culture, edited by 
Koichi Iwabuchi, Eva Tsai, and Chris Berry. Routledge, 2020, p. 49. 
100 See, for example, Limpongsatorn. A Study of Thailand’s Boys Love Drama and Its Transnational Chinese 
Audiences. 2020, pp. 69-71; She’er. “Uncover the Industry of How Thai Boys Love Series Produce Idols (in China): 
Invest Subtitle Groups, Hold Fan Meetings Secretly.” 2019. 
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meetings, they adopted the name “GBKCTT,” a simple assembly of their nickname initials.101 
GBKCTT was seldom used by Chinese fans. Rather, they clearly knew that it was an anonym 
that had to be created for these Thai boys to enter China (fig. 9). Granted that a few Chinese 
event organizers failed to dissociate these actors from the series they are in, such as “SOTUS S 
fan meetings” in Wuhan and Wuxi in mid 2018, it could be appreciated either as a “test” toward 
the “oscillation” of governmental censorship or as a “trust” toward China’s social context then. 
Moreover, these Thai actors behave in a reserved manner during fan meetings in China. Outside 
of the mainland, like in Hong Kong, Taipei, Bangkok, Manila, Seoul, or Tokyo, there is normally 
no constraint for them to show male-male intimacy on stage and sell gayness. In comparison, it 
often becomes a male-male brotherhood in China’s fan meetings, although they occasionally 
cunningly disclose “hints” of a supposedly closer relationship, such as looking right into each 
other’s eyes with smile. Interestingly, Chinese event organizers consciously abandon Beijing and 
Shanghai where governmental censorship is much more difficult to evade. Instead, they choose 
other modernized first-tier and second-tier cities with abundant fans of Thai Boys Love series to 
hold fan meetings. 
I would like to rearticulate that these tactics and examples above apply only to the time 
periods when these consumers feel that self-censorship is necessary after assessing China’s 
social context at the moment. The degree of their self-censorship keeps changing accordingly as 
well. They sometimes are quite relaxed if not unrestrained. At the end of 2020, a huge group of 
fans of Thai Boys Love series were organized and mobilized, using their votes to make I Told 
Sunset About You (dir. Kuno; 2020) the “most popular overseas drama of the 2020 Weibo 
awards,” with its main actors, PP Krit Amnuaydechkorn and Billkin Putthipong Assaratanakul, 
 
101 GBKCTT is for God Itthipat Thanit, Bas Suradej Pinnirat, Kim Varodom Khemmonta, Copter Panuwat 
Kerdthongtavee, Tae Darvid Kreepolrerk, and Tee Thanapon Jarujitranon. 
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the top two of the “most popular overseas star of the 2020 Weibo awards.” It was something 
risky, but luckily the series or the actors have not yet faced any consequences. Most of the time, 
Chinese consumers of Thai Boys Love series are aware of the might of governmental censorship 
and their “responsibility” to practice self-censorship, which, by this token, can be regarded as a 
meticulous act toward a potential threat. Thus, they stay cautious and alert, or at least they know 
they should. 
In sum, through all these efforts by Chinese viewers/fans, subtitle groups, as well as 
event organizers, Thai Boys Love series and the actors seem to be attentively safeguarded. They 
exercise their agency and come up with strategies to make use of the space left under the porous 
governmental censorship. This is to ensure that these series remain safe and easily accessible 
under current circumstances. 
 
Carnival Under Censorship 
In spite of the hegemony of governmental censorship, almost no Chinese consumers of Thai 
Boys Love series tend to undermine it. It appears that most of them are pretty contented with the 
status quo and the flourishing of these series in China. Their collective reluctance to stand up and 
resist is caused by numerous societal, historical, and ideological factors. What they are always 
prioritizing is the carnivalesque consumption that is still possible under today’s social context. 
The idea of “90 percent freedom”102 in the novel The Fat Years (auth. Chan; 2009) can be 
applied to this scenario. Although Chinese consumers of Thai Boys Love series are not entirely 
satisfied for the reality that they need to continuously stay alerted and practice self-censorship 
 
102 “90 percent freedom” (jiucheng ziyou 九成自由) is used by Chinese writer Chan Koonchung in his sci-fi (science 
fiction) novel The Fat Years to delineate people’s living conditions in the fictional Chinese society after China 
enters a “golden age of ascendency” but is still under a one-party rule. See Koonchung Chan. “Shengshi: zhongguo 
2013 nian” 盛世: 中国 2013年 [The Fat Years, 2009], translated by Michael S. Duke. Anchor Books, 2011, p. 145. 
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under the state apparatus, this “90 percent freedom” is acceptable for them, and they prioritize to 
focus on enjoying consuming these series. 
 The carnivalesque consumption is vibrant and flamboyant, which is, in addition to the 
dynamic fan meetings or lively online discussion, well crystallized by the “bullet screens” 
(danmu; a.k.a. “bullet curtains”)103 covered on these Thai Boys Love series. “Bullet screens” is a 
function on many video sharing platforms that enables instant comments from the audience to be 
overlaid on the screen directly and temporarily. Media works with popularity are always covered 
by plentiful interactive and sometimes colorful bullet screens (fig. 10), which can be turned off 
simply by clicking a button. Usually scrolling from right to left or popping up in the middle and 
then vanishing, bullet screens can be used by the audience to anonymously express excitement, 
confusion, complain, or just nonsense to all other viewers who are watching or later watch the 
same video. Studies suggest that this technology provides a more engaging “social viewing” 
experience for the audience.104 This engaging viewing experience is exceedingly important for 
Chinese fans of Thai Boys Love series, which is another reason why they manage to protect the 
public online platforms that enable bullet screens to function, even though Baidu Web Drive 
(private and without bullet screens) is always available for them to watch Thai Boys Love series 
alone. Among all the major platforms in late 2020 for Chinese viewers to watch Thai Boys Love 
series, Renren Shipin has become the most welcomed one, which also reflects the crucial 
significance of bullet screens. This app enables the audience to send real-time colorful texts and 
emojis (fig. 11): this feeling of watching together and “talking with” others in the fan community 
is captivating, making Thai Boys Love series more compelling. 
 
103 Danmu 弹幕 (share same Chinese characters with the Japanese term danmaku 弾幕). 
104 See, for example, Soussan Djamasbi, Adrienne Hall-Phillips, Zaozao Liu, Wenting Li, and Jing Bian. “Social 
Viewing, Bullet Screen, and User Experience: A First Look.” 49th Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences, 2016, pp. 648-657. 
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 On the organizational side, the subtitle groups play an irreplaceable role in maintaining 
this carnival by their informal and funny translation. As noted in Chapter One, Tianfu was first 
known for its casual way of translation, and many members of CFan were from Tianfu. Their 
casual way of translation is embodied in the deliberate lack of preciousness when translating but 
without disrupting the overall flow of the series or causing misunderstanding among viewers. 
Admittedly, the translation style ultimately depends on the specific members who are in charge, 
and a few series are indeed translated in a formal manner, but by and large, their informal and 
funny style is patently obvious and continues till now. This style is powerful in embellishing and 
even reframing Thai Boys Love series, and there are three noteworthy aspects. 
 First, the subtitle groups exhibit creativity and humor. It includes commenting, joking, 
transliterating, interpreting, highlighting, adapting to China’s context, and simply mistranslating 
for certain effects. The goal, ultimately, is to amuse, relax, and attract the audience (fig. 12). In 
episode 5 of Love Sick (dir. Kusolkulsiri; 2014), the two male characters, Noh and Phun, have 
been close with each other, but neither goes further to initiate a boyfriend relationship. In one 
scene, Noh comes to take care of Phun, saying to him, “you will be fine, bro.” Anticipating the 
moods of the audience facing their ambiguity, other than the translation, the translators insert a 
comment/joke, “can you just call him ‘dear’”105 (fig. 13), which must resonate with the thoughts 
of the viewers when watching this scene. In episode 2 of TharnType, there is a transitional scene 
depicting the reactions of different members in a private online group after someone mistakenly 
posts a porn clip. A member follows up a message, teasing that “if you want to send something, 
can it be more useful?”106 Since this scene has nothing to do with understanding the main 
storylines, it is translated as “can you guys send something that aligns with the Core Socialist 
 
105 Mandarin: “叫亲爱的可好?” 
106 Thai: จะส่งทั้งท่ี ขอสร้างสรรค์บา้งเถอะ. 
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Values?”107 Non-Chinese people may find it hard to comprehend, but Chinese viewers will get 
the point straight away. Through countless elements altered by the subtitle groups, Thai Boys 
Love series become funnier and more fascinating for the audience. 
 Second, the subtitle groups intentionally increase or even fabricate the intimacy of the 
male-male couple(s) in Thai Boys Love series. How they every now and then remold the 
pronoun phi108 in the Thai language is noteworthy. Phi is a common pronoun in the Thai society, 
referring to anyone who is elder than the speaker. It is used in nearly every occasion, such as 
when young people chat with an elder taxi driver. Unsurprisingly, it is frequently used in Thai 
Boys Love series, but it sometimes carries a different tinge after being translated into Mandarin. 
In Until We Meet Again (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2019), when the emotionally vulnerable Pharm 
talks to Dean, phi is occasionally translated as “little elder brother” (xiaogege),109 referring to the 
cute and handsome young boys whom the speaker wants to be relationally close with. Owing to 
the usage of “little elder brother,” the relationship between Pharm and Dean suddenly becomes 
much more ambivalent and intimate. It might be the personal interpretations from the translators: 
in their opinions, the usage is probably appropriate for these scenes. Similarly, sentence-final 
Chinese modal particles, such as la, ne, o, and ya110 are manipulated by the subtitle groups when 
translating Thai Boys Love series. These uninflected words are at times added when these boys 
communicate with others (not only between the male-male couples), highlighting their cuteness 
and creating a more intimate vibe among them. By doing so, the audience is more excited and 
invigorated when watching these series. 
 
107 Mandarin: “你们能不能发点符合社会主义价值观的东西啊.” 
108 Thai: พ่ี. 
109 Mandarin: 小哥哥. 
110 Mandarin (in order): 啦, 呢, 哦, 呀. In most cases, these sentence-final modal particles do not hold meanings but 
can have some connotations (like indicating the friendliness or cuteness of the speaker). 
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 Third, the subtitle groups deliberately strengthen and underline the top/bottom binary in 
their translation that is by no means notable in Thai Boys Love series. However problematic, this 
gendered dichotomy guides the perceptions of Chinese consumers toward male-male love. 
According to Yang and Xu, the conventions of Japanese Boys Love help lay the foundation of 
the Chinese iteration.111 The concept of top/bottom (seme/uke) has exerted tremendous impacts 
on Chinese people’s knowledge of homosexuality. Both seme and uke have a Chinese character 
plus a Hiragana. The character means “attacker/aggressor” and “receiver,” respectively, and are 
straightforwardly recognizable for Chinese speakers. These two Chinese characters have been 
adopted directly to replicate an equivalent top/bottom (gong/shou)112 dualism: both gong and 
shou are indispensable in a male-male relationship, and not only do they complement each other, 
the rigid top/bottom stipulation is barely reversible. This dominant thinking is endorsed by 
Chinese fans of Thai Boys Love series, and the subtitle groups utilize their mindset and actively 
meet their expectations via intentional translation. Back in 2011, Empresses in the Palace (dir. 
Zheng), a Chinese series set in the Qing Dynasty, made popular the pronoun bengong.113 This 
pronoun, used by the empress or high-ranking consorts when speaking to people in lower status, 
literally means “I, who own this palace.” Because the second Chinese character of this pronoun 
has the same pronunciation with “top” in Mandarin, Boys Love fans invented another bengong, 
which means “I, as the top.” Benshou, meaning “I, as the bottom,” was created simultaneously to 
match this notion.114 Based on the interpretations or imaginations of the translators, these two 
words are regularly assigned to the more active or aggressive side and the more passive or gentle 
side of male-male couples in these series. In episode 2 of Dark Blue Kiss (dir. Chaiwimol; 2019), 
 
111 Yang and Xu. “Chinese Danmei Fandom and Cultural Globalization from Below.” 2017, p. 9. 
112 Mandarin: 攻/受 (stem from the Japanese notion seme/uke 攻め/受け). 
113 Mandarin: 本宫, 宫 means “palace.” 
114 Mandarin (in order): 本攻 and 本受. 
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in one scene, Pete informs his boyfriend Kao “I will wait right here”115 with slight impatience 
and anger. Due to the personas of these two characters, this line by Pete is translated as “I, as the 
top, will wait right here” (fig. 14). Sporadic assignment of the pronouns “I, as the top” and the 
corresponding “I, as the bottom” penetrates this series and many other Thai Boys Love series.116 
This transformation reinforces and normalizes the top/bottom binary in male-male couples. 
Furthermore, top/bottom seems to reflect the personalities of each individual, rather than merely 
representing an actually reversible coital role allocation. 
Likewise, faen,117 referring to “boyfriend,” “girlfriend,” or partner of any gender in the 
Thai language, is from time to time translated as “husband” (laogong) or “wife” (laopo)118 in 
Mandarin by the subtitle groups. This also speaks to the hegemony of the top/bottom binary and 
the efforts of the subtitle groups. As can be noticed from the bullet screens and comments, many 
Chinese fans of Thai Boys Love series love this kind of translation and energetically discuss the 
top/bottom relationship of these characters. Through deliberate translation that strengthens and 
underscores the top/bottom binary, the subtitle groups not only cater to the needs of the audience, 
allowing the translated Thai Boys Love series to be much more arresting, but also further bring 
dynamics to the carnivalesque consumption. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter started by elucidating the porosity of China’s censorship, indicating that there is 
always more or less room left for people to strategically get around governmental censorship. It 
 
115 Thai: กูรอแม่งตรงน้ีแหละ. 
116 Many Thai Boys Love series are adapted from Boys Love novels. It is possible that the top/bottom relationship in 
the translation comes from the novels, but most series do not indicate that on the screen. 
117 Thai: แฟน. 
118 Mandarin (in order): 老公 (sometimes presented as 老攻; 攻, meaning “top,” has the same pronunciation with 公, 
which is another parody), 老婆. 
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continued to elaborate on the self-censorship practiced by most Chinese consumers of Thai Boys 
Love series, including viewers/fans, subtitle groups, and event organizers, in order to dodge the 
undesired attention from the censors. The tactics are extrapolated from previous experiences and 
constantly adjusted in response to China’s ever-changing social context. Then, it unveiled the 
“carnival under censorship” by scrutinizing the carnivalesque consumption of Thai Boys Love 






Figure 6 and 7. The display of male-male intimacy on Douyin (Tik Tok). Showing male-male intimacy 
has always been a way to attract viewers and popularize accounts. The two males in figure 6 declare they 
are “siblings,” and the two males in figure 7 say they are just “roommates.” Dissociating their closeness 
from a potential gayness may keep this kind of media representations away from the censorship. Despite 
that, a few Chinese men do avowedly articulate a gay identity on public online platforms, including their 
Douyin accounts. Screenshotted from Douyin accounts @guixiaogui and @zhongkexuezhang on October 






Figure 8. Announcement posted on July 24, 2020 and tinned at the offgun “super topic” (chaohua) 
community on Weibo. It requests all participants (“babii” is the name for fans of Off and Gun, which is in 
line with the convention of the international fan community) to restrain from mentioning “VPN” in their 
participations. The announcement itself does not mention VPN: it includes this three-letter taboo in the 





Figure 9. Poster of “GBKCTT” fan meeting in Wuhan on October 28, 2017. These Thai boys are the main 
actors of 2 Moons (dir. Meesuwan; 2017). In this poster, they are distanced from this Thai Boys Love 
series, and many Chinese elements are incorporated, making this event appear to be more admissible. 




Figure 10. Fan-edited video displaying male-male intimate moments of the eight main characters in Love 
by Chance (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2018). The bullet screens generated by the excited viewers are abundant 





Figure 11. Episode 10 of Together with Me (dir. Boonyoprakarn; 2017). In this scene, Knock finds out 
that his girlfriend has affairs with another man. Most viewers collectively change the bullet screens to the 
green color. In contemporary Chinese popular culture, the green color is a signifier of being cheated in a 




Figure 12. Episode 6 of Cause You’re My Boy (dir. Kusolkulsiri; 2018; a.k.a. My Tee). Mork says to Tee, 
“if something else comes out, you will have to see for yourself.” However, in the Mandarin translation, it 
becomes some “dirty talk” that makes their relationship more intimate: “to see if other things are ‘hard’ or 
not, we need to try and see.” It is notable that in the Mandarin word for “try” (shishi), a male-sign emoji is 
inserted in between. In contemporary Chinese popular culture, this emoji can connote male-male intimacy 




Figure 13. Episode 5 of Love Sick (dir. Kusolkulsiri; 2014). Produced by Middleman Media and 









The Alternative World to Escape from the Reality 
 
Throughout all online platforms where Chinese consumers of Thai Boys Love series assemble, 
there is one topic they never stop talking about: the liberal and inclusive world of Thailand. They 
discuss, enjoy, and on occasion envy the liberty and inclusiveness of not merely the idealized, 
utopian Thailand depicted in these series, but the imagined Thailand in reality as well (the latter 
part is detailed in Chapter Four). This impression is well exemplified by the saying, “the summer 
of Thailand never ends, the boys I adore are always in love,”119 which conspicuously swept 
across Chinese consumers of Thai Boys Love series after the release of I Told Sunset About You 
(dir. Kuno; 2020). This unprecedentedly popular series is set in Thailand’s Phuket Province. The 
tropical climate and landscape there, like the breathtaking beaches and swaying coconut palms, 
have become another icon that speaks to the “freedom” of Thailand (fig. 15). Since the release of 
the “first” Thai Boys Love series, Love Sick (dir. Kusolkulsiri; 2014), the Thai-style college and 
high school life, characterized most remarkably by the school uniform (fig. 16), has always been 
a symbol that connotes the alleged liberty and inclusiveness of Thailand, especially in respect of 
male-male relationships. This impression has convinced countless Chinese viewers and has been 
reinforced by the continually emerging Thai Boys Love series. 
 The admiration toward this “liberal and inclusive place” is so prevalent among Chinese 
viewers of Thai Boys Love series that it has almost become a cliché. It is important, then, to 
contemplate why they love the world delineated in the series by taking into consideration both 
 
119 Mandarin: 泰兰德的夏天永不停歇，我爱的少年永远热恋. The characters “泰兰德” (tailande), different from 
the standardized Chinese name of Thailand “泰国” (taiguo), is a transliteration of “Thailand.” The name “泰兰德” 
sounds more romantic. 
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the realities confronted by these viewers and what the features of the “alternative world” located 
in these series are. This chapter inspects the lived experiences and day-to-day struggles shared by 
most Chinese audience members of Thai Boys Love series, crystallizing some noteworthy traits 
of these series that are attractive to them. 
 
Escapism and Utopianism 
As the English film critic Richard Dyer shrewdly brings up in his “Entertainment and Utopia,” 
entertainment offers the image of “something better” to escape into, or something people want 
deeply that their day-to-day lives do not provide. Alternatives, hopes, and wishes are the stuff of 
utopia, the sense that things could be better, that something other than what is can be imagined 
and maybe realized.120 A later interpretation on Dyer’s idea contends that the audience consumes 
media products to escape social tension, inadequacy, and absence, so entertainment can provide 
“a utopian dimension and an escapist solution for day-to-day existence.”121 
This model of people escaping into a utopian space and consuming the better alternatives, 
unsurprisingly, is prevalent within Boys Love culture since its birth. Scholarly interpretations of 
Boys Love phenomenon have often centered around the potential that its narratives may offer in 
enabling mainly young straight-identified women to express an indirect critique of the dominant, 
patriarchal, and (hetero)sexist cultural systems to which they are subject.122 For example, the 
love between two male characters allow these female consumers to imagine an egalitarianism 
between partners, which is less imaginable in cross-sex relationships.123 Consuming Boys Love 
 
120 Dyer, Richard. Only Entertainment, second edition. Routledge, 2002, p. 20. 
121 D’Angelo, Sandra. “Sampling the Sense of Place in Baile Funk Music.” Relocating Popular Music, edited by 
Ewa Mazierska and Georgina Gregory. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 49. 
122 Martin, Fran. “Queer Pop Culture in the Sinophone Mediasphere.” Routledge Handbook of East Asian Popular 
Culture, edited by Koichi Iwabuchi, Eva Tsai, and Chris Berry. Routledge, 2020, pp. 191-201. 
123 McLelland, Mark. “Why are Japanese Girls' Comics Full of Boys Bonking?” Refractory, 2006, p. 10. 
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culture is also seen as a means for these girls/women to “sublimate negative notions concerning 
femaleness and femininity by imaginatively disguising themselves as boys/men.”124 Why certain 
men like Boys Love is scrutinized too. Many male consumers of Boys Love culture identify with 
the “bottom” character and in this way challenge and reject the socially constructed powerfulness 
that men are expected to have. Through the process coined “self-feminization,” they enjoy the 
character’s dependency and reliance on a more competent and more masculine “other” in this 
alternative world.125 It is obvious that entertainment as a whole and Boys Love culture can both 
embody and present “something better” for the consumers. 
What the majority of Chinese viewers can get from Thai Boys Love series is precisely in 
concordance with these scholarly treatments toward entertainment and Boys Love culture. The 
things lacking in their daily lives can be found in the world portrayed in Thai Boys Love series, 
which offers them relaxation, pleasure, and hopes. They are captivated with the alternative world 
where they are able to escape from the somewhat unsatisfactory reality. Two aspects stand out, 
as can be discerned from what they like to talk about in the bullet screens and comments when 
consuming these series. As I said in Chapter One, this thesis is not confined to the “essence” of 
Thai Boys Love series, male-male love. The first aspect, “living conditions,” has nothing to do 
with love, while the second aspect, “freedom to love,” returns to the essence. 
 
Living Conditions 
It should be emphasized again that most Chinese viewers of Thai Boys Love series are women 
with an urban background. Cities that host the greatest number of viewers, Beijing, Shanghai, 
 
124 Nagaike, Kazumi, and Katsuhiko Suganuma. “Editorial: Transnational Boys’ Love Fan Studies.” Transformative 
Works and Cultures, special issue, 2013. 
125 Nagaike. “Do Heterosexual Men Dream of Homosexual Men?” 2015, pp. 189-209. 
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Chongqing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Shenzhen, are all populous, fast-paced megacities. Based 
on a research conducted on the demographics of several Weibo “super topic” (chaohua) of Thai 
Boys Love series, around 90% of the Chinese viewers are youth aged from 18 to 34, within 
which the amount of people with a job position slightly exceeds students.126 Most people in both 
the leading groups are facing exhausting living conditions, largely because of the unaffordability, 
instability, and uncontrollability of housing. 
 For any Chinese office worker in big cities, finding a place to live is never easy, unless 
one enjoys the privilege of being a local, has very substantial income, or receives considerable 
financial support from others. China features the skyrocketing of housing prices in nearly all big 
cities since its economic takeoff, specifically since the early 2000s, sadly with no end in sight. 
Purchasing or renting a place to live, thus, becomes painfully unaffordable for most people. A 
2014 report on housing situation of employed youth in Beijing clearly showcases that the 
housing problem is a main source of pressure and worry for Chinese young people today, which 
has severely influenced their quality of life and social mentality.127 It is still the case during the 
completion of this thesis (2020-2021). According to price-to-income ratio, China now occupies 
more than half of the world’s top ten most expensive cities for residential property: in all first-
tier and some second-tier and third-tier cities, housing prices have become out of reach for 
ordinary wage earners.128 For example, in the four top-tier cities (beishangguangshen: Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen),129 average people’s yearly salary cannot even afford the 
 
126 She’er. “Uncover the Industry of How Thai Boys Love Series Produce Idols (in China).” 2019. 
127 Li, Chunling, Xuehong Li, and Haijuan Li. “Report on the Housing Situation of Employed Youth in Beijing 
2014: Survey on the Development of Adolescents in Beijing 2014.” Chinese Research Perspectives on Society: 
Social Analysis and Forecast of China (2015), edited by Guangjin Chen, Peilin Li, and Yi Zhang. Brill, 2018, p. 
243. 
128 Hao, Pu. “China’s Urban Housing: Past and Present.” Handbook on Urban Development in China, edited by June 
Wang, Ray Yep, and Thomas Johnson. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019, p. 93. 
129 Mandarin: 北上广深. 
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housing prices of one square meter (approximately 10.76 square feet) in the central or promising 
districts. 
 As a result, many people have to squeeze in small rented apartments if they want to live 
closer to the core area of big cities. Most have one or usually more than one roommate(s), seeing 
slim hope of purchasing their own housing properties. For them, it is not astonishing if their per 
capita housing space is beneath, say, twenty square meters (approximately 215.28 square feet). It 
is particularly applicable to the “drifters” (piao), migrant workers who come to big cities to find 
opportunities in hope of becoming wealthier.130 Increasing people have decided to live far away 
from the core area, with Yanjiao of Hebei Province right next to Beijing as a representative 
example, but they need to commute for around four to six hours every business day, because they 
can only afford public transportation. Not every landlord of theirs is kindhearted, making many 
people’s accommodation experiences further unstable. Notwithstanding their struggles, the loan 
(if they purchase with a down-payment) or the rent still wipes out a large proportion of their 
earnings. The living conditions of most Chinese office workers are this hard. 
 For any Chinese university student, the dorms most of them live in are uncontrollable and 
depressing to some degree. A typical Chinese university dorm is less than twenty square meters 
in size and accommodates at least four students, packed with students’ books, clothes, and other 
daily necessities (fig. 17).131 Facilities like bathrooms and laundry rooms are usually shared by 
dozens of students. Entering the halls of the other sex is strictly prohibited. Power and hot water 
are off at some points. Roommates cannot be changed once the assignment is finished prior to 
 
130 Mandarin: 漂. For example, “Beijing-drifters” (beipiao 北漂) refers to people without a Beijing household 
(hukou 户口) who work in Beijing, “Shanghai-drifters” (hupiao 沪漂) refers to this dynamic in Shanghai. It is 
difficult to get the hukou of big cities even though one has worked there for years. Hukou of big cities is an appeal in 
China’s “marriage market.” 
131 Cai, Shenshen. Contemporary Chinese Films and Celebrity Directors. Springer Singapore, 2017, p. 99. 
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the first semester. For some extreme examples, air conditioners are not equipped and stairs are 
not renovated. There are better dorms for foreign students, but ironically, the main viewers of 
Thai Boys Love series do not have such privilege. 
 Despite the impressive affordability and the supposed sense of unity among roommates, 
university students are not endowed with the power to determine their own living conditions. To 
put it colloquially, they have to pay for the dorm they are assigned to without the possibility to 
upgrade to a preferable environment by spending a little bit more. Admittedly, they may choose 
not to live in the dorms after finalizing the payment, but off-campus options are much more 
unaffordable because most prestigious Chinese universities are located in big cities. Unless their 
home is close to school, most students ultimately live in the dorms. The lack of private space, the 
conflicts with roommates, inconvenience, messiness, and the ubiquity of noise are the most 
reported problems of their dorm experiences. Since they are powerless to determine or change 
the living conditions, for some students, negative emotions gradually pile up and eventually lead 
to depression and other mental concerns. Many Chinese university students list “living in the 
dorms” as the worst experience during their time in school.132 
 Apparently, most Chinese people in the leading consumption groups of Thai Boys Love 
series view their own living conditions as undesirable and unsatisfactory. They seem to be stuck 
in this dark side of China’s rapid development in recent decades. To make matters worse, their 
anxiety toward housing and sometimes other capitals/properties keeps impacting them on the 
psychological level. Nowadays, owning a house (in big cities) is one of the most important goals 
for many Chinese young people and symbolizes one’s success and career status.133 Many people 
 
132 Some information comes from the answers under the Quora question “what does it feel like to live in a college 
dorm in China,” and some information comes from the casual conversations with my friends who study in Chinese 
universities. 
133 Li et al. “Report on the Housing Situation of Employed Youth in Beijing 2014.” 2018, p. 243. 
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endure this mindset, devoting their entire life to purchasing a decent apartment in big cities and 
expecting to maintain a harmonious family by doing so.134 Exploiting themselves and sacrificing 
their own leisure time, they are making great efforts in order to achieve this goal. For the office 
workers, according to a survey covered by the state-sponsored China Daily, more than eighty 
percent of employees in China are overworked and under mental and physical stress at an 
average or higher level.135 The prevailing “996 working hour system” (a.k.a. “996 practice”), 
requiring employees to work from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days per week and endorsed by Chinese 
billionaire Ma Yun, appears to be at one extreme end of the spectrum, but it serves as a vivid 
microcosm of China’s stressful working milieu. For the university students, they are confronting 
an era of “involution” (neijuan),136 a term popularized in the late 2010s to describe the overly 
excessive competition in many fields that is going to result in the increasingly higher standards 
and at length the energy exhaustion for all participants who get consciously or subconsciously 
involuted. For them, they strive to maintain a high GPA (ideally 3.8+ out of 4.0, but the standard 
keeps rising), take part in as many extracurricular activities as possible, and grab other chances 
to build their resume, with the unease toward their future that never gives them a break. Despite 
their endeavors and sacrifices of the current living conditions, no one can guarantee them “the 
best is yet to come.” This is something embedded in the state instrumentality and the society’s 
overall structure. Many people’s anxiety and discontent toward living conditions last throughout 
their lifetime, and “something better” can only be realized by imagination. 
 
134 It is a complicated and rich topic to talk about. For example, some young people complete the down-payment 
(shoufu 首付) of a decent apartment in big cities with almost all savings from their parents in order to successfully 
get married and spend the rest of their life paying the mortgage. 
135 “China Daily.” “Most Chinese Employees Overworked: Survey.” China Daily. 2 Nov. 2018. 
136 Mandarin: 内卷. This concept called “involution,” meaning an increasing elaboration within a fixed space or 
activity domain, originates from American anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s “Agricultural Involution: The Processes 
of Ecological Change in Indonesia” published in 1963. The meaning can be slightly different in China’s widespread 
use of this concept today. 
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 That is how Thai Boys Love series come into play by providing a utopian world for the 
Chinese audience to escape into and enjoy the better alternatives. These series can activate and 
prolong their imaginations toward what life can possibly become. Most main characters in Thai 
Boys Love series are from upper-middle-class background, which can be told directly from their 
skin color. Akin to the mechanism High discusses in her essay on Laos, skin color in Thailand 
and many Asian countries is not related to race by any means, but rather acts as an indicator of a 
person’s social status, since a light skin color needs to be underpinned through wealth.137 People 
in Thailand, a highly hierarchical society, are aware of their social status, using their skin color, 
location, and decorations (e.g., clothes, jewelries) to shape others’ perceptions on them and make 
judgements on others.138 The light skin color of most main characters in Thai Boys Love series 
indicates their relatively high social status, which echoes with their background as well as other 
behaviors in the series. They have very decent places to live in and seem not to worry about their 
living conditions at all. Since most Thai Boys Love series still focus on life in Bangkok, the only 
top-tier city and the absolute center of Thailand, their living conditions are more enviable for the 
Chinese audience. 
 The exquisitely decorated apartments and student dorms are the most shown residential 
places in Thai Boys Love series, and the main characters usually have their own bedroom and 
bathroom (a few have a roommate), such as Wayo in 2 Moons (dir. Meesuwan; 2017), Tharn and 
Type (roommate) in TharnType (dir. Sintanaparadee; 2019), and Pharm in Until We Meet Again 
(dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2019). Others live in their house with family, such as Fuse in Make It Right 
(dir. Sawatmaneekul et al.; 2016), Mork in Cause You’re My Boy (dir. Kusolkulsiri; 2018), and 
 
137 High, Holly. “Poverty and Merit: Mobile Persons in Laos.” Everyday Life in Southeast Asia, edited by Kathleen 
M. Adams and Kathleen A. Gillogly. Indiana University Press, 2011, pp. 37-46. 
138 Spencer, Dale C. “‘Authenticity’, Muay Thai and Habitus.” Fighting Scholars: Habitus and Ethnographies of 
Martial Arts and Combat Sports, edited by Dale C. Spencer and Raúl Sánchez García. Anthem Press, 2013, p. 175. 
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Teh in I Told Sunset About You. To feature an attractive “identity” for the audience, some main 
characters are even set as the “young master” (khun chai)139 of eminent or at least extremely rich 
family, such as Phun in Love Sick, Tin in Love by Chance (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2018) and Love 
by Chance 2: A Chance to Love (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2020) (fig. 17), and Tian in 1000stars (dir. 
Chaiwimol; 2021), who live in huge and luxurious houses. From the perspective of most Chinese 
viewers, these characters are blessed by economic strength and adequate freedom to determine 
where to live. Even if a few main characters are devoid of money from the setting, such as Mork 
in Dark Blue Kiss (dir. Chaiwimol; 2019) and Tutor in Why R U (dir. Wongskulphat; 2020) who 
need to work part-time to earn their daily expense, the places they live in by no means align with 
the assumptions most Chinese viewers would have. Both Mork and Tutor live in a single room, 
and their condo must appear to be unreachable for them (fig. 18). The lived experiences and day-
to-day struggles of most Chinese viewers in reality are at odds with the depicted lives of most 
main characters in Thai Boys Love series. From this point of view, Thai Boys Love series offer 
them a utopian space to consume the “better alternatives,” allowing them to establish attachment 
to the more satisfactory living conditions. 
 Given their material conditions, most main characters in Thai Boys Love series lead a 
relaxed and hedonistic lifestyle. Although they are supposed to be busy with schoolwork or jobs 
from the setting, it seems on the screen that they have inexhaustible leisure time for interpersonal 
communication and entertainment. When their friends or partners are in trouble or in bad mood, 
they always have the spare time to accompany them and deal with the problems. Their lives after 
class or after work, from partying at bars to going shopping with peers, reveal the abundance of 
freedom in terms of time and money. In spite of their carefree and relaxed attitudes, life does not 
 
139 Thai: คุณชาย. 
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fail to prepare them with a favorable future and an admiring living environment. Most Chinese 
viewers decipher this as a purely commercialized fictional media portrayal. Thus, instead of 
becoming cynical, they tend to obtain what they want (i.e., what they lack in real life) through 
consuming these series. They consider the living conditions of most main characters in the series 
as “better alternatives” vis-à-vis their own living conditions. For sure, better living conditions are 
hard to achieve in reality, but their dream toward “something better” is easy to be realized by 
getting involved in this alternative world. Many Chinese viewers imagine themselves to be the 
main characters who lead the desirable lifestyle without any worry about housing issues. Thai 
Boys Love series construct this utopian space for them to find a sense of belonging and enjoy the 
imaginary experiences, which at the same time compensates for the absence of such experiences 
in their real lives and brings them hopes toward a better future. 
 
Freedom to Love 
Love unquestionably is the core of all Thai Boys Love series. The male-male-love stories in the 
series represent how every love should be respected and make the Chinese audience jealous. For 
them, the “love” delineated in most Thai Boys Love series is in its pure and idealistic state, 
particularly compared to the way they choose, if not the way they are forced to choose, a partner 
in reality with significant social constraints in terms of how the partnership might be influenced 
by dominant norms and judged by other people. This section looks into the other trait, “freedom 
to love,” that renders Thai Boys Love series arresting for most Chinese viewers. 
 The pairing up between men and women has historically been China’s hegemonic social 
institution that governs its people. In spite of its rapid social transformations in recent decades, 
the institution of marriage remains normatively robust, and the traditional expectation that every 
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person will get married persists.140 Most pressures come from people’s own family, especially 
parents, because a successful marriage of their children is a matter of “face” as they interact with 
relatives, neighbors, and friends.141 The “marriage-matching corners” (xiangqinjiao)142 across 
Chinese cities is a case in point (fig. 20). Parents mostly in their 50s and 60s gather there to look 
for a partner for their children. The matching process is objectifying and depersonalizing, as the 
person being “advertised” is circumscribed to age, height, weight, education, hukou, occupation, 
income, health condition, marital status, and properties of the family (housing, car). Normally 
his/her picture is not attached. Nowadays, more and more Chinese youth realize that marriage is 
a social norm rather than a must. Most of their parents, however, do not attempt to understand 
this generational gap and still urge them to marry someone, which might destabilize the family’s 
harmony.143 The problem is further intensified by the one-child policy spanning 1979 to 2015. 
The “only child” in the aftermath of this controversial national policy shoulders much more 
pressures from the family: they are expected to not only get married, but also have offspring to 
continue the family clan of father’s and mother’s side. Unfortunately, most Chinese viewers of 
Thai Boys Love series now are the “only child” of their family. 
 Gay men make up a minor but nonnegligible part of Chinese viewers who consume Thai 
Boys Love series. Most of them are young people facing marital and parental stress. Marriage is 
conceivably their top concern among all the challenges, since most of them have no option but to 
negotiate this issue with their family.144 Exposing their non-heteronormative identity is never 
 
140 Davis, Deborah S. “Demographic Challenges for a Rising China.” Daedalus, vol. 143, no. 2, 2014, pp. 26-38. 
141 Choi, Susanne YP, and Ming Luo. “Performative Family: Homosexuality, Marriage, and Intergenerational 
Dynamics in China.” The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 67, no. 2, 2016, p. 267. 
142 Mandarin: 相亲角. The “marriage-matching corner” in People’s Park of Shanghai is the most well-known. 
143 Ma, Chunhua. “The Pressure to Get Married is Tearing China’s Families Apart.” Sixth Tone. 3 Sep. 2018. 
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easy, to say nothing of pursuing the people they like freely. Even if they have a boyfriend or 
sexual partner(s), they are likely to keep it a secret within close friend circles. As of early 2020, 
Blued, a Chinese dating app for gay men, accumulated more than 24 million registered users in 
China alone,145 but few Chinese gay men dare to embrace their identity in reality. Many Chinese 
gay men, those from lower-middle-class background in particular, will remain closeted and 
ultimately get married with a probably heterosexual woman as a means to be incorporated into 
the marriage and family system, eschewing the troubles from the family and fulfilling their filial 
piety.146 This familial “oppression” not merely exists in China, but across East Asia: gayness is a 
“family problem,” as portrayed in many East Asian media products.147 South Korean movie Two 
Weddings and a Funeral (dir. Kim; 2012) starts with the “contract marriage” between a gay man 
and his lesbian friend so that both can fulfill their family responsibility and satisfy their parents. 
Meanwhile, a few Chinese gay men question the heteronormative marriage system and manage 
to negotiate their individual autonomy with their family.148 Nevertheless, the regulative power of 
marriage as a hegemonic social institution should not be underestimated, under which Chinese 
gay men’s freedom to love is greatly undermined. 
  Young women in China, the leading consumption group of Thai Boys Love series, face 
similar pressures, which is well evidenced by the omnipresent “leftover women” (shengnü)149 
discourse targeting mainly urban unmarried women and carried out by China’s mass media 
 
145 It is common for a person to register multiple accounts and it is also possible that some non-gay people register 
just for curiosity, but many Chinese gay men have not yet registered on Blued. Nonetheless, this data released by 
Blued reflects the huge amount of gay men in China. 
146 Wang, Stephanie Yingyi. “When Tongzhi Marry: Experiments of Cooperative Marriage Between Lalas and Gay 
Men in Urban China.” Feminist Studies, vol. 45, no. 1, 2019, p. 16. 
147 Berry, Chris. “Asian Values, Family Values: Film, Video, and Lesbian and Gay Identities.” Gay and Lesbian 
Asia: Culture, Identity, Community, edited by Gerard Sullivan and Peter A. Jackson. Haworth Press, 2001, p. 215. 
148 Choi and Luo. “Performative Family.” 2016, pp. 260-280; Ning et al. “Negotiations Between Chinese Gay Men 
and Lesbians and Their Parents About Marriage.” 2019, pp. 1-10. 
149 Mandarin: 剩女. 
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campaign since 2007. The single women aged broadly 25 (27) or older are depicted as unwanted 
and thereby they must hurry up to find a partner to get married.150 The term “leftover men” 
(shengnan)151 was invented simultaneously to ridicule men who are old enough to marry but do 
not for whatever reason. Although many Chinese women choose to prioritize their career or self-
actualization over marriage, the society and people around them will constantly exert pressures 
on them through the regulative “leftover women” discourse. Their parents are noticeably more 
worried: they are afraid that their daughter will remain single, which means there will be no man 
to support her and no children to be at her side. Their daughter’s 25-year-old birthday is probably 
the watershed for their anxiety, after which they will spare no effort to “promote” their daughter, 
from advertising her online and offline to requesting her to meet all kinds of single men that 
meet their “standards.” They will ultimately encourage their daughter to get married, even if with 
someone she does not have much feeling toward. Under the dominant ideology that naturalizes 
and normalizes marriage, whether getting married or not seems not to be a negotiable issue, and 
most Chinese young women do not possess the freedom to decide when to get married, if they 
ever want. 
 Paradoxically, when Chinese young women have a boyfriend, their boyfriends are likely 
to face the strict “evaluations” from their parents and others based primarily on his appearance 
(especially height), education, hukou, job, income, and properties of his family (housing, car). 
The pivotal value orientation behind China’s traditional arranged marriage, “matching doors and 
windows” (men dang hu dui),152 is still prevalent nowadays,153 which argues that the two people 
 
150 Fincher, Leta Hong. Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality in China. Zed Books, 2014, pp. 15-
17. 
151 Mandarin: 剩男. 
152 Mandarin: 门当户对. 
153 Yang, Chao. Television and Dating in Contemporary China: Identity, Love and Intimacy. Springer Singapore, 
2017, p. 118. 
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in a partnership should match with each other particularly as for age, family background (hukou, 
education level of the parents, properties), and economic power (income, savings). For instance, 
if a girl from a modern city is in love with a boy who is shorter than her, has an unstable job, or 
comes from a rural area, her parents probably will discourage the girl from an engagement and 
use their resources to introduce her to some “better candidates,” even if these two young people 
have “true love.” Not only the family, some of their friends will interfere and provide “advice.” 
Their love, regardless of their own perspective, is constantly judged and at times denied by the 
family and the society. In this sense, most Chinese young women do not possess the freedom to 
decide who to stay with or marry as well. 
 In sum, most Chinese viewers of Thai Boys Love series confront hegemonic obstacles to 
love the person they love and get support from others around them. Same to the dynamic in the 
“living conditions” aspect, these series provide a utopian world for them to escape into and enjoy 
better alternatives, which allows them to imagine a different life trajectory and develops a sense 
of belonging there. The portrayed love and how people treat it in most Thai Boys Love series are 
more than ideal for them. 
 On one hand, what Thai Boys Love series delineate is not the male-female love Chinese 
people are most familiar with, but male-male love instead. Still a heteronormative society, China 
holds heterosexual love as the norm. A person’s sex is the unspoken but indispensable “criteria” 
in love, much more significant than other standards, such as education or income. For example, 
in “marriage-matching corners,” parents would not deliberately articulate that they are looking 
for a person of the other sex for their son or daughter, but it is taken as the default. For Chinese 
gay men, the predominance of heteronormativity is challenged and sometimes dismantled in 
Thai Boys Love series, where the male main characters can freely express their love toward other 
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men. In episode 3 of Until We Meet Again (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2019), In openly tells the boy he 
just encountered about his affection toward him directly in front of four friends of his, without 
receiving any undesired consequences afterward, like judgments or alienation. Many male-male 
couples in the series walk hand-in-hand in public, with smile and pride. Some even bring their 
boyfriend back home to meet their parents. These series offer an alternative space where their 
love toward the same sex is not discriminated and suppressed. For Chinese young women, the 
male-male love, exhibiting the very freedom to love, also resonates with their lived experiences. 
Limpongsatorn, among others, points out that male-male love represents a “pure relationship” for 
many people. For them, male-female love is always entangled with various concerns of family, 
materiality, reproduction, and inheritance, but male-male love is about the “pure relationship” 
besides occasional sexual desire.154 With regard to Chinese young women, if the “barrier” of the 
partner’s sex/gender can be overcome, then what else cannot. The world where male-male love is 
tolerated and even celebrated is the world where they, mostly as heterosexual women, can freely 
love the person they love, regardless of age, economic strength, and family background, and 
without prejudice and denial. 
 On the other hand, love, no matter in what kind of combination or format, is embraced 
and supported by people around the main characters in Thai Boys Love series. The series outline 
an extremely inclusive society, and the acceptance of male-male love, again, connotes the 
welcome of all sorts of love relationships (e.g., cosmopolitan girl and rural boy), since all are 
considered as more or less deviant from China’s predominant norm and probably will not receive 
support from people around them. This explains why the construction in Thai Boys Love series 
appeals to most of their Chinese viewers. In episode 11 of SOTUS S (dir. Botta; 2017), Arthit 
 
154 Limpongsatorn. A Study of Thailand’s Boys Love Drama and Its Transnational Chinese Audiences. 2020, pp. 96-
100. This kind of idea might be more popular in countries where same-sex marriage has not been legalized. 
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bravely comes out and confesses his relationship with Kongpob in the presence of the members 
of the company he works in, receiving applause and well wishes from all those present (fig. 21). 
They congratulate Arthit and are proud of his courage, rather than blindly judging him or feeling 
awkward or uncomfortable. In episode 1 of Bad Romance (dir. Boonyoprakarn; 2016), Yihwa 
runs into the intimacy of two male friends of hers, and she immediately conveys understanding 
before any of them explains what is going on (fig. 22). These two examples represent just a small 
sample of many similar examples. These friends are inclusive not only when the main characters 
disclose or are found out they like men, but also when they “switch” their sexual orientation.155 
From the setting, many main characters in Thai Boys Love series think they like women and 
even have a girlfriend at the beginning, such as Phun in Love Sick, Knock in Together with Me 
(dir. Boonyoprakarn; 2017), and Khai in Theory of Love (dir. Mongkolsawas; 2019). They all 
gradually realize their “real love” toward the other main character who “turns out to be a boy 
too.” For most Chinese viewers, it is no doubt a radical change, while most friends of the main 
characters in the series are not even surprised. In this respect, these main characters are blessed 
by precious and ubiquitous freedom and inclusiveness. 
 It is safe to conclude from previous discussion that family is the main source of stress for 
most Chinese viewers of Thai Boys Love series. In the everyday life, their family is indeed more 
troublesome to deal with in comparison to their peers, because increasingly Chinese young 
people are becoming more liberal and open-minded. Parents are more directly connected to them 
and therefore cause more stress. In opposition, most parents156 of the main characters in Thai 
 
155 Again, many main characters of Thai Boys Love series do not equal their love toward other boys to a gay identity 
or sexual orientation. 
156 In most Thai Boys Love series, if the family of the main characters is to be depicted, usually only their parents 
are involved in their “love issue.” Sometimes, siblings or cousins are involved as well, but they are “automatically” 
set to be inclusive, such as Teh’s brother in I Told Sunset About You and Tonhon’s sister in Tonhon Chonlatee (dir. 
Trakulkasemsuk; 2020). 
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Boys Love series are depicted as accepting. To be sure, there are a few homophobic parents in 
these series who intervene and persecute the love of their children. In episode 1 of Until We Meet 
Again, the repression of In’s family and Korn’s family impels this male-male couple to commit 
suicide together, which leads to their reincarnation and later storylines. However, most parents in 
the series are exceedingly accepting. Their inclusiveness is best reflected before, during, and 
after their children’s “coming out,” although in many series, the “coming out” process is not 
included, and the parents just accept their son’s love toward another boy. Kao’s mother in Dark 
Blue Kiss is perhaps the most comprehensive image to elaborate on this point. Kao hesitates 
before telling his mother about his relationship with another boy Pete and keeps it a secret for the 
most of this series. Kao’s mother notices some subtle hints and tells Kao she is always here if he 
wants to talk. When Kao eventually makes up his mind to admit he likes men, his mother shows 
support immediately, saying “I love everything about you no matter what.” After Kao’s coming 
out, the mother retains a good relationship with Kao’s boyfriend Pete and Pete’s equivalently 
inclusive father, happily living in this new form of “family” (fig. 23). Similar dynamics can be 
observed from Pete’s mother in Love by Chance as well as Thun’s mother in He’s Coming to Me 
(dir. Chaiwimol; 2019) (fig. 24), for example. In addition, for the at-first homophobic parents, 
their “awakening” process is usually narrated, such as Mork’s mother in Cause You’re My Boy 
and Tonhon’s father in Tonhon Chonlatee. They disallow their son’s love toward another boy 
and interestingly attribute their attitude to their ethnic Chinese heritage. After a few instances of 
mental struggles, they finally give in, since they do not want to lose the emotional proximity with 
their son and, more significantly, they realize that male-male love is nothing abnormal or strange 
(fig. 25 and 26). Most parents in Thai Boys Love series are that or become that inclusive and 
supportive. 
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 The freedom to love endowed by the portrayed inclusive society and the supportive 
people around the main characters in Thai Boys Love series is definitely a luxury most Chinese 
viewers crave. By entering the utopian world these series construct and getting immersed, they 
enjoy “something better” that the reality they are in fails to provide. It also compensates for the 
absence of the freedom to love in reality and brings them temporary pleasure through imaginary 
experiences. By identifying with the main characters, they are able to escape from the stressful 
reality, mitigate negative emotions, realize “the undone,” and experience the same within this 
alternative world. Undoubtedly, many people around the world are fighting with the depressing 
and unsatisfactory reality as for living conditions, freedom to love, and countless other struggles. 
Many of them will desperately turn to the alternative world of entertainment to escape into, build 
emotional connection with, experience alternatives, and even realize their dreams. To a certain 
extent, it can be viewed as a liberty-pursuit and a self-enrichment at people’s spiritual level under 
the reality that is arduous if not impossible to alter. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter, informed by the notions of escapism and utopianism, examined why Thai Boys 
Love series appeal to most Chinese viewers in response to these people’s tough lived experiences 
in reality. It focused on two outstanding aspects, namely living conditions and freedom to love. 
For both aspects, Thai Boys Love series provide “something better” for the audience to consume 
and enjoy, which is hard to actually achieve in their daily life. This chapter also suggested that 
their imaginary experiences in the alternative world may yield certain positive consequences for 





Figure 15. Cover of a fan-edited “Teh and Oh-aew Storyline” short video series on Bilibili that spotlights 
I Told Sunset About You (dir. Kuno; 2020). Beach, sea, sunshine, tropical plants, and things alike are all 
symbols of Thailand’s liberty and inclusiveness in the eyes of many Chinese viewers of Thai Boys Love 




Figure 16. Poster of SOTUS (dir. Samajarn; 2016). The white-color long/short-sleeve shirt (left) and the 






Figure 17. A typical look of student dorms in Chinese universities. Desk under bed and bunk bed are the 
two most used designs in student dorms. This picture is taken before the move-in of residents, and people 





Figure 18. Episode 1 of Love by Chance 2: A Chance to Love (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2020). Tin’s huge and 
luxurious house in/near Bangkok (a representation of top-tier cities in a country) is impossible to achieve 





Figure 19. Episode 5 of Why R U (dir. Wongskulphat; 2020). According to the setting, Tutor has to find a 
part-time job to sustain his college life, but he still lives in an exquisitely decorated single room. Produced 




Figure 20. A “marriage-matching corner” in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province. Each paper condenses a person’s 
basic information, especially in terms of age, height, weight, education, hukou, occupation, income, 
health condition, marital status, and properties of the family (housing, car). People walking by can view 
their information and decide whether to reach out (the phone number probably belongs to that person’s 













Figure 23. Episode 12 of Dark Blue Kiss (dir. Chaiwimol; 2019). The male-male couple (Pete and Kao), 
Kao’s mother, and Pete’s father communicate smoothly and joyfully after both kids disclose their love 




Figure 24. Episode 6 of He’s Coming to Me (dir. Chaiwimol; 2019). Thun makes up his mind to come out 
to his mother, fearing that he would sadden and disappoint her but receiving a warm hug and emotional 





Figure 25. Episode 12 of Cause You’re My Boy (dir. Kusolkulsiri; 2018). Tee is finally able to show his 
love relationship with Mork in front of his family after being impeded by his mother for a long time. 




Figure 26. Episode 10 of Tonhon Chonlatee (dir. Trakulkasemsuk; 2020). Tonhon’s homophobic father 
eventually becomes inclusive, apologizing for his previous deed and embracing his son’s love with the 
boy Chonlatee. When he announces his acceptance, he is surrounded by his family members (including 




Gay Paradise, Gay Archetype 
 
Most Thai Boys Love series provide an idealistic and utopian space for their Chinese viewers to 
escape from the unsatisfactory reality and gain temporary liberty, pleasure, and enrichment. In 
spite of the benefits these series may bring to the audience that I discussed in Chapter Three, 
concurrent undesired consequences should not be ignored. This chapter attempts to problematize 
the seemingly benign information flows from Thai Boys Love series to their Chinese viewers, 
with a focus on the process of stereotyping and naturalizing. This chapter is initially inspired by 
a conversation between me and a middle-age Chinese woman on a high-speed train from Harbin 
to Beijing in August 2019. She started to talk to me because she has a daughter similar to my age 
who had just attended college, and when I told her that I would be studying abroad in Thailand 
for the upcoming semester, she joked, “are you going there to see kathoey?” She automatically 
associated Thailand with the image of kathoey, Thai transgender women (a.k.a. ladyboys), which 
is, frankly speaking, not “surprising” among Chinese people’s conversations when it comes to 
this country. However, at that moment, I began to think about what may have contributed to the 
“natural link” between Thailand and kathoey. From our following conversations, I knew that she 
had never been to Thailand before, and this impression was based on the words from others and 
the advertisement of travel agencies. In this sense, Thai Boys Love series can be viewed as a 
hegemonic and sometimes even sole channel, broadcasting mainly about Thailand and gayness 
to the Chinese audience. This media industry is one of the many powerful factors that expounds 
how their impressions toward what Thailand’s social landscape is like and what gay men are 
supposed to be like get continuously consolidated. 
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 This chapter untangles and analyzes these two issues that Thai Boys Love series should 
be responsible for in the following sections. One concerns the “natural link” between Thailand 
and the image of a “gay paradise.”157 The other concerns the “natural link” between gay men and 
a supposed physical attractiveness as well as certain characteristics. Drawing from my extensive 




Thai Boys Love series not merely offer the fascinating world for the Chinese audience to escape 
into and enjoy the better alternatives, but at the same time heavily shape their perceptions toward 
Thailand. The liberal Thailand and inclusiveness of most characters in the series orient them to 
view this country in reality as a “gay paradise” where people are endowed with enough freedom. 
Again, this paradise metaphor does not confine to gay men, but instead appeals to all the people 
whose loves and other behaviors are not considered normative and thereby not tolerated in the 
places they live. Nevertheless, what these Chinese viewers discuss the most is the ubiquity of 
gay men and the openness of male-male relationships in Thailand. Most of them think gay men’s 
love is unbounded if not celebrated in Thailand, which confirms what they get from the idealized 
Thai Boys Love series. 
 This stereotyping and naturalizing process toward a place is a common practice within 
transnational/transcultural media flows. In Baudinette’s research on several Chinese consumers 
of Japanese Boys Love culture who stay in Japan, many view Japan as progressively advanced in 
accepting people of different sexual orientations. A thirty-year-old respondent confesses that he 
 
157 This term “gay paradise,” again, comes from Peter A. Jackson’s essay, “Tolerant but Unaccepting: The Myth of a 
Thai ‘Gay Paradise’” in 1999. 
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used to regard Japan as the “most tolerant country in the world” in his teenage age on account of 
the influences of Japanese Boys Love manga and anime, although Japan is a heteronormative 
and patriarchal society in fact.158 Similarly, Thailand (especially Bangkok) has a special weight, 
maintained by its media products and tourism, among gay men in Indonesia,159 Singapore,160 and 
other countries. By this token, their perceptions and impressions are mediated by the branding 
and promoting procedure, which might differ from the real-life situations. 
 At first glance, Thailand’s liberty and inclusiveness seem unquestionable. From gay bars 
in Si Lom to the non-heteronormative people who proudly express themselves on the streets, this 
country seems like a perfect fit for this image. Jackson coins the term “gay paradise” to describe 
this image of Thailand in most people’s mind. Although homosexuality is neither illegal based 
on Thailand’s laws nor immoral based on Buddhist teachings, and homophobic attacks against 
masculine-identified gay men are uncommon at the level of practice, gay men in Thailand are to 
some extent still suppressed.161 Anti-homosexual views have long permeated popular and official 
discourses,162 and homosexuality and transgenderism are always concerning for the government 
due to its relation to the public representation of the “Thainess.”163 Compared to kathoey who are 
generally regarded as Thai, safe, familiar, psychologically female, and hence can be appropriated 
 
158 Baudinette, Thomas. “Akogare no sekai wo yomitoru: ichijitaizai no chūgokujin gei ni taisuru ‘kibou no yori 
dokoro’ toshite no BL” 憧れの世界の読み取る：一時滞在の中国人ゲイに対する「希望のよりどころ」とし
ての BL [Aspirational Readings of Boys Love: BL as a “Resource of Hope” for Temporary Chinese Gay Migrants in 
Japan], translated by Asako Saito. “BL ga hiraku tobira: henyousuru ajia no sekushuariti to jendaa” BLが開く扉：
変容するアジアのセクシュアリティとジェンダー [BL Opening Doors: Sexuality and Gender Transfigured in 
Asia], edited by James Welker. Seidosha, 2019, pp. 173-189. 
159 Murtagh, Ben. “Bangkok’s Beautiful Men: Images of Thai Liberality in an Indonesian Gay Novel.” Queer 
Bangkok: 21st Century Markets, Media, and Rights, edited by Peter A. Jackson. Hong Kong University Press, 2011, 
pp. 163-179. 
160 Au, Alex. “Speaking of Bangkok: Thailand in the History of Gay Singapore.” Queer Bangkok: 21st Century 
Markets, Media, and Rights, edited by Peter A. Jackson. Hong Kong University Press, 2011, pp. 181-192. 
161 Jackson. “Tolerant but Unaccepting: The Myth of a Thai ‘Gay Paradise.’” 1999, p. 227. 
162 Ibid., p. 227. 
163 Ünaldi. “The Cinematic Regime of Representation of Kathoeys and Gay Men in Thailand.” 2011, p. 61. 
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within a binarized heterosexual framework, gay men are more likely to be treated as foreign, 
strange, potentially dangerous, if not criminal. A sex/gender conformity is enforced on them by 
the regime of shaming through discursive acts, like moral pressures from the family to align with 
heterosexual social norms.164 It is evocatively supported by the repression and discrimination 
toward gender-nonconforming boys from their school and family in 1996’s Pang Noi (set to be 
near Chiang Mai) portrayed in the movie Dew (dir. Sakveerakul; 2019) (fig. 27). Also, context 
specificity and social hierarchy play a crucial role in people’s attitudes and responses toward gay 
men,165 which means the treatment is diverse and fluent. As can be noticed, whether the Thai 
society is inclusive toward gay men has always been complex, instead of idyllically homogenous 
in most people’s stereotypical view. 
 More than twenty years have passed since Jackson’s problematization of this dominant 
impression toward Thailand. This country becomes more liberal and leads Asia in many aspects, 
reflected by the massive production and carnivalesque consumption of Thai Boys Love series, 
yet gay men are far from unrestrained. The dominant system accepts only one type of normative 
sexuality, comprised of a heterosexual orientation, sexual desire toward the opposite sex, and 
heterosexual sex for the purpose of procreation.166 Under this persistent hegemonic system, 
public images of gay men are still kind of negative.167 Many Thai officials always use Thailand’s 
inclusiveness to attempt to attract queer tourists, but is Thailand really all-encompassing or not 
remains a question, given the discursive and sporadic assault and prejudice targeting gay men 
 
164 Jackson. “Tolerant but Unaccepting: The Myth of a Thai ‘Gay Paradise.’” 1999, pp. 237-240. 
165 Jackson, Peter A. First Queer Voices from Thailand: Uncle Go’s Advice Columns for Gays, Lesbians and 
Kathoeys. White Lotus Press, 2017, pp. 129-161. 
166 Chonwilai, Sulaiporn, and Pimpawun Boonmongkon. “Key Findings.” Thai Sex Talk: The Language of Sex and 
Sexuality in Thailand, edited by Pimpawun Boonmongkon and Peter A. Jackson, translated by Timo Ojanen. 
Mekong Press, 2012, p. 17. 
167 Chonwilai, Sulaiporn. “Chai Rak Chai (ชายรักชาย): Men Who Love Men.” Thai Sex Talk: The Language of Sex 
and Sexuality in Thailand, edited by Pimpawun Boonmongkon and Peter A. Jackson, translated by Timo Ojanen. 
Mekong Press, 2012, pp. 125-133. 
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and many other gender minorities across the country. In this light, gay men’s freedom becomes 
the “name card” for touristy cities such as Bangkok and Pattaya, while many gay men in reality 
are struggling with moral pressures from family and conservative voices from religions. The 
delineation of media and tourism might only focus on certain areas and is in conflict with the 
comprehensive picture. Granted that Thailand is relatively open to gay men and will possibly 
become the second in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage, seeing this country as a monolithic 
“gay paradise” is still problematic, because this treatment over-fantasizes Thailand’s society and 
serves as a misleading stereotype in essence. 
 Most Chinese viewers of Thai Boys Love series easily take the “gay paradise” image of 
Thailand. Indeed, nearly all Thai Boys Love series have a happy ending. That is, the love of the 
male-male couple(s) is always tolerated by the society and supported by people around them, 
after they overcome more or less obstacles. As I detailed in Chapter Three, almost all of them 
live together happily thanks to the inclusive social environment. This idealized portrayal invokes 
the “gay paradise” image and at the same time drives the audience to see the real-life situations 
in Thailand also in this illusory and phantasmic fashion. 
In addition to the mediation effects of these series, the efforts of Thai actors/companies 
outside of the series and their knowledge about tourism in Thailand also come into play. But first 
of all, I would like to complicate the mediation effects of these series, concerning the reinforced 
perception of “gay men’s ubiquity” both in the series and in reality. Equating the main characters 
with gay men is flawed, since a decent number of these characters do not disclose or embrace a 
gay identity. At the beginning, some have a girlfriend or a girl they are pursuing, such as Fuse in 
Make It Right (dir. Sawatmaneekul et al.; 2016), Khai in Theory of Love (dir. Mongkolsawasl; 
2019) (fig. 28), Teh in I Told Sunset About You (dir. Kuno; 2020), and Tan in Manner of Death 
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(dir. Sakveerakul and Arronnet; 2020). Some do not have one, but they believe they will not like 
other boys whatsoever, such as Arthit in SOTUS (dir. Samajarn; 2016), Ae in Love by Chance 
(dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2018), Win in 2gether (dir. Thongjila; 2020) (fig. 29), and Tonhon in 
Tonhon Chonlatee (dir. Trakulkasemsuk; 2020). Some are even very homophobic, such as Type 
in TharnType (dir. Sintanaparadee; 2019). In the end, all of them realize their “real love” toward 
the other main character who “turns out to be a boy too.” Instead of discussing identity (i.e., “I 
am gay”), these series focus more on the realization process. Most characters remain equivocal 
toward declaring a clear identity, which is best exemplified by one of last scenes of SOTUS. In 
episode 14 of SOTUS, after the male-male love between Kongpob and Arthit becomes public for 
some of their friends, Kongpob’s friend, M, jokes that “we have been friends for four years, but 
you never told me you like men.” In response, Kongpob argues, “I do not like men, I like Arthit. 
It is not the same. If he is not Arthit, then I will not like him.” In episode 6 of TharnType, the 
previously homophobic Type expresses a similar idea that “I am not interested in any woman at 
all. I do not want to sleep with other men. I can only do it (kiss and have sex) with you (Tharn, 
the other male main character).” Admittedly, it is possible that the “bending the straight men” 
(a.k.a. “making them like other men”)168 process is utilized to attract the audience, but most main 
characters in Thai Boys Love series, displaying the sense of fluidity, are not constrained to the 
label named “gay.” For most Chinese viewers, naturally seeing these main characters as gay men 
has already been problematic, while some even take a step forward and bring this impression of 
“gay men’s ubiquity” to the reality. 
 However problematic it is, the efforts actors and production companies of Thai Boys 
Love series are carrying out keep strengthening the “gay paradise” image of Thailand. Although 
 
168 Tian. “Homosexualizing ‘Boys Love’ in China.” 2020, p. 113. 
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these actors are mostly heterosexual, they painstakingly sell gayness outside of the series to 
prolong the consumers’ fantasy toward them as male-male couples in the real-life scenario. Max 
Nattapol Diloknawarit and Tul Pakorn Thanasrivanitchai in Bad Romance (dir. Booyoprakarn; 
2016), Together with Me (dir. Booyoprakarn; 2017), Together with Me: The Next Chapter (dir. 
Booyoprakarn; 2018), and Manner of Death are seen as one of the highest “standards” as for 
devotion. They strive to represent real-life kiss with emotions in the series. Moreover, outside of 
the series, their male-male relationship is well managed to arrest the consumers. Both actors are 
in fact straight men, but their relationship is so immersive that many people think they are indeed 
a couple in reality (fig. 30). They always appear in pair in offline events, and every now and then 
post photos on social media showing their intimacy or sweet interactions (fig. 31). Akin to Max 
and Tul, most main actors of Thai Boys Love series are paired up by their production companies 
into male-male “couples,” and adopt the same approaches as for offline events and social media 
posts to sell gayness. Usually appearing in pair, they actively participate in all kinds of variety 
shows not only in Thailand and take intimate if not erotic cover shoot for numerous magazines, 
like Kazz, Attitude, and Kullastree (fig. 32).169 It is apposite to use the term “erotic economy”170 
here, and the commodification of gayness in the sphere of Thai Boys Love culture should not be 
neglected. The efforts of these Thai actors and companies, then, can be regarded as meeting the 
consumers’ needs and sustaining a lucrative business, rather than projecting or reflecting the real 
situations in Thailand. Lots of Chinese fans are passionate about saving anything related to these 
couples, like the photos of their offline events and their Instagram stories/posts and posting them 
on Weibo for the fan community, so their efforts are well-received in China even though they are 
 
169 Among these Thai magazines, Kazz and Attitude mostly use their English name, but Kullastree is better known in 
its Thai name, กลุสตรี. 
170 Farmer. “Contemporary Thai Cinema and Vernacular Queerness.” 2011, p. 71. 
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using some “censored” platforms. Owing to the high visibility and intimacy of these paired-up 
male-male couples in real-life scenario, it is not hard to understand why most Chinese viewers 
think that gay men and the celebration of male-male love are everywhere in Thailand. 
 Existed impression toward tourism in Thailand is another factor that explains why most 
Chinese viewers easily accept and naturally endorse the “gay paradise” image of Thailand they 
think is depicted in Thai Boys Love series. Thailand is a relatively affordable and arguably the 
most popular tourist destination for Chinese people. The number of Chinese tourists traveling to 
Thailand has been burgeoning since the Chinese and Thai governments agreed to have tourism 
cooperation in 1993. In 2019, the year before the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, more 
than 10.98 million Chinese tourists traveled to Thailand, representing more than a quarter of all 
foreign tourists.171 In addition to the delicious Thai food and beautiful beaches, travel agencies in 
China always use kathoey (renyao)172 and the sex industry to portray Thailand and encourage 
prospective tourists to experience the “uniqueness” of this country. For this reason, most Chinese 
people naturally link Thailand with the image kathoey, and the existence if not ubiquity of these 
transgender women has been one of the first impressions that arises in their mind when it comes 
to Thailand. For many Chinese people, furthermore, there is no essential difference between 
kathoey, gay men, and other queer people, since they are all somewhat “deviant.” Although some 
people have never been to Thailand, like the middle-age woman at the beginning of this chapter, 
they more or less know something about this country from others or the promotions of tourism, 
and it is usually about these gender-nonconforming people. It is true that the Chinese audience of 
Thai Boys Love series is the group of people whose horizons are boarder, but this kind of 
 
171 Panthamit, Nisit. “Impacts of COVID-19 on BRI: A Case Study of Thailand.” The Reshaping of China-Southeast 
Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, edited by Nian Peng. Springer Singapore, 2021, p. 127. 
172 Mandarin: 人妖. This term is considered by some people as derogatory since it literally means “human monster.” 
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preexisting impression toward Thailand still frames their mind, echoing with the “gay paradise” 
image they believe are delineated in the series. 
 How the portrayal in Thai Boys Love series is perceived, along with the efforts of Thai 
actors/companies outside of the series and the always prevalent impression promoted by tourism 
sector, results in the reinforcement of the stereotype that Thailand is a monolithic “gay paradise.” 
In his 1999 article, Jackson highlights “gay paradise” as “the myth.” Myth, by one version of 
definitions according to French literary theorist Roland Barthes, makes particular worldviews 
appear to be unchallengeable because they are “natural.”173 This is exactly the case how the “gay 
paradise” image keeps being strengthened by the various factors elaborated above and thereby 
becomes unchallengeable. The naturalization process may bring about negative outcomes. Many 
Chinese viewers of Thai Boys Love series actively endorse “gay men’s ubiquity” in Thailand. As 
observed from their bullet screens and comments, some even explicitly state that they now view 
every man from Thailand as a “potential gay,” because “it is highly possible that a man is a gay 
there.” It further derives other tags toward this country, such as sexual promiscuity. With this 
impression constantly being reinforced, most of them have never thought about challenging this 
habitual perspective and are inclined to consume the romanticized Thailand in their mind. This 
treatment serves as an irresponsible stereotype and a blind generalization toward a country, and 
ignores gay men’s actual struggles across Thailand, especially in places out of people’s sight. 
 
Gay Archetype 
Another remarkable problem Thai Boys Love series may lead to among the Chinese audience is 
the standardization of gay men’s appearance and the promotion of a “gay archetype.” Almost all 
 
173 Barker, Chris, and Emma A. Jane. Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice, fifth edition. SAGE Publications, 
2016, p. 91. 
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main characters in Thai Boys Love series follow the Asian young men’s “standard of beauty” 
popularized by South Korean popular culture in the twenty-first century. This “standard” swept 
across Asia and elsewhere by Hallyu, which forms around soft masculine bodies: kkonminam174 
(a.k.a. “flower boys”).175 The kkonminam ideal refers to young men, mainly from East Asia and 
Southeast Asia, who possess soft masculinity but avoid becoming either too “manly” or too 
“effeminate.” Thus, it is notable that nearly all main actors of Thai Boys Love series are young, 
physically attractive, fit, masculine-identified but not that muscular, fashionable, with light and 
smooth (hairless) skin, and without tattoo or glasses (fig. 33).176 The “standard of beauty” has 
flowed from South Korea to China and Thailand, among many other societies, since the 2000s, 
which explains why the main actors of Thai Boys Love series perfectly match with the aesthetics 
of most Chinese viewers. 
 For most Chinese viewers of Thai Boys Love series, the physical attractiveness of the 
actors is of utmost importance. Although no one fails to be physically attractive according to the 
socially constructed and recognized standard, there is stratification among these already beautiful 
boys. As I briefly mentioned in Chapter One, the “mass production” of Thai Boys Love series 
generates a surplus, which empowers the audience the freedom to choose and forms a hierarchy 
among these series. On top of the design of storylines which requires the efforts of the directors, 
screenwriters, and many other production staffs, the physical attractiveness of the main actors 
influences if not determines whether the audience consumes the series or not. This dynamic is 
 
174 Korean: 꽃미남 or 꽃美男, known in China as 花美男. 
175 Jung, Sun. “Chogukjeok Pan-East Asian Soft Masculinity: Reading Boys over Flowers, Coffee Prince, and 
Shinhwa Fan Fiction.” Complicated Currents: Media Flows, Soft Power, and East Asia, edited by Daniel Black, 
Stephen Epstein, and Alison Tokita. Monash University Press, 2010, pp. 1-8. 
176 There are, of course, few exceptions. For example, Drake Sattabut Laedeke, main actor of Cause You’re My Boy 
(dir. Kusolkulsiri; 2018) and Our Skyy (dir. Botta et al.; 2018), is more hairy, Earth Pirapat Watthanasetsiri, main 
actor of Water Boyy (dir. Kusolkulsiri; 2017) and 1000stars (dir. Chaiwimol; 2021), has tattoo, and Pod Suphakorn 
Sriphothong, main actor of Dark Blue Kiss (dir. Chaiwimol; 2019) and Tonhon Chonlatee is very muscular. 
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very noteworthy within the fan community in China. The “demand” of most Chinese viewers 
toward the physical attractiveness of the Thai actors is sometimes even disrespectful. After the 
main actors of 2 Moons (dir. Meesuwan; 2017) quitted, new main actors were hired to continue 
the storylines of this well-received series. When the poster of 2 Moons 2 (dir. Soisangim; 2019) 
(fig. 34) was produced and circulated among China’s fan community in 2018, the physical 
appearance of the main actors received massive attacks from numerous fans. They complained 
that the new actors are “way uglier compared to the previous ones (in 2 Moons)” and argued that 
“how can we watch this series with this sort of appearance.” Some took a more radical approach 
and requested the production company to stop tarnishing the “2 Moons” brand. Until now, many 
Chinese viewers still refuse to consume it. Similarly, on November 14, 2020, Tianfu (one of the 
leading Thai-to-Mandarin subtitle groups) posted an article on its WeChat Public Platform 
reporting that decreasing viewers were watching the new Boys Love series Ghost Runner (dir. 
Arnuparp; 2020) and suggesting this series had been abandoned due to the physical appearance 
of the main actors. The most liked comment Tianfu chose to present under its article asserted that 
“we cannot accept and consume every pair-up of two guys.”177 Another popular comment teased 
that “are the main actors from Thai massage parlors?”178 The central point of many fans was the 
main actors fall short of the “standard” of Thai Boys Love series. 
 The leading consumption group of Thai Boys Love series is young heterosexual women. 
Many of them like to consume the kkonminam in general. What Thai Boys Love series can offer 
them is the “doubled” happiness and satisfaction, because they are male-male couples in the 
series and usually appear in pair in reality. Tianfu and CFan, the two dominant Thai-to-Mandarin 
 
177 Mandarin: 这也不是随便两个男的就都能磕下去的. Ke 磕, an Internet language popularized in recent years, 
can be understood as “consume.” 
178 Mandarin: 演员是泰国按摩店找的吧. 
 91 
subtitle groups, always evaluate the physical appearance (yanzhi)179 of the main actors and the 
chemistry among them, and then “report” it to the fan community. In order to attract and secure 
the consumers in China and elsewhere, Thai Boys Love series deploy only kkonminam as the 
main actors. While the selection of only physically attractive boys to play male-male couple(s) in 
the series can be explained by the lucrative purposes of the production companies, still people 
should not overlook the harmful consequences it might give rise to in China. There is no doubt 
that selecting physically attractive actors is a common practice in the production of media works 
for the sake of its profits, especially those depicting youth’s love. Most Chinese viewers do not 
have real-life encounters with gay men and do not know what they are like in reality. To put it a 
more understandable way, take romantic series delineating male-female love and including only 
physically attractive characters as an example, they understand it as an idealized construction, 
since they have adequate experiences and knowledge about what male-female couples are like in 
reality. In contrast, as I discussed in Chapter Three, most gay men do not have the bravery to 
express their identity and love in China, so many viewers have not ever come across real-life 
male-male couples. Even though they might feel that Thai Boys Love series have nothing to do 
with a precise projection of the reality, many of them still regard the portrayal in these series, 
particularly in regard to physical appearance, among other attributes, as the “ideal” and “just the 
way it is (or it should be).” 
 Physical appearance is definitely not the only aspect of what the “gay archetype” Thai 
Boys Love series are promoting encompasses. For instance, the main characters are expected to 
not behave in a too “manly” or too “effeminate” (niang or mu)180 manner. They are also expected 
 
179 Mandarin: 颜值. 
180 Mandarin: 娘 (as in niangpao 娘炮, which functions similar to the “f*g” discourse) or 母 (as in muling 母零, 
“feminized bottom”). 
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to have a metropolitan lifestyle, avoid being “nerdy,” and be good at sports (usually apply to the 
“top” in the audience’s mind). Physical appearance is nonetheless the most important one. The 
meaning of all aspects of the social world is given and installed,181 so is “being a gay.” From a 
constructionist perspective, reality, always a complex organization or configuration that is being 
put together constantly, is constructed rather than given.182 Otherwise stated, reality is produced, 
brought into existence, maintained, and sometimes repaired and transformed by the construction, 
apprehension, and utilization of symbolic forms.183 Through the rather monolithic representation 
of the male main characters in Thai Boys Love series, the model of gay men is constructed, and 
people aligning with or not aligning with this model are assigned meanings, framed as in-groups 
or out-groups, and directed to rewards or punishments. Since most Chinese viewers equate the 
male-male couples with gay men, these series frame their perceptions regarding “what gay men 
should be like” in terms of physical appearance and other characteristics. 
 The body, constantly assessed by oneself and others using the degrees of normativity, is 
central in social life: people are privileged by the degree to which they approximate the cultural 
ideal.184 In many White-dominated Euro-American societies, for example, Black men are seen as 
“animal-like” and “hypersexual,”185 while Asian men are seen as “feminine” and “asexual”186 by 
nature. As can be seen, the body hierarchy privileges certain bodies and stigmatizes others.187 It 
 
181 Ingraham, Chrys. “One is Not Born a Bride: How Weddings Regulate Heterosexuality.” Handbook of the New 
Sexuality Studies, edited by Steven Seidman, Nancy Fischer, and Chet Meeks. Routledge, 2006, p. 212. 
182 Grossberg, Lawrence. Cultural Studies in the Future Tense. Duke University Press, 2010, p. 23. 
183 Carey, James. “A Cultural Approach to Communication.” Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and 
Society. Unwin Hyman, 1989, pp. 23-25. 
184 Gerschick, Thomas J. “The Body, Disability, and Sexuality.” Handbook of the New Sexuality Studies, edited by 
Steven Seidman, Nancy Fischer, and Chet Meeks. Routledge, 2006, p. 272. 
185 Collins, Patricia Hill. “Prisons for Our Bodies, Closets for Our Mind: Racism, Heterosexism, and Black 
Sexuality.” Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, and the New Racism. Routledge, 2004, pp. 87-116. 
186 Kong, Travis S. K. “Sexualizing Asian Male Bodies.” Handbook of the New Sexuality Studies, edited by Steven 
Seidman, Nancy Fischer, and Chet Meeks. Routledge, 2006, p. 98. 
187 Ibid., pp. 97-102. 
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is still prevalent in the queer community, a place considered to be all inclusive but unfortunately 
not. There is always an anti-Asian sentiment among White people in the gay community, since 
Asianness is “an exoticized and fetishized item” rather than an everyday-person thing. On the 
contrary, White gay men are idolized into the default and norm of sexual creatures.188 Similarly, 
due to the influences of Thai Boys Love series and many other sources, gay men who match with 
the “archetype” (young, physically attractive, fit or muscular, masculine-identified, fashionable) 
is rewarded by other people’s collective acknowledgement that they are the “reference point,” 
while other gay men are more or less deviated and demeaned based on the distance they are from 
the disciplining model. It rhymes with the current environment in China’s gay community. Most 
people in the community collectively worship the image of jocks (tiyusheng;189 sports students) 
for its supposed connection with attributes like young, tall, fit or muscular, energetic, and regard 
them as the ideal. Other gay men, old, short, overweight, slim, nerdy, “feminine/girly,” disabled, 
or simply differing from the “standard of beauty,” are treated as subordinate gay variants and as 
only attractive to people who have fetishization toward these “deviant” attributes. 
 Like a considerable amount of Chinese gay men, most Chinese viewers, influenced by 
Thai Boys Love series, consciously or subconsciously endorse this hegemonic hierarchal system. 
As reflected by their inhospitable responses toward 2 Moons 2 and Ghost Runner as well as their 
bullet screens and comments when watching these series, they evaluate, categorize, and discuss 
the characters by comparing them to the archetypal image, taking some’s privilege and some’s 
devalue as granted. This treatment is hard not to continue to the reality, which accounts for their 
“conditional inclusiveness” toward gay men. That is, if each side of the gay couple matches the 
archetype, they are more likely to support and celebrate it; otherwise, they may feel it difficult to 
 
188 Luta, Francis. “Project Gelb” [Project Yellow: A Film by an Asian Guy About Asian Guys]. 2014. 
189 Mandarin: 体育生. 
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accept. Most Chinese viewers of Thai Boys Love series automatically view it as a “reality” or 
“something natural.” However, the whole “standard of beauty” or “archetype” thing is socially 
constructed, normalized, and popularized. Let me elaborate this point with an example that these 
viewers must be familiar with. In 2016, the “A4 waist challenge” swept across Chinese social 
media sites. If women, sometimes men, can hide their waist right behind a sheet of A4 paper, the 
skinny body shape is regarded as desirable (fig. 37). Many women who failed to achieve that 
jokingly expressed their wish to go back to the Tang Dynasty (618-907), when a slightly plump 
body was the ideal (fig. 38). 
 It can be seen that the standard is historically and culturally specific and keeps changing. 
Having said that, it must be underlined that the whole “standard of beauty” or “archetype” thing 
is problematic and hence should be challenged, since it establishes a superior/inferior, good/bad, 
or desirable/undesirable dichotomy and allows this hegemonic hierarchal system to continuously 
judge, then award or discriminate people based mainly on their exterior traits. The binary system 
always belittles the “inferior” side,190 but who belongs to which side and why on earth the binary 
system exists need to be scrutinized in relation to social construction. Everyone’s self-image is 
shaped by the process of evaluating oneself in comparison with the “reference group,” mirrored 
and framed by other people’s judgments.191 If a not-that-confident Chinese gay man notices a 
bullet screen, comment, or post arguing that “this character is too ugly to be a gay,” just imagine 
how he will relate it to himself and how damaging it is to his own self-esteem. The groups being 
put at the bottom of the sexual ladder tend to internalize some of the oppressions. People with 
disabilities frequently internalize societal negative stereotypes acting on them as if they are true 
 
190 Barker and Jane. Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice. 2016, p. 21. 
191 Strickhouser, Jason E., and Ethan Zell. “Self-Evaluative Effects of Dimensional and Social Comparison.” 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 59, 2015, pp. 60-66. 
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and look down upon their own self-worth,192 many fat women “recognize” that their fatness is 
repulsive and makes them undesirable,193 and gay men of color sometimes feel lucky when any 
White man wants to talk to them.194 By the same token, with the still predominant and incredibly 
powerful regulation of the “gay archetype,” many gay men who are merely differing from the 
ideal will get tempted into the delusional sense that they are sexually undesirable, internalize the 
messages that they do not deserve the love or attention from other men, and prompt them to 
admire those gay men who happen to be in line with the ideal in this historically and culturally 
specific period. 
 Thai Boys Love series are one of many sources in China’s society today that constantly 
promote and reinforce the “gay archetype” among a certain group of Chinese people. The rather 
homogenous representation establishes and naturalizes a hierarchal system that values some gay 
men and devalues others based on their physical appearance and other characteristics, persuading 
the Chinese audience to take it as a static reality. It not only alienates and marginalizes a great 
number of members within the gay community, but also forces them to accept the unequal power 
relations and internalize the suppressions. The hegemony of the “gay archetype” should be 
destabilized and dismantled, which necessitates Thai Boys Love series and many other sources, 
like the culture in China’s gay community or the Asian young men’s “standard of beauty” from 
South Korean popular culture I discussed above, to go through some dramatic and substantial 
changes. The most idealized situation is to deconstruct the whole “archetype” stuff, since it can 
always yield the unequal power relations. 
 
 
192 Gerschick. “The Body, Disability, and Sexuality.” 2006, p. 276. 
193 Harding, Kate. “How Do You Fuck a Fat Woman.” Yes Means Yes!: Visions of Female Sexual Power and a 
World Without Rape, edited by Jaclyn Friedman and Jessica Valenti. Seal Press, 2008, pp. 67-75. 
194 Luta. Project Yellow. 2014. 
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Toward a Better Future 
Thai Boys Love series should be held accountable for promoting and reinforcing both the “gay 
paradise” image of Thailand and the “gay archetype” that polices many people. The final section 
of this chapter shares some of my own opinions about how the industry of Thai Boys Love series 
can make changes to challenge their dominance. 
 The “gay paradise” image is related to the monolithic representation of the always liberal 
and inclusive Thailand in these series. It is best signified by the happy ending of nearly all series, 
which is blessed by the support from people around the main characters and the tolerant social 
atmosphere. However, it undoubtedly does not project the real-life situations in every corner of 
Thailand, since many gay men across the country are indeed struggling with different familial or 
societal pressures. Media works that capture the reality are easy to empathize with and call for 
changes. Love of Siam (dir. Sakveerakul; 2007), the titled “first ever Thai Boys Love media,” did 
a great job. In the very last scene of this movie, Tong conveys to Mew, “I am sorry. I cannot be 
your boyfriend, but that does not mean I do not love you.” Tong explicitly avows his attitudes, 
while he has ultimately decided to put family and his duties as a good Thai son before his sexual 
and romantic desire toward Mew.195 Likewise, in the well-known movie Call Me by Your Name 
(dir. Guadagnino; 2017), how powerless Elio and Oliver are in their affection toward each other 
under the social environment is depicted. There seems to be an intangible force that separates 
them apart. Both movies engagingly portray the barriers gay men might confront in their growth 
and love, instead of idealizing the society for people’s consumption purposes (i.e., whether the 
audience likes the storylines and ending or not). The latter is what most Thai Boys Love series 
have been doing since the release of Love Sick (dir. Kusolkulsiri; 2014). 
 
195 Farmer. “Love of Siam: Contemporary Thai Cinema and Vernacular Queerness.” 2011, p. 97. 
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 The “gay archetype” hegemony is related to the monolithic representation of the male-
male couples. There is no problem for Thai Boys Love series and many other media works to use 
physically attractive main actors because of lucrative purposes. I also do not think the “standard 
of beauty” will vanish anytime in sight. As a result, what is at stake is to seek for opportunities to 
challenge the idea of “what gay men should be like.” These physically attractive main actors can 
help the media works reach more viewers, which means more people can be educated if they 
take advantage of it and come up with strategies. The deployment of only physically attractive 
main actors is not totally incompatible with vitalizing people to deconstruct the “gay archetype,” 
since it is always feasible to delink them from the archetypal image. In episode 8 of Love, Victor 
(dir. Rubin et al.; 2020), sequel of America’s coming-of-age movie Love, Simon (dir. Berlanti; 
2018), Victor, along with many viewers before the screen, is educated by Simon’s boyfriend 
Bram that “there is no one way to be gay.” They, as the handsome main characters, do not speak 
for an ideal. Instead, men like them, men doing crossdressing, men playing sports well, and men 
of all kinds are “ideal,” and their self-worth is recognized (fig. 39). It is necessary for Thai Boys 
Love series to have strategies alike to disassociate their physically attractive main characters 
from the “gay archetype,” which is almost invisible in their current practices. 
 The reluctance of Thai Boys Love series to carry out a “revolution” is mainly because of 
economic concerns. Depicting beautiful boys living intimately and happily in this romanticized 
all-encompassing society has become the formula to attract the audience and guarantee profits. 
However, if Thai Boys Love series want to shoulder more responsibility toward a better future 
by destabilizing the hegemony, as the influential and prestigious stronghold of male-male-love 




This chapter pointed out that Thai Boys Love series, together with many other factors in China’s 
social landscape nowadays, should be responsible for advertising and strengthening the “gay 
paradise” image of Thailand and the “gay archetype” hegemony that causes harm to China’s gay 
community. Both dynamics can be partly traced back to the depictions of Thai Boys Love series, 
proving that the media flow from these series to the Chinese audience is by no means entirely 
positive. They need to be challenged and undermined. The last section of this chapter included 
some of my viewpoints regarding how Thai Boys Love series may take pains to achieve that for 




Figure 27. A scene from Dew (dir. Sakveerakul; 2019). In 1996’s Pang Noi town, gender-nonconforming 
boys are accused and pushed out from the line by other students to attend the “training session” organized 
to “correct” them in the name of preventing the spread of AIDS/HIV and supervised by psychiatrists and 




Figure 28. Episode 1 of Theory of Love (dir. Mongkolsawas; 2019). Khai is an extreme but illustrative 
example. He has dated at least one girl from every department at his school, except his own department. 
However, he eventually realizes his “true love” toward Third, the other male main character, who happens 





Figure 29. Episode 1 of 2gether (dir. Thongjila; 2020). Tine asks Sarawat a favor to pretend to be his 
boyfriend, so that he can evade the pursuit of another boy, Green. He firmly believes he like girls then and 




Figure 30. Episode 13 of Take Guy Out Thailand (Season One). In this episode released in August 2016, 
Max Nattapol Diloknawarit and Tul Pakorn Thanasrivanitchai came to promote their new series, Together 
with Me (dir. Booyoprakarn; 2017). They confirmed that both of them are straight men but insisted that 







Figure 31. Max and Tul showing intimacy on social media. This is a very common and frequent practice 
among paired-up male-male “couples.” Screenshotted from Instagram account @maxiiin_ on January 23, 





Figure 32. Kazz 167, volume 13 (2020). It features the intimacy of Off Jumpol Adulkittiporn and Gun 
Atthaphan Phunsawat. Some other cover shoot for magazines can be erotically shirtless. Downloaded 





Figure 35. PP Krit Amnuaydechkorn, ranked number one in the “most popular overseas star of the 2020 
Weibo awards.” In the viewpoint of most Chinese viewers, he is a perfect match of Asian young men’s 
“standard of beauty.” Screenshotted from the music video Skyline for the series I Told Sunset About You 




Figure 36. Poster of 2 Moons 2 (dir. Soisangim; 2019). The physical appearance of these main actors 
received many disrespectful attacks from the Chinese audience, who thought their physical appearance 





Figure 37. A4 waist challenge. The skinny enough waist that is able to be hidden right behind a sheet of 
A4 paper is considered to be ideal for Chinese women in recent years. Downloaded from Sohu and altered 




Figure 38. A scene of Tanggong Yeyan in Henan TV’s Spring Festival Gala in 2021. This extremely 
popular show revivifies women’s lives in palace back in the Tang Dynasty (618-907). A slightly plump 





Figure 39. Episode 8 of Love, Victor (dir. Rubin et al.; 2020). This scene mainly promotes the idea that 
“there is no one way to be gay.” Produced by Temple Hill Entertainment, No Helmet Productions, The 




Vulnerability of the “Chinese-Thai Romance” 
 
Chinese fans love Thai Boys Love series, and Thai Boys Love series love their zestful supporters 
in China. It is always the case. Many Chinese fans spare no effort to show their love and support 
toward Thai Boys Love series. The aforementioned packed fan meetings of Thai actors and 
vibrant participations online are just a tip of the iceberg regarding what they can do for the series, 
actors, or directors they love. With hundreds of millions of enthusiasts, they can achieve many 
spectacular and impressive things. After the release of SOTUS (dir. Samajarn; 2016), Thai actor 
Krist Perawat Sangpotirat quickly accumulated enormous popularity in China due to his role as a 
trying-to-be-fierce but intrinsically cute upperclassman in the series, along with the other main 
actor Singto Prachaya Ruangroj. In November 2017, Krist successfully graduated from Kasetsart 
University in Bangkok. In response, a group of his Chinese fans rented a huge billboard in Times 
Square, New York City to celebrate his graduation and his twenty-second birthday took place in 
the previous month (fig. 40). This example is perhaps extreme but precisely exhibits the love and 
support of these Chinese fans. Correspondingly, Thai Boys Love series love their Chinese fans. 
Most of these Thai actors embrace their native Chinese names (if they are Chinese Thai) and the 
Chinese names/nicknames assigned by their Chinese fans,196 and they are managing to learn and 
speak Mandarin, at least some of the most basic phrases. When something important occurs in 
China, such as the Spring Festival each year and the initial outbreak of the coronavirus in Wuhan 
 
196 A considerable percentage of actors of Thai Boys Love series are Chinese Thai. On Instagram, the social media 
platform targeting for fans all over the world, Thai actors like Tul Pakorn Thanasrivanitchai (Wu Xudong), Tay 
Tawan Vihokratana (Lin Yang), and Toptap Jirakit Kuariyakul (Qiu Changyu) display their Chinese names in 
Chinese characters right on their profile names. Bas Suradej Pinnirat embraces the Chinese nickname Pangpang and 
shows it on his Instagram profile as well. Nearly all main actors of Thai Boys Love series have more than one 
Chinese names/nicknames. Please note that their Instagram profile may change after the completion of this thesis. 
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in January 2020, they always convey their greetings and wishes to all Chinese people through 
various ways and platforms (fig. 41).197 This sort of treatment is inconceivable for the fan 
community of other countries, with the possible exception of the fan community in Thailand. It 
appears like Thai Boys Love series and their Chinese fans are on their long-lasting romantic 
honeymoon ever since Love Sick (dir. Kusolkulsiri; 2014) unlocked China’s huge entertainment 
market several years ago. 
 However, no one anticipated this solid romance was to be significantly interrupted by an 
incident on April 11, 2020. Moreover, no one anticipated it was simply triggered by a Twitter 
repost and an Instagram post of a Thai actor’s then girlfriend. This incident, known as #nnevvy, 
is reckoned by netizens to be the biggest civilian conflict online between Chinese and Thai 
people since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the People’s Republic of China and the 
Kingdom of Thailand in 1975. By scrutinizing this incident in a “cross-cultural communication” 
framework, this chapter probes the vulnerability of the “Chinese-Thai romance” in spite of the 
harmony on the surface. 
 
The #nnevvy Incident 
Before April 11, 2020, #nnevvy did not carry any remarkable meaning. It was merely the Twitter 
and Instagram account name of Nnevvy Weeraya Sukaram, then girlfriend to Bright Vachirawit 
Chivaaree. Bright is the main actor of 2gether (dir. Thongjila; 2020), a GMMTV-produced Thai 
Boys Love series that swept across the world in that time period. Due to his chemistry with the 
other main actor in this series, Win Metawin Opasiamkajorn, Bright was exceedingly popular in 
China. Their nicknames, Bright and Win, both have meanings in English, so their Chinese fans 
 
197 Behaviors of this kind are more noticeable for Thai artists of Handsome Entertainment (Hansen Yule 漢森娛樂), 
a company based in Hong Kong SAR and more connected to China’s entertainment market. 
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translated these English meanings into Chinese and gave them their cute Chinese nicknames, 
Liangzai and Yingzai,198 respectively. A young man with Thai, American, and Chinese descent, 
Bright attracted nearly one million Chinese followers on Weibo within days because of his 
physical attractiveness. 
 The relationship between Nnevvy and Bright is not a common thing among main actors 
of Thai Boys Love series. Please bear in mind that most fans of Thai Boys Love series are 
young, heterosexual, and urban women. Among fans all over the world, a certain proportion of 
them are what Chinese fan culture terms “girlfriend fans” (nüyou fen),199 referring to female fans 
who actively imagine the actor(s) to be their romantic and even sexual partner(s). Certainly, there 
are also gay men who imagine these actor(s) as their boyfriend(s). To maintain their imagination 
and satisfy them, main actors of Thai Boys Love series, mostly heterosexual, are supposed to 
remain single or at least proclaim their single status if they are indeed in a relationship. The same 
dynamic applies to K-pop idol groups too, for example. In addition, many fans prefer to immerse 
themselves in the utopian world where they are enabled to gaze at and enjoy the male-male love 
among good-looking boys, and they normally will extend this male-male relationship to the real 
world. The existence of a girlfriend in reality definitely undermines their experiences of doing 
so. In this light, for Bright, admitting his relationship with Nnevvy was a brave act, with the risk 
of losing a great deal of fans. Fortunately, in China, fans liked him so much that they would 
support his relationship as long as they avoided showing off too frequently online. Prior to this 
incident, although many fans were sad, disappointed, or frustrated about the fact that Bright had 
had a girlfriend, a few of them who know how to use VPN and have an Instagram account would 
 
198 Mandarin: 亮仔 and 赢仔. The names literally mean Bright-zai and Win-zai, respectively. Zai is usually added 
after a one-character name to denote a “young male” image and connote a relational closeness. Also, in Mandarin, 
亮仔 shares the same pronunciation with 靓仔, a Cantonese word for “handsome guy.” 
199 Mandarin: 女友粉. For “mom fans” (mama fen 妈妈粉), please revisit footnote #9. 
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go to Nnevvy’s account to leave some compliments or wishes, such as “you are so pretty” and 
“please be happy with Bright.” Having said that, for another group of Chinese fans, her image 
had always been annoying when they navigated and consumed the Boys Love world, especially 
the series 2gether. 
 For those enthusiastic fans who know how to use VPN to access foreign sites, they keep 
close attention on every move of the actors they like. On April 11, 2020, they noticed something 
“strange” of Bright: he liked Nnevvy’s retweet that seems to link the outbreak of the coronavirus 
to a Wuhan lab. Feeling both offended and puzzled, they went through Nnevvy’s social media 
accounts carefully and ended up in shock. On September 15, 2017, she posted a photo of her trip 
to Taiwan, below which Bright commented, “you are beautiful, look like a Chinese girl.” She 
replied “what” in a cute fashion, whereas when another user asked her “what is your style,” she 
answered, “Taiwanese girl~” Meanwhile, some fans exposed that prior to Nnevvy’s retweet, 
Bright also liked a tweet that lists “Hong Kong” in juxtaposition with other “countries,” although 
he had apologized for that later, saying “I did not read the caption clearly.” The screenshots went 
viral first among Chinese fans of Thai Boys Love series and were spread and circulated online in 
an unbelievably fast speed. The two leading Thai-to-Mandarin subtitle groups, Tianfu and CFan, 
immediately responded that from then on, they would stop translating 2gether and promoting 
anything related to this series (fig. 42). 
 Most Chinese fans endorsed the “patriotic” rhetoric of Tianfu and CFan. They supported 
expelling Nnevvy, Bright, and the series 2gether out of China’s entertainment market. Based on 
their comments on Weibo, many argued what Nnevvy and Bright had violated was “a matter of 
principle” (yuanze wenti)200 regarding China’s integrity and sovereignty. Many mentioned the 
 
200 Mandarin: 原则问题. 
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humiliating past China had gone through and the unfair stigmatization China is facing in the 
current world order largely dominated by Euro-American countries. 
Above all, this incident was collectively regarded as a “ruhua”201 one. As a recurring and 
well-known concept in contemporary China, ruhua, literally “humiliating China,” is referred to 
when any subject wittingly or unwittingly offends Chinese people by failing to align with their 
collective perceptions or expectations toward China and how it should be treated, including but 
not limited to its people, culture, internal affair, territorial integrity, historical dispute, and even 
ruling party.202 In the case of Nnevvy, both retweeting a post that suggests the Wuhan lab’s 
potential link with the coronavirus and differentiating Taiwan from China were, without a doubt, 
considered as ruhua. Whether a saying, a behavior, or an incident is ruhua is largely subjective, 
but most Chinese people can reach an agreement in the majority of cases. The reason has a lot to 
do with education and media, growing nationalistic sentiments, and the Sinocentric view, which 
is expanded in the following sections. It is more than accurate to use the adjective “countless” to 
describe the individuals and organizations that have been involved in big or small ruhua events 
in recent years,203 from public figures or common people (e.g., Chou Tzuyu, Daryl Morey, Tian 
 
201 Mandarin: 辱华. 
202 This “definition” is come up with by me, so there is no citation. Ruhua is definitely an understudied cultural 
phenomenon of modern-day China. 
203 Here, I select some of the examples and discuss why they are considered as ruhua. (1) Daryl Morey: in October 
2019, this then Houston Rockets general manager tweeted in support of the 2019-2020 Hong Kong “protests” (a.k.a. 
“riots” for some people), triggering the temporary ban of NBA in China together with the NBA commissioner Adam 
Silver; (2) Yang Shuping: in May 2017, in her commencement speech at the University of Maryland, this Chinese 
international student praised the air in the United States as “so sweet and fresh, and oddly luxurious” and highlighted 
China’s severe air pollutions. She then talked about issues like democracy and freedom with a critiquing undertone 
toward China, which annoyed many Chinese people and even China’s press Global Times, an English-language 
newspaper under the state-sponsored People’s Daily; (3) Balenciaga: in April 2018, the staffs of the Balenciaga shop 
in Paris allowed non-Chinese costumers to cut in the line of the Chinese shoppers, and later subdued and assaulted 
these Chinese shoppers. It was seen as a mistreatment and discrimination toward Chinese people; and (4) Mercedes-
Benz: in February 2018, this company used a quote from Dalai Lama in its Instagram post. For more about what 
might be categorized by most Chinese people as ruhua, please watch Chih-chyi Chang. “Zhe wujian shiqing 
qianwan buneng zuo! Xiang zhongguo daoqian daheji!” 這五件事情千萬不能做！向中國道歉大合集！[Stay 
Away from These Five Things at All Costs: Summarize All Situations That You May Need to Apologize to China]. 
YouTube. 21 Oct. 2019. 
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Jialiang, Ezequiel Lavezzi, Yang Shuping, Mark Horton, Hamzy, Trevor Noah) to international 
organizations (e.g., Dolce & Gabbana, Balenciaga, H&M, Marvel, Versace, Mercedes-Benz, 
APA Hotels, Lotte). 
The two most noteworthy tactics most Chinese people use to fight against any alleged 
ruhua events are articulation of economic threat and cyber expedition. Expedition (chuzheng)204 
is an Internet word meaning that a large group of netizens gather together, head to some specific 
sites/accounts, and “boom” them with overwhelming comments for certain purposes. Normally, 
there is an “enemy” image from whom the netizens demand explanation and apology. Both 
economic threat and cyber expedition are voluntary (i.e., initiated by civilians) and collective in 
most cases. For instance, Dolce & Gabbana released an advertisement in November 2018 which 
was considered to be essentially racist and surely insulting, looking down upon Chinese culture. 
Chinese people, including all the Chinese celebrities that Dolce & Gabbana had cooperation 
with, collectively boycotted this brand. Many netizens accessed foreign sites to bombard this 
advertisement, the brand, and the founders, threatening that Dolce & Gabbana would be forever 
boycotted in China. Among these cyber expeditioners, some were more rational, explaining why 
Chinese people got so irritated and emphasizing how China has been treated unfairly in modern 
history, while some adopted a more radical means, attacking this brand with words like “trash” 
and using equally racist approaches against the other side. This incident escalated within a week, 
and nearly all products of this brand were removed online and offline in China. Although the two 
founders, Domenico Dolce and Stefano Gabbana, eventually apologized (they even said “sorry” 
in Mandarin) and asked for forgiveness from Chinese people, this brand is still on people’s 
“ruhua blacklist,” and the huge economic loss caused by this incident has continued till now.205 
 
204 Mandarin: 出征. 
205 This incident is narrated based on my online observations then. There are a lot of articles about it online. 
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This advertisement from Dolce & Gabbana is indeed Orientalist and can be easily perceived as 
discriminative, and how it dealt with this crisis was problematic and hence led to a “brand fail,” 
but what I would like to illustrate by dwelling into this example is, first of all, the strategies and 
patterns of these Chinese netizens when facing this kind of circumstance, which can be noticed 
from the #nnevvy incident as well. 
In the same vein, the instant the #nnevvy incident broke out, a group of Chinese netizens 
(mostly fans of Thai Boys Love series at the start) arrived at Twitter and Instagram, the main 
“battlegrounds” of this incident, to contend with Nnevvy, Bright, and even Bright’s company 
GMMTV. At first, some stayed rational and requested merely an explanation and apology. For 
them, an explanation and apology were a matter of face, reflecting that Bright and his company 
still value China, at least the money from Chinese fans. Thai netizens (also, mostly fans of Thai 
Boys Love series) were surprised by the sudden appearance of them. Some kindly pointed out 
that it is nearly impossible that Nnevvy and Bright did it out of spite, and Nnevvy’s way of using 
“what” was assuredly not a denial of Bright’s comments “look like a Chinese girl” in the Thai 
language. They were confused, for sure, because in their mindset and worldview there is nothing 
wrong with questioning a state agency or saying “Taiwanese.” At this first place, sadly, many 
had already displayed explicit aggressiveness toward the other side. To make things worse, the 
results these expeditioners wanted did not come. Nnevvy closed her accounts and began to delete 
comments in Mandarin. Bright posted a story on Instagram showing he was playing video games 
joyfully with his friend, a person who is said to support Hong Kong independence. GMMTV 
remained silent and did not address anything related to this incident at all. Hence the anger of 
these expeditioners got completely ignited. Some put more pressures on GMMTV by threatening 
to permanently “ban” all series from this company, while more people directly scolded Nnevvy 
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and Bright using harsh words. Feeling the other side’s hostility, Thai netizens fought back. The 
conflict soon evolved into an all-rounded battle, expanding far beyond the behaviors of Nnevvy 
and Bright. Informed by the contents of Nnevvy’s retweet and Instagram post, many Chinese 
expeditioners attempted to use the same rhetoric to irk their Thai enemies, by saying things such 
as “Thailand’s national power is so weak” and “southern Thailand206 should be independent.” 
However, most Thai netizens were not that annoyed by these, but their sayings such as “China is 
an orphan on the global stage” and “Hong Kong and Taiwan are not China” could exasperate 
their Chinese counterpart, rising their anger to the next level. 
Realizing the outbreak of this incident, many netizens from Taiwan and Hong Kong 
joined the battle (fig. 43). Since most of them who immediately came and helped Thai netizens 
out are anti-China and/or anti-CPC in essence, many of them started with an extremely sarcastic 
and offensive manner, such as using the word “pink maggot” (fenqu)207 to refer to these Chinese 
expeditioners. For these Chinese expeditioners, people from Taiwan and Hong Kong are their 
“compatriots” both politically and culturally, but their self-righteous acts reminded them of how 
some Western countries strive to disdain anything about China and has successfully brainwashed 
these non-mainlanders, which made them completely infuriated. Many Chinese “reinforcements” 
joined, and this conflict soon became an absolute chaos full of inflammatory, biased, and racist 
hate speeches from all parties. The focus of the Chinese expeditioners, without a doubt, was no 
longer the behaviors of Nnevvy and Bright per se, but instead assaulting their “enemies” while 
 
206 What they were referring to are Thai Provinces of Songkhla, Satun, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat where Muslims 
dominate (note that most Thai people believe in Buddhism). Part of this region overlaps with the Pattani Kingdom, a 
sultanate with part of the territory being incorporated into Thailand’s map in the early twentieth century (the 
remaining territory was incorporated into today’s Malaysia). Thai government always tries to assimilate people in 
this region but faces intense and sometimes violent resistance. 
207 Mandarin: 粉蛆. 粉, pink, comes from the term “little pink red” (xiaofenhong 小粉红), an Internet meme broadly 
referring to any (young) Chinese citizen who extremely loves China and supports the government. 蛆, maggot, 
indicates that they do not have the ability to think independently and are controlled by the state. 
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safeguarding the image, sovereignty, integrity, and legitimacy of China. On the other side, these 
people from Thailand, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were united under the “Milk Tea Alliance,”208 
and the hashtag #nnevvy evolved into an icon for spreading any anti-China and/or anti-CPC 
sentiments. What is noteworthy and is explored later is that although both sides got angry when 
receiving personal attacks, these Chinese people felt annoyed and offended when their country 
and government were derided or despised and thus endeavored to defend for them, while their 
counterparts were much less responsive regarding that. 
This incident went out of control209 and did not quiet down until a week later. Nnevvy, 
Bright, 2gether, and the sequel of this series Still 2gether (dir. Chaiwimol; 2020) were since 
ostracized from China’s entertainment market, although a small group of fans still secretly like 
them. A few Thai actors unfollowed Nnevvy and Bright on social media, and a few Thai actors 
suggested in a very reserved manner that they were against the bully of Chinese fans, but most 
Thai actors and companies remained silent, as if there was no conflict happened at all. Bright has 
lost nearly two-thirds of his followers on Weibo, but ironically, he became much more popular 
outside of China and well-known for the people who never watch Thai Boys Love series. On 
June 20, 2020, Bright abruptly posted a nine-minute video on Weibo in which he explained and 
apologized. This late apology, unsurprisingly, was not acceptable for Chinese fans, especially 
after they got further irked during the online battle, and the comment with most likes under the 
video contained a picture showing one huge Chinese character, “fu*k off.” In spite of that, just a 
few weeks after the #nnevvy incident, most Chinese fans seemed to “forgive” and reconcile with 
Bright’s company GMMTV and Thai Boys Love series in general. The emerging series are 
 
208 There are also people from Vietnam and other countries around the world joining in the battle. In addition, some 
non-Chinese people did support the Chinese side, arguing that many people (e.g., from Taiwan and Hong Kong) 
who are blindly pro-democracy had already become the poor puppets of the West. 
209 For example, it became Thailand’s top trending on Twitter only a few hours since its outbreak. 
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warmly welcomed in China, except the ones starring Bright, and the fan community of Thai 
Boys Love series keeps enlarging. This time, however, no one dares to ever promise how long 
this “new chapter” of honeymoon will last.210 
 
The Rise of Nationalism 
As mentioned before, the #nnevvy incident became unexpectedly famous, attracting attention 
from people of different backgrounds and nationalities. There are tons of related articles: most of 
them take an anti-China and/or anti-CPC stance, so their narratives are distorted and not helpful 
for people to comprehend the topic of this chapter. By using my narrative based on my extensive 
online observations when this incident occurred, I aim not to propose a biased/unbiased or 
right/wrong binary. Rather, I hope to lay the context in a more objective fashion for later analysis 
and raise some aspects that are going to be evident for the more theoretical contents remained. 
The ultimate goal of this chapter is to illuminate how the differing and sometimes contrasting 
mindset and worldview of people may impede effective cross-cultural communication and even 
cause friction. It is exactly the case concerning why the “Chinese-Thai romance” is always in 
danger, regardless of how stable and concordant it appears to be. 
 To explore this topic, it is significant to first understand why these Chinese fans became 
irritated at the very beginning and during the battle, vis-à-vis the ruhua (humiliating China) 
discourse. Most Chinese people are unable to tolerate any ruhua events, since in their mind, 
China must not be humiliated anymore. From a Sinocentric perspective, China had always been 
the center and the “superior” one, leading the neighboring cultures, bringing them civilization, 
 
210 This incident is narrated based on my online observations then. It is impossible to include every detail of this 
incident. For example, Bright also seemed to give Win names, which was another thing that annoyed Chinese fans at 
the very first place and motivated their cyber expedition. 
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and assimilating them. However, since the late Qing Dynasty, due to the fatuity of the Manchu 
rulers211 and the invasion of the imperialists, China was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by 
Western powers and Japan from the mid nineteenth century to the mid twentieth century.212 
China, with decreasing power, gradually lost its dominance on the global stage. This time period 
is referred to as “the century of humiliation” (bainian chiru; a.k.a. bainian guochi)213 by Chinese 
people, which is always the center of patriotic education and political discourses (fig. 44 and 
45).214 According to the rhetoric, it is something sorrowful but able to alert Chinese people, since 
“humiliation” would only happen when China was weak in power. The ubiquitous appearance of 
“the century of humiliation” in education and media, using the vivid memories it provokes, keeps 
reminding today’s people of how Chinese people back then were called “the sick men of Asia,” 
how Chinese lands were conceded, how Chinese cities were looted, how Chinese cultures were 
disdained, and all in all, how China was humiliated by outside powers. It delineates the image of 
the past China being humiliated and calls for all Chinese people to work together to prevent the 
humiliation from happening again. 
 In this sense, the mindset of most Chinese people nowadays is peculiarly unique since it 
is heavily shaped by the mediated collective memories toward “the century of humiliation” in 
relation to China’s rejuvenation (fuxing)215 and prosperity in recent decades. With the economic 
reform (a.k.a. Reform and Opening-up) in China launched in 1978 by former Chinese President 
Deng Xiaoping, the world, including Chinese people who have more entries to the outside world, 
 
211 Again, it is from a Sinocentric perspective brought up by the dominant Han Chinese. 
212 The start is always marked by the First Opium War between Britain and the Qing Dynasty from 1839 to 1842, 
and the end is always marked by China’s victory over the Imperial Japan in 1945 and/or the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949. 
213 Mandarin: 百年耻辱 (a.k.a. 百年国耻). 
214 Wang, Zheng. “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic 
Education Campaign in China.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 4, 2008, pp. 783, 785. 
215 Mandarin: 复兴. This term is ubiquitous in China’s political rhetoric nowadays, such as in Xi Jinping’s “the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (zhonghua minzu weida fuxing 中华民族伟大复兴). 
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has witnessed China’s rapid economic development and increasing international recognition. The 
year of 2008 is particularly memorable in the process of rejuvenation when the Beijing Olympics 
splendidly showed the world the comeback of a powerful China. These days, the magnificent 
skylines in big cities, the high-quality lives people share on social media, the record-breaking 
technologies, and many other things keep reminding and convincing Chinese people that they are 
truly in an era of shengshi.216 The notion of shengshi refers to the golden years of prosperity and 
ascendency, which is used to depict China’s peak throughout the history, like the Han and Tang 
Dynasty (202 BC-220 AD; 618-907), the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong era (1661-1796) of 
the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), and to be sure, the current moment. The saying “this shengshi is 
as you wish”217 has been noticeably popular since the 2010s to commemorate the pioneers who 
overcame all kinds of difficulties in the “Old China” and used their blood, sweat, and tears to 
establish the “New China” which is now on its way to reach the pinnacle again. 
 These changes in recent decades empower the people to express their identity as a proud 
Chinese, invite them to safeguard China’s interests in every aspect, and generate nationalistic 
sentiments. This nationalism is not a xenophobic one, but definitely is extremely patriotic and 
centric to their own beliefs. The impression that China is in shengshi, widely acknowledged by 
Chinese people, is in sharp contrast with the painful experiences and memories from “the century 
of humiliation.” In their mind, the bully and humiliation, like discrimination toward Chinese 
people and culture, loss of territory, and groundless accusation and stigmatization, that happened 
in the past must not continue to the current stage, given the power and prestige China possesses 
now. As illustrated before, whether something is bullying and humiliating China is subjective, 
but influenced largely by education and media, most Chinese people have their unique but united 
 
216 Mandarin: 盛世. 
217 Mandarin: 这盛世如你所愿. 
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worldview and criteria. Things Nnevvy conducted at the first place crossed the line of tolerance 
for Chinese people, as the issues involved are provocative for them. 
 For most Chinese people, Nnevvy challenged China’s territorial integrity concerning 
whether Taiwan belongs to China. In most places worldwide, these two are clearly two different 
and independent nation-states, no matter which one is the legitimate representative of “China.”218 
In Taiwan, an increasingly well-received historiography views this island as being colonized by 
several foreign regimes since the seventeenth century, including the current regime, the Republic 
of China, which fled from the mainland upon the defeat of the Chinese Civil War and since then 
took it over.219 In contrast, education and media in China have been emphasized on the territorial 
integrity, especially the “historical fact” that Taiwan belongs to China. It is a historical problem 
within China that will be solved, and both sides have already been unified under the “One-China 
Principle.”220 A metaphor they adopt is to describe China’s map as a powerful rooster, of which 
Hainan island and Taiwan island constitute the two feet of the rooster. Taiwan, Hong Kong SAR, 
Tibet Autonomous Region, and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region remain the four most 
sensitive regions to talk about.221 Many individuals and groups I listed above were considered as 
ruhua because they did something that were not in line with most Chinese people’s mindset and 
 
218 On October 25, 1971, the United Nations (UN) recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to be the only 
legitimate representative of China. Prior to this, this title was held by the Republic of China (ROC), which lost the 
Chinese Civil War and retreated to the island groups of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu in 1949. 
219 See, for example, Wi-vun Taiffalo Chiung. “Languages Under Colonization: The Taiwanese Language 
Movement.” Changing Taiwanese Identities, edited by Bruce Jacobs and Peter Kang. Routledge, 2017, pp. 40, 51; 
Beng Su. “Taiwanren sibainian shi” 台灣人四百年史 [Taiwan’s 400 Year History]. Paradise Culture Associates, 
1980. 
220 China stresses the agreement of both sides on the “One-China Principle” 一中原则 (a.k.a. 1992 Consensus 九二
共识), which argues “one China” (一个中国). It deliberately does not mention an important part of this agreement, 
“different interpretations” (各自表述; a.k.a. 一中各表), meaning that both the PRC and the ROC can claim they are 
the only China. Also, it is an agreement reached between the CPC and the Kuomintang (KMT). Many Taiwanese 
people nowadays and the current President Tsai Ing-wen from the other dominant party, the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP), refuse to accept it. 
221 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Macao SAR are sometimes on this list too. 
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worldview of territorial integrity. As for Nnevvy’s Instagram post, replying “what”222 toward 
Bright’s comment “look like a Chinese girl” and announcing a “Taiwanese girl” self-image 
challenged the collective belief of most Chinese people that “Taiwan was, is, and will be part of 
China.” Just imagine what if she said “Shanghaiese girl,” “Sichuanese girl,” or “Dongbei girl”: 
even though she used “what” toward Bright’s comment, she would be totally fine. The problem 
is that Taiwan is the most sensitive region to talk about when it comes to territorial integrity for 
most Chinese people. 
 Moreover, Nnevvy’s retweet that suggests a potential link between the coronavirus and a 
Wuhan lab was regarded as a groundless stigmatization toward China. This incident outbroke on 
April 11, 2020, when the virus had been defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a 
global pandemic, causing chaos and death all over the world, with anti-Chinese/Asian sentiments 
climbed to the next level. The most well-known examples for most Chinese people must be the 
then President of the United States Donald Trump’s wordings, such as “China virus” and “kung 
flu,” and Taiwanese people’s use of “Wuhan pneumonia” (wuhan feiyan).223 Both displeased and 
offended them, making them feel the world was looking for a scapegoat to blame for and justify 
their unsuccessful control of the virus. According to the Chinese state’s rhetoric in April 2020, 
the virus might originate in Wuhan, but there has not been any scientific conclusion about its real 
origin yet. Furthermore, China was the first country to have effectively contained the spread and 
resumed people’s lives back to normal, which is supposed to be learned from. More and more 
people began to buy into this rhetoric and feel proud of China’s achievements. Many seemed to 
 
222 Again, Nnevvy’s way of saying “what” is not a denial toward “look like a Chinese girl.” However, most Chinese 
people do not know Thai at all. They relied on translation tools, and the literal meaning was problematic to them. 
223 Mandarin: 武漢肺炎. Although this name was used even by Chinese officials in the first days of its outbreak, 
only新冠肺炎 (xinguan feiyan) or COVID-19 are used upon the creation of these two “non-discriminative” names, 
which applies to most Chinese-speaking places. However, Taiwanese people still use “Wuhan pneumonia,” which 
disgusts most Chinese people and further dismantles the “emotional connection” in between. 
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forget that they themselves were very dissatisfied at first. After the death of the whistleblower Li 
Wenliang in early February, many Chinese people’s discontent reached the apex. A multitude of 
them gathered online to criticize the lack of transparency and freedom of speech, prompting the 
state to employ censorship. Since around mid/late March, however, they were more inclined to 
endorse the “role model” image promoted by the government, thinking of outside critiques as 
disinformation and groundless stigmatization toward China, no matter how neutral or reasonable 
they seemed to be. For them, Nnevvy’s retweet supported the conspiracy theory that China 
intentionally unleashed the virus to the world and should be held accountable. This “bad devil” 
image of China acquired through these people’s overinterpretation was definitely humiliating for 
them and contradictory to what they believed at the moment. 
 The dynamics behind Nnevvy’s Twitter repost and Instagram post, unsurprisingly, have 
their equivalents dating back to “the century of humiliation.” Due to its weakness then, China 
continued to lose its territory, with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Outer Mongolia (today’s Mongolia) 
as classic examples. Also, China faced groundless accusation, racialized stigmatization, and 
outrageous bully then. For instance, the Imperial Japan baselessly accused China for the missing 
of a Japanese solider in July 1937, thereby having the excuse to start the Second Sino-Japanese 
War. Through representations and amplification in education and media, the state depicts these 
painful memories and anything alike as entirely incompatible with the contemporary powerful 
China, generating and consolidating people’s nationalistic sentiments. For most Chinese people, 
the biggest threat toward China is the “foreign forces” (jingwai shili),224 which refers to countries 
with power to “distort facts” on purpose to defame China and manage to make all people believe 
so. Euro-American countries, especially the Five Eyes,225 and sometimes Japan, South Korea, 
 
224 Mandarin: 境外势力, sometimes as “foreign hostile forces” (jingwai didui shili 境外敌对势力). 
225 The Five Eyes (FVEY) comprises Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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and India are among the list. In this sense, Nnevvy’s behaviors, in the understanding of most 
Chinese people then, were to endorse the “meticulously framed” rhetoric of foreign forces and 
stand in the opposing side to China. This mentality of most Chinese people is exemplified by the 
saying, “the desire of the imperialists to exterminate us has not dead yet,”226 which is frequently 
used when Euro-American countries and their allies, in their eyes, seek to divide and criticize 
China groundlessly. For them, Nnevvy, a person from Thailand, one of China’s closest allies, 
must be bewitched by the foreign forces. It also explains why these Chinese people went furious 
when seeing people from Taiwan and Hong Kong join the battle: they were brainwashed and 
orchestrated by foreign forces to counter their compatriots. Most Chinese people are determined 
to combat with the foreign forces to safeguard the integrity, spirit, and pride of China. 
 Another interesting aspect of the #nnevvy incident is why these Chinese expeditioners 
were so irritated by the attacks from the other side. Most of them perceived the attacks on China, 
the CPC, and even the leadership as “personal” and closely linked to their self-image. That is, to 
attack the state, government, or Party is to attack them as individuals, which will stimulate a 
“defense mechanism” by resorting to nationalistic sentiments.227 It is also backed up by the myth 
China has been advocating that the destiny of every person is inseparably linked to the destiny of 
the nation.228 Thus, they were angry not only when the other side attacked them as individuals or 
attacked Chinese cultures, but also when the other side said something bad about the Chinese 
nation or the ruling party. These Chinese expeditioners took in the latter also as personal attacks. 
Conversely, this tactic did not work for their Thai “enemies” when they tried to insult them the 
same way. When Chinese expeditioners aggressively said, “Thailand’s national power is so 
 
226 Mandarin: 帝国主义亡我之心不死. 
227 Yang and Xu. “Chinese Danmei Fandom and Cultural Globalization from Below.” 2017, pp. 13-14. 
228 Ringen, Stein. The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century. Hong Kong University Press, 2016, p. 176. 
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weak” and “your King is sh*t,” Thai netizens simply replied, “I agree with you” and “yes, he 
definitely is.”229 In response to “southern Thailand should be independent,” Thai netizens joked 
that “not only southern Thailand, it is totally fine if you say Pattaya and Chiang Mai do not 
belong to Thailand, or you may even say Thailand belongs to China.”230 Many reports on this 
incident attribute Thai people’s reactions to their humor by nature, but what was at stake is 
people’s differences in mindset and worldview, and this characteristic was amplified during this 
hostile cross-cultural communication. 
The rising nationalistic sentiments brought by China’s impressive accomplishments and 
earthshaking changes impelled the Chinese fans to protect themselves and China simultaneously. 
Collectively clenching the standard toward what ruhua is and how it should be dealt with, they 
were committed to forestalling the painful experiences during “the century of humiliation” from 
taking place again and utilizing China’s power today to compensate for the past. By this token, 
nationalism is one resolution when anyone or anything fails to be in line with their mindset and 
worldview. However, what matters to them might not by any means a big deal for other people, 
such as the Thai netizens in this incident. Even though that is the case, most Chinese people will 
attempt to impose their ideas on others and force others to accept theirs or at least surrender in 
the form of apologizing, and it is what the next section explicates. 
 
The Comeback of Sinocentrism 
 The other mentality China’s high-speed development in recent decades has begat is the 
comeback of Sinocentrism. I use “comeback” instead of “emergence” because Sinocentrism has 
 
229 Actually, it is illegal to denounce Thai monarchy (especially the King) according to the laws, but the anonymity 
on many social media sites create a safer space for Thai people to do so. 
230 This is an irony that Thailand’s economy is too dependent on China, Chinese tourists and Chinese investments in 
particular. Also, Chinese-Thai people dominate many social arenas in Thailand now, such as media and business. 
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a rich history. It can be traced all the way back to the Zhou Dynasty (1046-256 BC) when the 
Chinese tributary system231 and the tianxia232 ideology began to develop across Asia. Tianxia, 
basically “all under heaven,” is an ancient Sinocentric idea that connotes China’s cultural and 
geopolitical dominance in the region (which equaled the world in people’s perception then).233 It 
portrays (ancient) China at the absolute center, bringing civilization to the “barbarians” nearby. 
There was definitely a superior/inferior hierarchy, and the more assimilated by China, the more 
civilized: ancient Kyoto’s city planning, Gyeongbokgung Palace in today’s South Korea, as well 
as Vietnam’s usage of Chinese characters are all such examples. Nearly all states around ancient 
China, including Siam (today’s Thailand), were China’s tributary states at some point. 
 There is no doubt that this system vanished upon the arrival of European colonizers. 
During and probably after “the century of humiliation,” China and Chinese people were put at 
the inferior side, and the dominance in the region no longer existed. Chinese people themselves 
even saw their own cultures as “backward” and turned to the West to seek for modernity. For 
example, the well-known writer Lu Xun (1881-1936), hailed as the “the sage of modern China,” 
advocated for abolishing Chinese characters and replacing them with the Latin alphabets. In his 
view, “Chinese characters constitute a tubercle on the body of China’s poor and laboring masses, 
inside of which the bacteria collect. If one does not clear them out, then one will die.”234 With 
China’s expeditious and astonishing development in recent decades, people now have returned to 
value and at times overly take pride of the traditional cultures. Popular music celebrating the 
 
231 Wang, David Der-wei. “The Panglossian Dream and Dark Consciousness: Modern Chinese Literature and 
Utopia.” Utopia and Utopianism in the Contemporary Chinese Context: Texts, Ideas, Spaces, edited by David Der-
wei Wang, Angela Ki Che Leung, and Yinde Zhang. Hong Kong University Press, 2020, p. 59. 
232 Mandarin: 天下. 
233 Basu, Dilip K. “Chinese Xenology and the Opium War: Reflections on Sinocentrism.” The Journal of Asian 
Studies, vol. 73, no. 4, 2014, p. 928. 
234 Mullaney, Thomas S. The Chinese Typewriter: A History. MIT Press, 2018, p. 13. 
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richness and remarkability of Chinese characters reflects this pride, such as Taiwanese idol group 
S.H.E.’s Zhongguohua in 2001 and Chinese singer Chen Keyu’s Shengpizi in 2017.235 The lyrics 
“people all over the world are speaking the Chinese language now” and “people with the yellow 
skin color raise (our/their) head with pride” explicitly reveal the Chinese language’s influences 
worldwide and most Chinese people’s increasing confidence toward it. Another quintessential 
example is the Hanfu Movement aiming to revitalize ancient customs of Han Chinese (fig. 46). 
The prevalence of this movement is partly because of the global recognition of Kimono of Japan 
and Hanbok of Korea. Many followers highlight Hanfu’s status by using wordings like “Hanfu is 
the ancestor of Kimono and Hanbok,” hoping the world could grasp its abundance, splendor, and 
the upspoken “superiority” in the region, at least in the ancient setting. 
 Through a more nuanced investigation, in ancient China, the Sinocentric ideas prevailed 
only among the very few literate people in power: only they knew China’s position in relation to 
other neighboring states. The vast majority of illiterate Chinese people identified with their local 
community (e.g., village) instead of the dynasty they were in, let alone the concept of “China.” 
However, in contemporary China, via education and media, the legacies of ancient China as the 
“influencing center” and the Sinocentric view have been spread to the mass. In this sense, what 
the comeback of Sinocentrism connotes is that in most Chinese people’s perspectives today, the 
image of “China as the center” that requires enough power to sustain has come back. Also, they 
support this very ideology. 
 As Kissinger precisely elucidates in his book On China, “in the Chinese perception, 
China was considered the center of the world, the ‘Middle Kingdom,’ and other societies were 
 
235《中國話》https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCKGoND0pS0 (by S.H.E.: Jen Selina, Tien Hebe, Chen Ella);
《生僻字》https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGmH7eanIQI (by Chen Keyu). 
 125 
assessed as gradations from it.”236 The depicted Sinocentric view definitely has come back in the 
wake of economic takeoff, and more and more Chinese people pay respect to the ancient legacies 
if not look forward to resuming the tianxia system. China’s regional dominance in the course of 
history (undermined by the Manchu-established Qing Dynasty and collapsed under European 
colonization) was maintained largely through its acknowledged cultural superiority and the ritual 
center it represented.237 Doubtlessly, this sort of civilizational hierarchy among different cultures 
no longer work today. However, education and media constantly portray China’s ancient legacies 
to the people, familiarizing and drawing them to the Sinocentric world order. Although what is 
portrayed is neither false nor exaggerated, overemphasis might lead to people’s condescending 
and patronizing attitudes when they come across scenarios like cross-cultural communication. 
Their pride always collides with the unsatisfactory reality, since many people in the world do not 
know China well and even still look down upon its people and cultures. There is a psychological 
gap between their expectations of China’s international status and how it should be treated and 
its disappointingly actual prestige.238 This imbalance will push some Chinese people to eagerly 
and sometimes aggressively demand others to recognize and respect China’s ancient legacies and 
the status it “deserves” for its contributions to the world. A lot of polemical issues in this facet 
arise between Chinese and South Korean netizens, with the origin of Hanbok (in relation to the 
Ming Dynasty-style Hanfu) and who has been stealing the culture from the other side as the most 
classic example. The initial form of Hanbok was hugely influenced by China’s Hanfu, while it 
also cannot be disavowed that it went through the local adaptation, transformation, and flourish. 
Both sides like to use antagonistic words toward each other. Facing assaults from South Korean 
 
236 Kissinger, Henry. On China, illustrated edition. Penguin Books, 2012, p. 10. 
237 Song, Nianshen. “Faxian dongya” 发现东亚 [Discovering East Asia]. New Star Press, 2018. 
238 Yang, Lijun, and Yongnian Zheng. “Fen Qings (Angry Youth) in Contemporary China.” Journal of 
Contemporary China, vol. 21, no. 76, 2012, p. 652. 
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netizens, Chinese netizens tend to adopt Sinocentric discourses, such as “all Korean cultures 
were from China” and “do not forget your father even if you have a new father named America.” 
These radical hate speeches are rendered because the South Korean netizens fail to admit ancient 
China’s influences on Korea, which is, again, highly controversial and complex. Their conflicts 
derive from the very different socially constructed and organized histography and interpretations 
since the birth of the nation-states as well as the rising nationalistic sentiments on both sides, and 
it is a topic of extreme complexity that might not be successfully elucidated within a book, not to 
speak of in a few sentences. What I want to draw attention to is people’s Sinocentric responses 
from China’s side. 
 The embodiments of Sinocentrism’s return match with the essence of ethnocentrism, 
which sees one’s own culture as superior to others. Nowadays, more Chinese people know that 
each nation’s culture should be treated with respect and try to refrain from being too explicit, but 
many still have the Sinocentric view and ancient legacies in their consciousness. What they want 
is a world where people can listen to (sometimes follow) China/Chinese people and pay respect 
(sometimes extra respect) to Chinese cultures. To put it more succinctly, they emphasize more on 
the status of and other people’s esteem toward China, possibly with a cultural hierarchy in mind. 
China used to be dominant within its tianxia due to its cultural hegemony collectively accepted 
by the neighboring states, but Chinese people need to find other ways to manage to reconstitute 
and represent its ascendency in the contemporary world. China’s rapid development in recent 
decades, again, plays an irreplaceable role in this new approach, because it gives rise to Chinese 
people’s purchasing power. 
Most people must be acquainted with how powerful it can be, and in many cases, Chinese 
consumers mean a lot to a brand or even a place. As noted above, articulation of economic threat 
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is a tactic most Chinese people use when confronting anyone or anything that is considered to be 
ruhua. It works. Many individuals or organizations that were drawn into ruhua events ultimately 
chose to apologize in order to save some of their Chinese consumers. In 2015, Taiwanese K-pop 
singer Chou Tzu-yu was found waving the flag of Taiwan (ROC) in a television program. Owing 
to that, any business between her and China was suspended, and her group TWICE and company 
JYP Entertainment were boycotted by Chinese netizens. She finally came out to apologize two 
months later. In the video officially uploaded by JYP Entertainment, this then 16-year-old girl 
read her apology entirely in Mandarin and claimed that “there is only one China, and I am proud 
of being Chinese” blankly. Similar to Chou, many individuals and organizations say “sorry” to 
China not because they agree with what Chinese people argue. Instead, their seemingly sincere 
apology may melt Chinese people’s boycott and secure some profits. 
 Most Chinese people know that their apology in no ways indicates they approve Chinese 
people’s mindset and worldview. Nevertheless, they still can use this method to manifest China’s 
“supposed” status and earn outward respect. The bottom line is not to lose face, which is implied 
by the “do not care” manner or insistence from the other side facing Chinese people’s request. 
It came with no surprise that such strategy was adopted in the #nnevvy incident. Despite 
their economic threat, there was no response from Nnevvy, Bright, or GMMTV for a while. It 
brought negative consequences especially for Bright. Bright belongs to the four male “couples” 
GMMTV is currently promoting with most efforts.239 These eight men, undoubtedly, bring most 
profits to the company, from the calendars, mugs, key rings, and boxsets GMMTV is selling to 
the fan meetings and product endorsements. However, after the #nnevvy incident, most Chinese 
 
239 The four male “couples” (eight men) are: (1) Singto Prachaya Ruangroj and Krist Perawat Sangpotirat; (2) Off 
Jumpol Adulkittiporn and Gun Atthaphan Phunsawat; (3) Tay Tawan Vihokratana and New Thitipoom 
Tachaapaikun; and (4) Bright Wachirawit Chivaaree and Win Metawin Opasiamkajorn. 
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fans only recognize three of the four, with Bright and every series he is in on the blacklist. No 
one shall underestimate the amount of money Chinese fans are willing to spend on the people 
they like. Aside from Krist’s example at the very beginning of this chapter, similar things occur 
every single moment, from putting their idol’s posters on sky trains to sending gifts to their 
production companies to posting the birthday celebration videos they made across Bangkok’s 
LED billboards. What Chinese fans can bring is absolutely not limited to these “direct” profits. 
After the release of I Told Sunset About You (dir. Kuno; 2020), the coconut-flavored shampoo 
Oh-eau uses in the series quickly became out-of-stock in China as well as numerous places in 
Thailand. Many viewers of this series have already set Phuket Province, the shooting location of 
this series, as the first stop of their post-coronavirus travel. The purchasing power of Chinese 
fans of Thai Boys Love series, in this light, is important not only for the production companies, 
but also for Thailand’s economy to a certain extent. 
 It perhaps explains why the target of the Chinese expeditioners soon became Bright in the 
conflict. The economic threat tactic would not be that effective for Nnevvy, since she has very 
few business connections with China’s market. Collectively boycotting GMMTV might be way 
too unreasonable and unsafe, since around half high-quality Thai Boys Love series are from this 
company. Therefore, Bright was the best target to put pressures on and demand an apology. For 
them, whether Bright apologized or not was a symbolic move, indicating how much Thailand’s 
side cared about their Chinese consumers. At the same time, they began the meaning-assigning 
process to convict Bright. His like of Nnevvy’s retweet and the tweet that lists Hong Kong as a 
country violated the mindset and worldview of most Chinese people. His unresponsiveness 
during the battle was interpreted as a silent consent toward what his then girlfriend and the Thai 
netizens had conducted. In this way, although Bright’s attitudes were assumed by the Chinese 
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expeditioners without much evidence, they still reached the conclusion that Bright is intrinsically 
a person in support of splitting and defaming China. 
 It perhaps also explains why Bright eventually came out to apologize to Chinese people 
two months after the #nnevvy incident. Although his seemingly sincere apology did not change 
the collective boycott on him in China, he attempted to draw this incident to an end and clear out 
a potential “threat” for Thai Boys Love series in the future. Bright will definitely not be the last 
one to apologize under the pressures of Chinese people’s purchasing power, but Thai production 
companies are exercising extra caution toward their relationship with Chinese fans so that this 
kind of incident will not happen one more time. For example, on the Instagram profile of Toptap 
Jirakit Kuariyakul, an actor from GMMTV, the “caption” of the story highlight of his trip to 
Taiwan is an emoji of the flag of China (PRC) (fig. 47). According to my observations, it was an 
emoji of the flag of Taiwan (ROC) before the #nnevvy incident. By highlighting their purchasing 
power, Chinese people can force others to repeat their mindset and worldview at least vacantly, 
obtain seeming respect for China, and speak for its dominance. Their Sinocentric view is hence 
satisfied and reinforced. 
 As a matter of fact, Thai Boys Love series always take particular “care” of China. From 
their promotions in Mandarin (fig. 48) to their efforts to incorporate Chinese elements into the 
series (fig. 49 and 50) to their more frequent interactions with the Chinese fans, Thai Boys Love 
series try to show that they are paying special attention to their Chinese fans. This complaisant 
and compliant attitude has long been satisfying for those fans with a Sinocentric view. It echoes 
with the bigger myth of “Chinese-Thai romance,”240 which articulates the closeness between the 
two countries and their peoples in every aspect. That said, the #nnevvy incident exhibits how 
 
240 Mandarin: 中泰一家亲; Thai: จีน-ไทย ครอบครัวเดียวกนั. 
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vulnerable the romance in fact is under the rise of nationalism and the comeback of Sinocentrism 
in contemporary China. The agonizing memories toward “the century of humiliation” create the 
unique mindset and worldview among most Chinese people, while the incredible purchasing 
power of Chinese people enables them to threaten other people to follow their demands and act 
obediently. Both are empowered by China’s economic takeoff in recent decades, and probably 
will continue for a long time. Thai Boys Love series have always been managing to meet the 
needs of their Chinese fans, but once something goes divergent from their collective mindset and 
worldview, they will request for more by asking Thai people to behave more acquiescently and 
intervening people’s freedom of speech outside of China. Nnevvy or Bright is definitely not an 
exception: in terms of mindset and worldview, most non-Chinese people are differing from and 
even contrasting with their Chinese counterparts. The #nnevvy incident broke out simply since it 
was found out and unexpectedly publicized and escalated. The unique mindset and worldview of 
most Chinese people can always be an obstacle toward effective cross-cultural communication, 
rendering any civilian relationship between China and other cultures fragile. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with a detailed narration on the #nnevvy incident that greatly interrupted the 
“honeymoon” between Thai Boys Love series and their Chinese fans, bringing up some aspects 
and paving the way for the later analysis. It then turned to inspect the rise of nationalism and the 
comeback of Sinocentrism among Chinese people empowered by China’s rapid development in 
recent decades and shaped by certain historical and societal factors. The distinctive mindset and 
worldview generated under this environment apply to most Chinese people, and they manage to 
force other people to endorse what they consider to be correct by any means. This chapter also 
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indicated that most Chinese people would prioritize China over the things they like. As a result, 
the “Chinese-Thai romance” and any cross-cultural relationship can be vulnerable, since their 





Figure 40. LED billboard in Times Squares, New York City displaying congratulations and wishes to 
Krist Perawat Sangpotirat from his Chinese fans. Wang Huizhen (the three Chinese characters) is Krist’s 
Chinese name, which is frequently called by his fans. Screenshotted from Instagram account @kristtps 




Figure 41. Chinese New Year 2020 greetings video by Thai artists of Handsome Entertainment. In this 
part, Prem Warut Chawalitrujiwong and Boun Noppanut Guntachai, main actors of Until We Meet Again 
(dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2019), send their bests wishes for the upcoming Chinese New Year to Chinese 
people. They are wearing Chinese customs, and many actors in this video manage to speak some Chinese. 





Figure 42. Announcement by Tianfu right after the outbreak of the #nnevvy incident. It says, “nothing can 
be more important than our country. The subtitle group has decided to stop livestreaming and translating 
2gether from now on. I love China!” This post garnered more than 111,000 likes within five hours. CFan, 
the other Thai-to-Mandarin subtitle group, posted a similar announcement the same day. Screenshotted 





Figure 43. Wong Chi-fung amid the online battle. As one of the leaders of the 2019-2020 Hong Kong 
protests, he posted it on his Twitter account to support people from Thailand, Taiwan, and Hong Kong 
and encourage them to stand together against Chinese people’s bully they all face. The picture on Switch 




Figure 44 and 45. Pictures showing how China was carved up and occupied by Western powers and Japan 
during “the century of humiliation.” Most Chinese people must have seen both if they grow up in the 
education system in China. The left one was a French political cartoon published on Le Petit Journal in 
1898, with the caption “En Chine - Le gâteau des Rois et... des Empereurs” (China - the Cake of Kinds 
and… of Emperors). The right one, named Picture of the Current Situation (Shijütu), was created by the 





Figure 46. Chinese people wearing Hanfu during a Hanfu Festival in Guangzhou in November 2020. It is 
increasingly prevalent to wear the traditional customs of Han people and claim its status in relation to 





Figure 47. Instagram profile of Toptap Jirakit Kuariyakul. At the right bottom corner, he uses an emoji of 
the flag of China (PRC) for his story highlight of his trip to Taiwan. It used to be an emoji of the flag of 
Taiwan (ROC) prior to the #nnevvy incident. The cover is even the iconic architecture, Taipei 101. 





Figure 48. Poster of Why R U (dir. Wongskulphat; 2020) in Mandarin. It draws attention to the Chinese 
title of this series, featuring the two male actors with their cute Chinese names, Zhou Jieming and Zhao 






Figure 49. Episode 1 of Tonhon Chonlatee (dir. Trakulkasemsuk; 2020). This series starts with a funny 
Chinese wuxia scene, generating laughs and resonance among the Chinese audience, as can be seen from 




Figure 50. Opening song of He’s Coming to Me (dir. Chaiwimol; 2019). This series incorporates many 







The preceding chapters inspected four noteworthy aspects of “the reception of Thai Boys Love 
series in China” in detail. There is no wonder that the interactions between these series and their 
Chinese consumers, including viewers/fans, subtitle groups, and event organizers, are fascinating 
and provide a rich terrain to explore. Thai Boys Love series begin to attain increasing influences 
not only within the Chinese consumers, but also in some parts of contemporary China’s society, 
which is known as “becoming popular outside of the circle” (huochuquan).241 The extremely 
well-received series I Told Sunset About You (dir. Kuno; 2020) gained popularity among people 
who do not identify themselves as the “solid fans” of Thai Boys Love series, and Teh’s word to 
Oh-eaw in the final scene of episode 1, “keyi ma”242 (in Mandarin, meaning “okay” or “can I”), 
has been massively cited and represented across Douyin (Tik Tok) and other online platforms in 
China. Similarly, the #nnevvy incident I elaborated in Chapter Five attracted attention from a 
considerable number of Chinese netizens, and many “cyber expeditioners” were not from the fan 
community of these series. Although the intra-Asian influences of Thai Boys Love series on 
China’s social landscape today are minor compared to, say, Japanese anime or K-pop, this media 
industry and its role in China are rising swiftly. 
 This thesis is guided by three subtopics, namely consumption, imagination, and friction. 
In terms of consumption, Chapter Two examined how Thai Boys Love series are disseminated in 
a cautious manner and then consumed in a carnivalesque manner under China’s currently porous 
 
241 Mandarin: 火出圈. 
242 Mandarin: “可以吗.” In this scene, Teh initiates to be Oh-eaw’s Mandarin tutor after they resume their 
friendship, which is the foundational step for the future development of their relationship. This half-shy and half-
brave move from an adolescent boy to another excites and touches many Chinese people. 
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governmental censorship, with the strategic self-censorship carried out by almost all consumers. 
In terms of imagination, Chapter Three unveiled the unrestricted world portrayed in these series 
that offers a space for the Chinese audience to escape into and imagine the better alternatives 
given the pressures and difficulties most of them are facing in reality. Chapter Four complicated 
this seemingly benign flow and contemplated how these series promote and reinforce the “gay 
paradise” fantasy and the “gay archetype” hegemony, which resonates with their impressions and 
imaginations toward Thailand and the gay community. In terms of friction, Chapter Five started 
with the #nnevvy incident in April 2020, looked into the rise of nationalism and the comeback of 
Sinocentrism with China’s rapid development in recent decades that expounds most Chinese 
people’s mentality during this unprecedented conflict, and indicated the actual vulnerability of 
the alleged “Chinese-Thai romance.” This thesis is organized in a progressive fashion, from the 
encounter (Chapter Two) to the exchanges (Chapter Three and Chapter Four) to the relationship 
(Chapter Five) of Thai Boys Love series and their Chinese consumers. 
 This thesis, without a doubt, cannot include every aspect of “the reception of Thai Boys 
Love series in China,” needless to say casting light on every aspect of Thai Boys Love series. I 
selected the aspects based on how noteworthy they were in this transnational/transcultural media 
flow and how I familiarized with them. My level of familiarity applied to Thai Boys Love series 
and the secondary sources too. As can be seen, some series were cited more often than others. It 
was simply impossible to watch and rewatch every Thai Boys Love series during the one-year 
period of working on this thesis when I was still busy with other courses as an undergraduate 
student. Also, since my Thai language was far from excellent when I completed this thesis, most 
information on Thailand’s side was acquired via English-language or Chinese-language sources. 
In addition, I aimed to grip the “thread” that connects all topics and holds the thesis together. For 
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example, in Chapter Four, I could have talked about the way Thai Boys Love series, along with 
Chinese movies filmed in and depicting Thailand such as Lost in Thailand (dir. Xu; 2012) and 
other powerful factors, promote and reinforce the Chinese audience’s perceptions toward the 
monolithically chilled Thai people, reflected in their “just relax” (jai yen yen)243 discourses and 
behaviors. But I did not include that since it is trivial to the chapter’s focus and unrelated to the 
thesis’s thread. All of these discussed in this paragraph might be considered as the limitations of 
this thesis, and I admit that there must be a lot to improve. With that being said, I firmly believe 
that this thesis has delved into a decent number of topics in a groundbreaking manner, which can 
provide the readers many insightful, brand-new views. 
 There are numerous topics alike in “the reception of Thai Boys Love series in China” and 
Thai Boys Love culture that I did not or could not include in the previous chapters. I am going to 
introduce and briefly discuss them as potential directions for future research in the remainder of 
this discussion chapter. 
 China’s fan community of Thai Boys Love series (taiquan)244 claims a solidarity and tries 
to keep this community away from the poisonous trend of China’s own entertainment ambiance 
(neiyu).245 As revealed from the conflict between Cai Xukun’s fans and Zhou Jielun’s fans that I 
mentioned at the beginning of Chapter Two, this trend centers around these fans’ undivided 
attention and love toward their idol(s). They strive to improve their idol’s reputation and status 
partly by attacking and defaming other celebrities, who are seen as the competitors of their own 
idol. This trend, characterized by the mechanism known as “uplifting one and abasing the other” 
(pengyi caiyi),246 permeates the fan community of China’s own entertainment products and, for 
 
243 Thai: ใจเยน็ๆ. 
244 Mandarin: 泰圈. 圈 is the same character as in “fan community” (fanquan 饭圈) that I discussed in footnote #33. 
245 Mandarin: 内娱. 
246 Mandarin: 捧一踩一, also known as 踩一捧一 (different order, same meaning). 
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instance, K-pop. Since the fan community of Thai Boys Love series (and Thai media in general) 
was newly established within a decade and the size remains relatively small, most members hope 
to keep this community “clean.” Therefore, members are expected to share relevant information, 
support each other, and love these Thai boys altogether as a tight-knit, cohesive group. Members 
who violate this norm are labeled as the “canker” and requested to leave. Although this “clean 
environment” is desirable, it is maintained by the community’s relatively small size. People do 
have the freedom to not like and even speak ill of some celebrities: many of them have a good 
reason for doing so and stay rational (i.e., avoid insulting languages). As the community keeps 
enlarging, some people who “continue the bad trend in China’s own entertainment ambiance” 
have entered the fan community of Thai Boys Love series, and the “clean environment” most of 
them want to sustain is indeed in danger. 
 Many Thai Boys Love series are adapted from Thai Boys Love novels (fig. 51), such as 2 
Moons (dir. Meesuwan; 2017) and My Gear and Your Gown (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2020). The 
authors of these novels, like Hideko_Sunshine, are sometimes invited to the events production 
companies of Thai Boys Love series hold. The display of male-male intimacy, including kissing 
and intimate sex, is usually more straightforward in the novels. Similar dynamic happens in 
Japanese Boys Love manga and Boys Love anime. In the manga, even the penetration process is 
clearly showed, but the anime presents the intimacy in a more reserved manner on the screen. 
Some Chinese viewers of Thai Boys Love series also consume Thai Boys Love novels, mainly 
translated by the two leading Thai-to-Mandarin subtitle groups, Tianfu and CFan. The majority 
of Thai Boys Love series are categorized by the Chinese audience into the label known as “plain 
water series” (qingshui jü),247 such as Love Sick (dir. Kusolkulsiri; 2014), SOTUS (dir. Samajarn; 
 
247 Mandarin: 清水剧. 
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2016), Our Skyy (dir. Botta et al.; 2018), and Tonhon Chonlatee (dir. Trakulkasemsuk; 2020). 
These series only include a few kissing scenes (merely once or twice is possible) and mostly no 
sexually suggestive scene. Although the viewers like this kind of series, many of them prefer to 
consume the “more intense” ones, such as Together with Me (dir. Boonyoprakarn; 2017), Love 
by Chance (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2018), TharnType (dir. Sintanaparadee; 2019), and Why R U 
(dir. Wongskulphat; 2020). These series include more explicit kissing scenes and some sexually 
suggestive scenes and are the “18+” ones under the Thai rating system for media products. Due 
to their perceptions toward Thai Boys Love novels, many Chinese consumers demand the series 
to be produced according to the standard of novels and make clear that what they want is intense 
male-male intimacy. Even though some novels are also “plain,” these consumers will bring their 
experiences from other sources (e.g., Chinese danmei) and actively imagine something intense is 
happening between the male-male couple(s). Why they prefer and even demand an intense male-
male intimacy is worth scrutinizing. 
 The representation of gender-nonconforming or androgynous characters is concerning. 
Based on my definition of Thai Boys Love series, the male-male couple(s) in the series should be 
masculine-identified. Even if putting aside my definition, gender-nonconforming or androgynous 
characters who are portrayed to be essentially different with the male main characters exist in 
some series. These characters are called kathoey. Although this term carries a predominant image 
of transsexual women who have transitioned, it can refer to all transgender women, especially 
the “effeminate men” in Thai Boys Love series. Starting with the “first ever Thai Boys Love 
series,” Love Sick, the kathoey characters are utilized as a “comic relief” (fig. 52).248 In addition, 
they stand for the absolute opposition to the gender-conforming main characters who is seen as 
 
248 Baudinette. “Adapting Japanese ‘Boys Love’ to Thailand and the Creation of a New Genre of Queer Media.” 
2019, p. 118. 
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“normal” and whose love is celebrate in the series. On the contrary, the representation of these 
kathoey characters, how they speak and behave in particular, is problematic, which is evident 
from Love by Chance to TharnType to 2gether (dir. Chaiwimol; 2020). The representation can be 
described as intentionally stereotypical: their “femininity” is amplified, and their behaviors are 
exceedingly dramatic. For example, in episode 3 of TharnType, when a transgender woman and 
her female friend (might be another transgender woman) meet the handsome and masculine Type 
on campus, they react with dramatically surprising voice, force him to take pictures together, and 
keep touching his body without any consent (fig. 53). Focusing on gender-conforming characters 
does not mean this kind of biased and misleading representation of the kathoey characters is fine, 
because it will probably give rise to the marginalization and stigma toward the transgender and 
transsexual community. Specifically, in China’s society, people already have stereotypes toward 
(Thai) transgender women, manifested in the term “human monster” (renyao) that I brought up 
in Chapter Four. This kind of representation will only worsen the situations. It is one reason that 
I exclude series that represent non-masculine-identified protagonists from my definition of Thai 
Boys Love series in Chapter One. Some Thai media products, such as Diary of Tootsies (dir. 
Boonnitipat; 2016), Diary of Tootsies 2 (dir. Thongaoum; 2017) (fig. 54), and the sequel movie 
Tootsies & The Fake (dir. Thongaoum; 2019), do positively depict the kathoey characters who 
happily and courageously live their lives as their true selves. 
 Many Thai Boys Love series get involved in exhibiting and discussing social issues, from 
school/cyber bullying to depression to homophobia. Among these various social issues, same-sex 
marriage and surrogacy might more outstandingly raise the Chinese audience’s awareness about 
the issues themselves, since both are the de facto taboo to talk about, at least publicly, in China’s 
society nowadays. Under Thailand’s still heteropatriarchal system and the legitimate concerns of 
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the production companies, only a few Thai Boys Love series talk about these two social issues. 
However, most viewers actively continue their imagination that the male-male couple(s) will live 
together in the future with happiness and stability, and in this way, they need to think about how 
they will have legal protection toward their relationship and even how they can have kids. Thus, 
I argue that “same-sex marriage” and “surrogacy” are probably going to come to the audience’s 
mind when they consume the series, even if the series do not explicitly draw their attention to the 
issues. A few Thai Boys Love series have begun their exploration in this domain. In episode 8 of 
Dark Blue Kiss (dir. Chaiwimol; 2019), during a trip of the male-male couple Pete and Kao, they 
engage in a short conversation about “will we get married” (fig. 55). Pete insists that although 
they cannot get married in Thailand, they can do so overseas. In the end of TharnType 2: 7 Years 
of Love (dir. Passawut; 2020), the “marriage” of the male-male couple Tharn and Type with the 
company of their friends is grandly delineated (fig. 56). Tonhon Chonlatee even takes a step 
forward to include the more controversial issue of surrogacy. I mentioned in Chapter Three that 
Tonhon’s previously homophobic father finally gives in and avows his son’s love relationship 
with another boy Chonlatee, but he requests Tonhon to have offspring to continue the family’s 
line and prosperity. Miriam, a female friend/schoolmate of Tonhon and Chonlatee, is found and 
approved by his father as the surrogate mother (fig. 57). I do not know the audience’s reactions 
elsewhere, but this plot received extremely mixed reviews in China upon the release of this 
episode, with many viewers questioning the ethic and legitimacy of surrogacy. 
 Besides same-sex marriage and surrogacy, the perception of the Chinese audience toward 
the (ex-)girlfriends of the main characters in Thai Boys Love series is also interesting. As I have 
discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, a great number of main characters think they like 
women and even have a girlfriend at the beginning, but they gradually realize their “true love” 
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toward another male main character and later break up with the girlfriend. This reminds the 
Chinese viewers of the “homowife” (tongqi)249 issue in contemporary China’s society. This term 
refers to the heterosexual women who unknowingly (or maybe knowingly) get married with gay 
men. According to the Chinese sexologist, sociologist, and activist Li Yinhe, there are more than 
sixteen million homowives in today’s China, part of which is because everyone is expected to get 
married under the familial and societal expectations.250 This social issue is well-known, and the 
Chinese audience perceives that these (ex-)girlfriends in the series, similar to the homowives, are 
as miserable and pathetic. Despite that, the audience is envious of the liberal and inclusive social 
landscape of Thailand portrayed in the series that prevents these “poor girls” from becoming real 
homowives. Their love toward the boy who is ultimately in favor of the same sex is another issue 
the audience likes to talk about and compare with China’s own situations. 
 From a larger perspective, the whole industry of Thai Boys Love series is important to 
Thailand’s economy, especially as for tourism. In Chapter Five, I disclosed that many Chinese 
viewers have already set Phuket Province as the first destination of their post-coronavirus travel 
due to the influence of the extremely well-received Thai Boys Love series, I Told Sunset About 
You. As a matter of fact, most Thai Boys Love series have a persistent focus on the campus lives 
in Bangkok or its immediate hinterlands (fig. 58), including but not limited to Nakhon Pathom 
Province (Mahidol University there is the shooting location of, for example, Love by Chance) 
and Pathum Thani Province (Rangsit University there is the shooting location of, for example, 
SOTUS). All feature the splendid cityscape under Thailand’s development and the metropolitan 
lifestyle of the characters. However, it is obvious that the shooting locations become more and 
more diversified. I Told Sunset About You in Phuket is definitely an example (fig. 59). Also, 
 
249 Mandarin: 同妻. 
250 Tan, Kenneth. “Li Yinhe on Homowives.” Shanghaiist. 5 May 2018. 
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Manner of Death (dir. Sakveerakul and Aroonnet; 2020) and 1000stars (dir. Chaiwimol; 2021) 
are filmed in/near Chiang Mai, spotlighting the culture, scenery, and local customs of northern 
Thailand. 1000stars is even set in a village up on the mountain near the national border (fig. 60), 
although the delicate makeup of the characters is at odds with this setting. Most viewers are 
willing to travel to the exact shooting locations to experience the series and emotions in person. 
This phenomenon is related to a notion named seichi junrei,251 derived from Japanese popular 
culture and existing since the 1990s. The article analyzing Japanese popular culture and contents 
tourism concisely elaborates that “places of particular significance to anime fans have become 
known as ‘sacred sites’ (seichi) and the act of visiting these sacred sites is known as ‘pilgrimage’ 
(seichi junrei).”252 Undoubtedly, this phenomenon has expanded well beyond the fan community 
of Japanese anime: the audience who likes Empresses in the Palace (dir. Zheng; 2011) and visits 
the Forbidden City is also regarded as conducting seichi junrei. The Chinese audience of Thai 
Boys Love series, among many other audience groups around the world, wish they can make a 
“pilgrimage” to the shooting locations of these series, particular the significant ones (e.g., where 
the male-male couples date). It is definitely a favorable circumstance the Thai government and 
travel agencies can harness to attract tourists and boost the economy. 
Furthermore, the storylines and plots also become diverse. Thai Boys Love series used to 
be pretty homogenous, centering around the pure love of college or high school students in the 
campus-centric setting, but it is noticeable that more themes are being explored and presented to 
the audience. For instance, He’s Coming to Me (dir. Chaiwimol; 2019) is about the human-ghost 
love and a detective story. Much of Until We Meet Again (dir. Sawatmaneekul; 2019) starts after 
 
251 Japanese: 聖地巡礼. 
252 Seaton, Philip, and Takayoshi Yamamura. “Japanese Popular Culture and Contents Tourism: Introduction.” 
Japan Forum, vol. 27, no. 1, 2014, pp. 1-11. 
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the reincarnation of a male-male couple. Manner of Death comprises a series of very engaging 
criminal and detective scenes. Nowadays, although the “school love” theme still dominates Thai 
Boys Love series, more unique and refreshing elements are incorporated into the storylines, with 
more innovative and exciting themes being explored. 
At this beginning of the 2020s, Southeast Asia and East Asia have indisputably become 
the stronghold of male-male-love media products. The Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, 
among others, continuously yield high-quality Boys Love works, while Thai Boys Love series 
endeavor to maintain the leading role within the region, if not the world. Meantime, the intricate 
and vibrant relationship between Thai Boys Love series and the Chinese consumers keep altering 





Figure 51. A shelf of Thai Boys Love novels at B2S, CentralPlaza Salaya (Nakhon Pathom, Thailand). 
These novels of various themes are common and popular in Thailand’s bookstores. Taken by the author 




Figure 52. Episode 6 of Love Sick (dir. Kusolkulsiri; 2014). This group of kathoey characters serves as the 









Figure 54. Poster of Diary of Tootsies 2 (dir. Thongaoum; 2017). This series features three transgender 









Figure 56. Episode 12 of TharnType 2: 7 Years of Love (dir. Passawut; 2020). Tharn and Type are kissing 






Figure 57. Episode 10 of Tonhon Chonlatee (dir. Trakulkasemsuk; 2020). Miriam is the surrogate mother 




Figure 58. Episode 1 of Theory of Love (dir. Mongkolsawas; 2019). A modern-looking university campus 
in/near Bangkok has always been the main shooting location for the majority of Thai Boys Love series. 





Figure 59. Episode 2 of I Told Sunset About You (dir. Kuno; 2020). The Phuket old town and the beautiful 
sceneries in the seaside portrayed in this series arrest the attention of many viewers worldwide and invite 




Figure 60. Episode 4 of 1000stars (dir. Chaiwimol; 2021). This series is set in a northern village (near 





Featured Thai Boys Love series (most well-received ones from 2014 to April 2021) 
 
English Title Thai Title Chinese Title Release Time 
Love Sick 
เลิฟซิคเดอะซีร่ีส์ รักวุ่น 
วยัรุ่นแสบ 为爱所困 July 2014 
Love Sick 2 
เลิฟซิคเดอะซีร่ีส์ รักวุ่น 
วยัรุ่นแสบ (ฤดูกาลที่ 2) 为爱所困 2 May 2015 
Senior Secret Love: 
Puppy Honey 
รุ่นพี่ Secret Love 
ตอน Puppy Honey 
我的狗狗男友 March 2016 
Make It Right รักออกเดิน 爱来了别错过 May 2016 
SOTUS วา้กตวัร้ายกบันายปีหน่ึง 一年生 August 2016 
Water Boyy / 水男孩 or 游基队 April 2017 
Senior Secret Love: 
Puppy Honey 2 
รุ่นพี่ Secret Love 
ตอน Puppy Honey 2 
我的狗狗男友 2 March 2017 
2 Moons เดือนเก้ียวเดือน 逐月之月 May 2017 
Make It Right 2 
รักออกเดิน (ฤดูกาลที่ 
2) 
爱来了别错过 2 May 2017 
Together with Me อกหักมารักกบัผม 醉后爱上你 August 2017 
SOTUS S / 一年生 2 or 二年熟 December 2017 
Kiss Me Again จูบให้ไดถ้า้นายแน่จริง 爱我你就再亲我 April 2018 
Cause You’re My Boy 





Love by Chance บงัเอิญรัก 不期而爱 August 2018 
Together with Me: 
The Next Chapter 
อกหักมารักกบัผม (ภาค
ต่อ) 
醉后爱上你 2 September 2018 
Our Skyy / 我们的天空 November 2018 
He’s Coming to Me 
เขามาเชงเมง้ขา้งๆหลุม
ผมครับ 
清明时节爱上我 February 2019 












Dark Blue Kiss 
จูบสุดทา้ยเพื่อนายคน
เดียว 
深蓝之吻 October 2019 
Until We Meet Again ดา้ยแดง 待到重逢时 November 2019 
Why R U เพราะรักใช่เปล่า 缘来誓你 January 2020 
2gether เพราะเราคู่กนั 
只因我们天生是一












Love by Chance 2: A 
Chance to Love 
รักน้ีบงัเอิญคือคุณ 2: 
โอกาสที่จะไดร้ัก 
不期而爱 2 or LBC 2 September 2020 
My Gear and Your 
Gown 
เกียร์สีขาวกบักาวน์สีฝุ่ น 白色齿轮 September 2020 






Theory of Love: 
Special Episode 









真爱墨菲定律 2 or 
与爱同居 2 
November 2020 








Manner of Death พฤติการณ์ที่ตาย 亡者之谜 November 2020 








Lovely Writer นบัสิบจะจูบ 数到十就亲亲你 February 2021 
Second Chance จงัหวะจะรัก 第二次 March 2021 
Fish upon the Sky ปลาบนฟ้า 天上飞鱼 April 2021 
Close Friend โคตรแฟน 密友 April 2021 
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Other Thai Boys Love series or Thai series with Boys Love contents (not an exhaustive list) 
 
English Title Thai Title Chinese Title Release Time 




爱的测验 April 2014 
Hormones 2 ฮอร์โมนส์ วยัวา้วุ่น 2 荷尔蒙 2 July 2014 
Club Friday The 
Series 5: The Secret 







Hormones 3 ฮอร์โมนส์ วยัวา้วุ่น 3 荷尔蒙 3 September 2015 
Kiss รักตอ้งจูบ 爱我你就亲亲我 January 2016 
Views of Love: Grey 
Rainbow 
รุ้งสีเทา 灰色彩虹 April 2016 
Bad Romance ตกหลุมหัวใจยยัปีศาจ 恶魔的浪漫 July 2016 
My Bromance พี่ชายเดอะซีรีส ์ 我的兄弟情人 December 2016 
Club Friday The 
Series 8: True 




真爱还是困惑 June 2017 
My Dear Loser: Edge 
of 17 
รักไม่เอาถ่าน ตอน 









What the Duck 
What the Duck รัก
แลนดิ้ง 
爱的着陆 January 2018 
My Dream นายในฝัน 梦中注定 October 2018 
Friend Zone เอาให้ชดั 朋友界限 November 2018 
What the Duck 2: 
Final Call 
What the Duck 2 รัก
แลนดิ้ง 
爱的着陆 2 March 2019 
The Best Twins รักจิ้น ฟินเฟร่อ 双子偷心 March 2019 




爱情效应 October 2019 
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I am Your King 2 ผมขอส่ังให้คุณ 2 国王游戏 2 or 王的
命令 2 
October 2019 
2 Wish / 有生之年 November 2019 











爱情工(or 攻)心计 April 2020 
YYY มนัส์เว่อร์นะ 
耽生公寓 or Y情公
寓 or YYY 
April 2020 




So Much in Love นิยามรัก 爱的定义 August 2020 
Club Friday The 
Series 12: Rak Sap 
Son 
รักซับซ้อน 隐秘的爱之爱生孽 August 2020 
Oxygen 
ออกซิเจน เดอะซีรีส์ - ดัง่
ลมหายใจ 
你是我的氧气 September 2020 
Friend Forever บทเพื่อน บทเพลง 男校风云 September 2020 
Friend Zone 2: 
Dangerous Area 
Friend Zone 2  
เอา·ให้·ชดั 
朋友界限 2 September 2020 
Ghost Runner นกัวิ่งผี 鬼逐 September 2020 
My Bromance 2: 5 
Years Later 
พี่ชาย My Bromance 
2: 5 Years Later 
我的兄弟情人 2 December 2020 
Y-Destiny หรือน่ีคือพรหมลิขิต 缘来天注定 March 2021 
Call It What You 
Want 
จะรักก็รักเหอะ 恋爱无名氏 April 2021 
 
Other media works included in this thesis (in order of appearance) 
 
English Title Native Title Country of Origin Release Time 
3 Will be Free สามเราตอ้งรอด Thailand August 2019 
Bangkok G Story Bangkok G Story Thailand December 2017 
Lady Boy Friends เพื่อนกนัมนัส์ดี Thailand February 2015 
Diary of Tootsies ไดอาร่ีตุ๊ดซ่ีส์ Thailand January 2016 
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Love 8009 (a.k.a. 
Varieties of Love) 
รักแปดพนัเกา้ Thailand January 2004 
Tomorrow, I’ll Still 
Love You 
พรุ่งน้ีก็รักเธอ Thailand November 2009 
Qi Pao ก่ีเพา้ Thailand November 2012 
Love of Siam รักแห่งสยาม Thailand November 2007 
I’m Tee, Me Too คนละทีเดียวกนั Thailand September 2020 
Detective Conan 
(a.k.a. Case Closed) 
名探偵コナン Japan January 1996 
Addicted 上瘾 China January 2016 
The World’s Greatest 
First Love 
世界一初恋 Japan April 2011 
The Dead End 烈日灼心 China August 2015 
Take Guy Out 
Thailand 
Take Guy Out 
Thailand 
Thailand May 2016 
The Untamed 陈情令 China June 2019 
Bad Genius ฉลาดเกมส์โกง Thailand May 2017 
Empresses in the 
Palace 
甄嬛传 China November 2011 
Two Weddings and a 
Funeral 
두 번의 결혼식과 한 
번의 장례식 
South Korea June 2012 
Dew ดิว ไปดว้ยกนันะ Thailand October 2019 
Call Me by Your 
Name 
Call Me by Your 
Name 
Brazil, France, Italy, 
United States 
November 2017 
Love, Victor Love, Victor United States June 2020 
Love, Simon Love, Simon United States March 2018 
Lost in Thailand 人再囧途之泰囧 China February 2012 
Diary of Tootsies 2 ไดอาร่ีตุ๊ดซ่ีส์ 2 Thailand February 2017 
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